On the receipt of the Chinese reply, Lord Morley telegraphed to the Viceroy for the views of the Government of India; but at the same time he impressed on them that they should bear in mind that it was essential that a strictly non-committal attitude on all points at issue between China and Tibet should be observed.
The Viceroy replied on March 12[[64]] that it appeared that all power at Lhasa had been taken by the Chinese into their own hands. The only high official left could not act without consulting the Chinese Resident. Reports from Trade Agents stated that the Chinese did not allow the Tibetans to deal with them direct. Various reports as to Chinese aggressive and oppressive action were in the possession of Government, but their authentication was difficult. It appeared to be the case, however, that there was no longer any Tibetan authority in existence, and it was impossible to reconcile with established facts the statements of the Chinese that the power and position of the Dalai Lama had not diminished, and that no alterations in internal administration were contemplated. Copies of the correspondence that had passed between the Dalai Lama and the Assistant Minister at Lhasa had been given to Mr. Bell. This correspondence, in the genuineness of which there was every reason to believe, showed (1) that the intention was that the Dalai Lama’s temporal power should be taken from him; and (2) that the despatch of only 1,000 troops was contemplated. Lama Buddhists and Tibetans would not recognize that the Dalai Lama had been deposed spiritually, and the latter would, therefore, be a source of trouble to the Chinese. There was no reason why the Dalai Lama should have our support, but confidence would be restored on the frontier by his restoration, and it would be proof of a desire to maintain the status quo. The Suzerainty of China was denied by Tibetan Ministers in conversation with Mr. Bell, but if China wished to be friendly it might still be possible to bring about a modus vivendi.
The Viceroy suggested that in any case our own interests must be protected. There was unsettlement in our frontier States. Rumours of location of a garrison at Yatung and the number of troops in Tibet constituted, in the opinion of the military authorities, a menace to the peace of our border. The reform, not the abolition, of the Tibetan Government was contemplated in the edict of March 9, 1908. The Trade Regulations of 1908 had been violated in the following respects: Administration and policing of trade-marts had, inconsistently with Article III., been taken over by Chinese, and direct dealings between our Agents and Tibetans had been prevented. The Tibetan Government was recognized by the Convention of 1904, which was recognized by Article I. of the Convention of 1906. A large slice of Tibetan territory had been lopped off by the Chinese, who had forcibly occupied and dispossessed the Tibetans of Chiamdo, of Troya, and of Tsa Kalho—provinces of Eastern Tibet. It seemed necessary in any case, therefore, that the Chinese Government should be required to give definite assurances on the following points: (1) The limitation of the Chinese garrison in Tibet to a number adequate for maintenance of order internally. (2) The maintenance of a real Tibetan Government. (3) The policing of the trade-marts by Tibetans under Chinese officers, if necessary. (4) The appointment at Lhasa of an Amban less hostile to British interests. (5) The issue of instructions to Chinese local officers to co-operate with British Trade Agents and not to hinder our officers and the Tibetans from dealing direct with one another. It might be advisable that at this stage the Chinese Government should be informed that the British Government must reserve the right to retain and increase the escorts at Yatung and Gyantse, if necessary, in view of the change in the status quo, unfriendliness of local Chinese officers, and disturbed state of Tibet. Individual Chinese might get out of hand, though it was improbable that our agencies would be attacked by the Chinese.
Lord Morley, in forwarding these views of the Indian Government to the Foreign Office, observed that it appeared that the Chinese Government was deliberately making its suzerainty over Tibet effective, and that the result of its proceedings would be the substitution of a strong internal administration for the feeble rule of the Dalai Lama. It was necessary, therefore, to consider how this change would affect, in the first place, British-Indian relations, commercial and political, with Tibet; and, secondly, the relations of the three States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, lying outside the administrative border of British India, but under British control or protection, with the Government of India and with their neighbour in Tibet. As to the first of these questions, it seemed to be sufficient at this stage to take note of the assurance of the Chinese Government that it would fulfil all treaty obligations affecting Tibet, and to inform it that His Majesty’s Government would expect that pending negotiations and representations on the subjects of tariff, Trade Agents, monopolies, tea trade, and so forth, would not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of administration. The second question was, however, one of greater urgency and importance, because delay might create mistrust in the States concerned, and even encourage China to raise claims which would hereafter lead to trouble. It seemed to be advisable that a clear intimation should at once be made to China that the British Government could not allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or the rights of a State so closely allied to the Government of India. Sikkim had long been under British protection. By a recent Treaty the foreign affairs of Bhutan were under the control of the British Government. The communication, therefore, which it was proposed to make to the Chinese Government relative to Nepal might well cover the other two States on the borders of British India. While, then, it was suggested that the Chinese Government should be informed that the British Government expected the Treaty obligations of Tibet and China in respect to Tibet to be scrupulously maintained, and, moreover, were prepared to protect the integrity and rights of their allies, the States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, the Secretary of State for India proposed to instruct the Viceroy to check any action on their part which was not authorized by the Government of India.
Should China fail in performing her Treaty obligations in Tibet after the receipt of the intimation, the breach of agreement could form the subject of precise protest and negotiation. But in the meantime it was undoubtedly desirable to press the Chinese Government to send strict orders to their local officials to co-operate with our own officers in a friendly manner, since without such friendly relations (of which there had recently been a marked absence), friction between the two Governments was certain to arise. It might also be well, thought Lord Morley, to impress upon the Chinese the inadvisability of locating troops upon or in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of the States concerned. The Tibetans, though ignorant, were peaceable people, and it was unlikely that a very large Chinese force would be necessary for such simple police arrangements as were contemplated by Article 12 of the Trade Regulations.
Adopting these proposals, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Mr. Max Müller on April 8, to make a representation to the Chinese Government in their sense.
All we know further than this is that two battalions of infantry, four guns, and some sappers have been sent by us to the Sikkim frontier, to be ready, if necessary, to proceed into Tibet to protect the Trade Agents. And so the story ends much as when it began, except that while formerly it was the Tibetans who were supposed to be the most impenetrable and unsociable, it is now the Chinese who are presenting the real obstacles to any reasonable intercourse between India and Tibet.