With these very definite assurances from Russia, it might well be asked why we should still have desired to take pronounced measures in Tibet. Anxiety in regard to Russian action in Tibet was the main reason why the Government of India sought to take action in Tibet. Now that we were reasonably assured that Russia had no intention of interfering in Tibet, why should we still have thought it necessary to send a mission into the country? The answer is that we had not yet settled those questions of trade and intercourse which had existed years before the Russian factor intruded itself into the situation; besides which we had always the consideration that, although it might be true enough that the Russians had no mind to have any dealings with the Tibetans, yet the Tibetans might still think they could rely on the Russians in flouting us. The Germans had officially no intention of interfering with the Boers, yet it was because Kruger thought he could rely upon German support that he went to war with England. He was much too astute an old gentleman to have fought us if he had thought he would have had to fight us by himself. So it was with the Tibetans. The Russian Government might not have the remotest intention of helping them in any possible way, yet the Tibetans might, and did, think they could count upon Russian support. The Dalai Lama’s Envoy Extraordinary had been very well received by the Czar and by the Russian Chancellor and others. Doubtless, he had collected some very handsome subscriptions and received valuable presents. A little Oriental imagination would soon expand these ordinary amenities into a promise of thick-and-thin support against the English. We had still this erroneous impression to reckon with.
CHAPTER VIII
A MISSION SANCTIONED
While the negotiations with Russia were proceeding the Home Government would come to no final decision as to the action to be taken. The question at issue, they informed the Indian Government[[21]] in February, was no longer one of details as to trade and boundaries—though on these it was necessary that an agreement should be arrived at—but the whole question of the future political relations of India and Tibet. They agreed with the Indian Government that, having regard to the geographical position of Tibet on the frontiers of India, and its relations with Nepal, it was “indispensable that British influence should be recognized at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other Power to exercise a pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India.” They admitted, also, the force of the contention that the interest shown by the Russian Government in the action of the Government of India on the Tibetan frontier demonstrated the urgency of placing our relations with Tibet on a secure basis. They recognized that Nepal might be rightly sensitive as to any alteration in the political position of Tibet which would be likely to disturb the relations at present existing between the two countries, and that the establishment of a powerful foreign influence in Tibet would disturb those relations, and might even, by exposing Nepal to a pressure which it would be difficult to resist, affect those which then existed on so cordial a basis between India and Nepal. They regretted the necessity for abandoning the passive attitude that had hitherto sufficed in the regulation of affairs on the frontier, and were compelled to recognize that circumstances had recently occurred which threw on them the obligation of placing our relations with the Government of Lhasa upon a more satisfactory footing. And they acknowledged that the proposal to send an armed mission to enter Lhasa, by force if necessary, and establish there a Resident, might, if the issue were simply one between India and Tibet, be justified as a legitimate reply to the action of the Tibetan Government in returning the letters which on three occasions the Viceroy had addressed to them, and in disregarding the Convention with China of 1890. But they stated that they could not regard the question as one concerning India and Tibet alone. The position of China in its relations to the Powers of Europe had been so modified in recent years that it was necessary to take into account those altered conditions in deciding on action affecting what still had to be regarded as a province of China. It was true that we had no desire either to declare a protectorate or permanently to occupy any portion of the country. But measures of that kind might become inevitable if we were once to find ourselves committed to armed intervention.
For the above reasons, the Home Government thought it necessary, before sanctioning a course which might be regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese Empire, to be sure that such action could be justified by the previous action of Tibet, and they had, accordingly, come to the conclusion that it would be premature to adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the affairs of Tibet as those proposed by the Government of India. They would await, therefore, the result of their reference to the Russian Government, and after those explanations had been received they would be in a better position to decide on the scope to be given to the negotiations with China, and on the steps to be taken to protect India against any danger from the establishment of foreign influence in Tibet.
When the Russian assurances were at length received, the purport of the conversation Lord Lansdowne had held with the Russian Ambassador was at once communicated by telegram to the Viceroy, and on April 14 the Secretary of State, presuming that it would be necessary to include in the scope of the negotiations with China and Tibet the entire question of our future relations with Tibet, commercial and otherwise, asked the Viceroy for his views as to the form which these negotiations should now take, with special reference to the means to be adopted to insure that the conditions that might be arrived at would be observed by Tibet.
The Viceroy on April 16 replied that he had recently received from the delegate deputed by the Chinese Resident an intimation that if Yatung was not considered a suitable locality, they were willing to negotiate at any place acceptable to us. And he proposed, accordingly, to invite the Chinese Resident to depute delegates to meet our representative at Khamba Jong, which was the nearest inhabited place on the Tibetan side to the frontier in dispute near Giagong. The Viceroy proposed that our representative, with an escort of 200 men, should proceed to that place, while reinforcements were held in reserve in Sikkim, and that, should the Chinese and Tibetan representatives fail to appear, or should the former come without the latter, our representative should move forward to Shigatse or Gyantse, in order that the arrival of the deputations from Lhasa might be accelerated.
The Secretary of State telegraphed on April 29 that there was no objection to the Chinese, Tibetan, and Indian representatives meeting at Khamba Jong or to the military arrangements recommended; but His Majesty’s Government considered that without previous reference to them the Mission should not advance beyond that place, as in existing conditions, even in the event of the failure of the Chinese and Tibetan parties, any sudden advance to Lhasa was not, in their opinion, justified.
In regard to the subject-matter of the forthcoming negotiations, the Viceroy telegraphed on May 7 that, having regard to the stultification of existing treaty provisions, and to the unsuitability of either Yatung, Phari, or any other place in the Chumbi Valley, for a trade-mart, in which business could be transacted directly between British and Tibetan merchants, without incurring the monopoly of local traders, it was necessary to insist upon opening a new trade-mart and upon having a British agent at Gyantse. The Viceroy thought that having a British representative at Lhasa, which would be the best possible security for the future observance of the conditions, would be far preferable; but assuming the unwillingness of His Majesty’s Government to press this claim, the proposal for an agent at Gyantse was a suitable alternative. In any case, the fullest facilities should be given to the British representative for direct communication with the Tibetan Government, and if he met with obstruction, it would be necessary to resort to the alternative of moving him forward to Lhasa. Furthermore, it would be necessary to secure for British Indian subjects the same freedom for trade and travel in Tibet as was enjoyed by Kashmiris and Nepalese, and to insist that all British subjects duly authorized by the Government of India should be allowed to proceed by recognized routes to Gyantse, beyond which a pass from the Tibetan Government would be required.
As Commissioner, the Viceroy proposed to appoint Major Younghusband, Resident at Indore. He could confidently rely on his judgment and discretion, and he had great Asiatic experience. With him he would associate as Joint Commissioner Mr. White, Political Officer in Sikkim.