Long-range bombing had, however, been carried out spasmodically before 1918. In addition to its taste for bombing in general, the Royal Naval Air Service were keenly bent from the outset on long-range bombing in particular. The question of forming an Allied squadron to bomb German munition factories was first raised in 1915 at one of the monthly meetings between the French and British Aviation departments; and in February, 1916, a small squadron of Sopwith "1½ Strutters" was formed at Detling for the purpose of bombing Essen and Dusseldorf from England, but the Army in France, being short of machines, asked that they should be sent to the front, and therefore the scheme did not mature; neither, for similar reasons, did one for the co-operation in 1916 of British and French bombing squadrons, operating from Luxeuil.
It was not until October, 1917, that the first striking force, consisting of three squadrons, was formed under the Army with Ochey as its base. It was mainly used in raids against the ironworks in the Alsace-Lorraine Basin and the chemical industry in the neighbourhood of Mannheim. As I have said, a definite offensive policy by means of an independent strategic force was later decided upon, and the "Independent" Air Force was brought into existence. It originally comprised two day-bomber and two night-bomber squadrons. During the summer additional squadrons were allotted to it, including D.H.9's and Handley Pages. Day-bombing squadrons had to fight their way to objectives in close formation, and the problems connected with navigation, calculation of petrol supply, action of wind and ceiling, were all accentuated. Casualties were heavy, with the result that a squadron of Fighters, composed of Sopwith "Camels," was incorporated for the purpose of protection. Thus we see the beginnings of an air fleet analogous to the naval fleet with its capital ships and protective craft.
The main objectives were the centre of the chemical industry at Mannheim and Frankfort; the iron and steel works at Briey and Longwy and the Saar Basin; the machine shops in the Westphalian district and the magneto works at Stuttgart; the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, and Hamburg, and the accumulator factories at Hagen and Berlin.
It will be seen from a map that three of the main industrial centres were situated near the west frontier of Germany; and, therefore, one portion of the striking force was based at Ochey, which lies within a few miles of the Saar Basin, within 180 miles of Essen, and within 150 miles of Frankfurt. Another portion was based on Norfolk, where a group of super-Handley Page machines were established for the specific purpose of attacking Berlin, a distance of 540 miles, and the naval bases within 400 miles. It was obvious that though aircraft from England would have to cover greater distances, they would not expose themselves to the strong hostile defences in rear of the battle front.
Three instances of the Independent Air Force's action may be cited. On the night of August 21st/22nd, two Handley Page machines dropped over one ton of bombs on Cologne Station, the raid occupying seven hours. On the night of August 25th/26th two Handley Pages attacked the Badische Aniline und Soda Fabrik of Mannheim; bombs were dropped from a height of 200 feet, direct hits being obtained in every case; and the machines then remained over the town, which they swept with machine-gun fire. On August 12th the first attack was made on Frankfurt by twelve D.H.4 day-bombers, every machine reaching the objective and returning safely in spite of being attacked, over Mannheim and throughout the return journey, by some forty hostile fighters.
During the five months of its existence the Independent Air Force dropped 550 tons of bombs, 160 by day and 390 by night. Of these 200 tons were dropped on aerodromes, largely by the short-distance F.E.2b's, as a result of which, hostile attacks on Allied aerodromes became practically negligible. Theoretically, machines of the Independent Air Force should not have been utilized for attacking purely military objectives in the Army zone, such as aerodromes, and their co-operation with the Army for this purpose shows that their true rôle was either not appreciated or not favoured by the French and other Commands.
There is ample testimony to the spirit of demoralization which pervaded the civil population of the towns attacked.
"My eyes won't keep open whilst I am writing," reads one captured letter. "In the night twice into the cellar and then again this morning. One feels as if one were no longer a human being. One air raid after another. In my opinion this is no longer war but murder. Finally, in time, one becomes horribly cold, and one is daily, nay, hourly, prepared for the worst." "Yesterday afternoon," says another, "it rained so much and was so cloudy that no one thought it was possible for them to come. It is horrible; one has no rest day or night."
Although, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter here, only a comparatively small percentage of the efforts of the Independent Force were directed against the industrial targets for which the force had been created, yet by the end of the war the strategic conception of air power was bearing fruit, and the Air Ministry had in hand measures for bombing which would have gone far to shatter German munitionment. The defence measures forced upon the Germans within their own country were reacting on their offensive action at the front, which was at the same time denuded of fighting aircraft at various points to meet the menace of our strategic force at Ochey.