It had been estimated that, if our forces had all left Tibet by October, the cost of the expedition would not be less than £648,000. The contingency of such an early withdrawal was remote, and it seemed probable that the operations necessary to assert our treaty rights and to exact reparation from the Tibetans would cost us not less than a million sterling.
The Indian Government were, therefore, of opinion that, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Convention, and as a security for the payment of the indemnity, that they proposed to require, as well as in the interests of the people of the valley themselves, the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for such period as might be necessary for the due protection of our treaty rights, and international interests would become inevitable.
The next point to be considered was this question of demanding an indemnity.
Now that it had become necessary to send a regular military expedition to Lhasa, Government submitted that they had a good claim to be recouped the expense to which they had been put. It was obvious that the retention of the Chumbi Valley would not, from a monetary point of view, be an adequate return for the outlay in which they had been involved, and Government thought it well to put forward a claim to compensation against the Tibetans. Further, they considered that, having regard to the recent attacks upon their Mission at Gyantse, and as a measure calculated to increase the security of their representative in Tibet, they should follow the precedent of the demands presented by the allied Powers to the Chinese Government after the events of 1900, and should insist on the razing of all fortified positions which might impede the course of free communication between our frontier and Lhasa, and on the prohibition of the importation of arms into Tibet or their manufacture within the country except with their special permission.
Finally the Government of India discussed what might be done if His Majesty’s Government declined to agree to the appointment of a representative at Lhasa. In that case they would urge that a Resident Agent should be posted at Gyantse, whose functions would primarily be to supervise and maintain the trading facilities which we must undoubtedly secure. Although the duties of such an agent would be mainly commercial, they would necessarily comprise that of seeing that the Convention or treaty which we should eventually conclude with the Tibetan Government was observed in all respects. The agent should, therefore, have the right of proceeding to Lhasa, as occasion might require, to discuss matters with the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama.
In making the terms of his appointment Government considered that the grounds and conditions of our self-restraint in this matter should be clearly indicated to the Tibetans. It should be explained that His Majesty’s Government consented to waive their claim to the appointment of a Resident Agent at Lhasa solely out of regard for the Tibetan desire to maintain their freedom from contact with European influence at the political and religious capital of their country; that they were prepared to forego this demand, so long as the Tibetan Government preserved an attitude of isolation from external affairs, and avoided all intercourse with other European Powers; but that, in the event of any departure by the Tibetans from this policy in the future, the British Government would reserve to themselves the right to require the acceptance of an agent at the capital itself.
Government considered, however, that this alternative, the least which could be contemplated, was not calculated, in the same degree, to afford a guarantee of satisfactory results. An agent at Gyantse, though possibly in greater personal security, would probably not be in so good a position for knowing what transpired in political circles at Lhasa.
But whether or not a British agent was established in Tibet, Government considered that recent events justified their requiring from the Tibetans and from the Chinese Government a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet, and an engagement that they would not admit to Tibet the representative of, that they would cede no portion of Tibetan territory to, and that they would enter into no relations regarding Tibet with, any other foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government.
Turning to less contentious matter, namely, that of facilities for trade with Tibet, to secure which was the primary object of the Mission when it was originally despatched on an errand, which was then indubitably peaceful in character and intention, Government contended that it was, of course, necessary to insist on access for purposes of trade to convenient centres in Tibet proper in the place of Yatung, which was beyond all question unsuitable for the object for which it was intended. In Central Tibet present information led to the belief that the town of Gyantse provided the site which was best fitted to our requirements. And, in view of recent developments, they thought that it might be advisable to insist on the opening up to trade of the neighbouring town of Shigatse, the seat of the Tashi Lama, and also of Lhasa itself, if a British Resident should be posted to the capital. They considered, too, that the present opportunity should be taken of completing the road to the frontier, and of opening another market at Gartok or some other convenient place in Western Tibet, which, with its vicinity to Chinese Turkestan, might acquire considerable importance in the future.
It would be useless at the present stage, the Government of India thought, to enter into details of the draft Convention, of the trade regulations, of the terms as to Customs duty, of the arrangements in regard to mining rights and concessions which appeared to be necessary, and of the boundary settlements on the Sikkim and Garhwal Frontiers which stood for decision. These questions must first be discussed by their Commissioner with the representatives of the Tibetan Government.