The period since the Armistice has been employed in the reduction and consolidation of the Royal Air Force. In England the cadre system has been adopted, while abroad the greatest concentration of effort is aimed at, with Egypt, at present the most important strategic point in the Imperial air system, as the centre of activity. Iraq is being handed over to the control of the Royal Air Force, whose share in the policing of overseas possessions is likely usefully to grow provided any tendency to the concurrent building up of a large ground organization is withstood. The advantages of aircraft for "garrison" duties lie, under suitable geographical conditions, in their swift action and wide range, their economy, and, during disturbances their capacity for constant pressure against the enemy without fear of retaliation. One of the main problems is at present that of personnel. Service flying is restricted to comparatively young men, and therefore the majority of officers can only be commissioned for short periods. For this reason the experiment is being made of taking officers direct from civil life on short engagements, and at the same time endeavouring to ensure, by technical and general education, that the Royal Air Force shall not become a blind-alley occupation.
Though it is difficult to foretell on what lines aircraft will develop for any one purpose, as in the past, the problem of military co-operation will perhaps be less complex than that of co-operation with the Navy. It will probably consist of improvements along the lines already indicated, such as increased range, speed, climb, manœuvrability, offensive armament, armour, the assistance of tank and anti-tank action, and the utilization of gas. Fighting will undoubtedly take place at very high altitudes to keep the enemy's fighting machines away from the zone of operations—necessitating the development of the single-seater so as to increase climb and manœuvrability, and obtain, if possible, a speed of 200 miles an hour at 30,000 feet. Cavalry, unless retained, as I think they should be, in the form of mounted machine-gunners, will, I think, disappear in European warfare, but infantry will remain, and it will be the object of aircraft to assist their advance by reconnaissance, ground attack, artillery and tank co-operation, and the destruction of the enemy's supplies and communications. In this connection ground tactics and air tactics must develop pari passu and commanders of Corps and Armies must work out during peace training the fullest schemes for the most intimate co-operation between air and land forces.
The future of naval co-operation is a difficult problem, more especially as there was no major naval engagement after Jutland in which aircraft could be used, and consequently we have little to go on in estimating their practical value in direct co-operation with the fleet. It is impossible at present to judge between the conflicting opinions as to the future of the capital ship, but it is certain that aviation will materially modify naval tactics and construction. Coast defence, reconnaissance, anti-submarine work, escort, and the bombing of enemy bases, will doubtless continue and develop with ever-increasing machinery and equipment; but torpedo attack by aircraft may reach a point where the very existence of opposing fleets may be endangered. It is already questionable whether a battleship could survive an attack launched by even a small force of this mobile arm.
As was the case during the war, the action of aircraft at sea is restricted by range, the difficulty being to find the mean between the opposing conditions of radius of flight and limitation in the size of aircraft imposed by the deck-space of "carriers," but there is reason to suppose that on the one hand engines will be so improved as to afford a sufficient radius of action to comparatively small aircraft, while, on the other, devices will be found to economize deck-space.
Fleets operating near the enemy's coast will be vulnerable from land aircraft bases, and thus close blockade will be rendered increasingly difficult. The possibility of gas attack on enemy bases from the air in co-operation with submarines and of effecting a blockade by this means must be envisaged.
Since the Armistice the operational work of the Royal Air Force on behalf of the Navy has been conducted under the auspices of the Admiralty. Improvements have been made in large flying boats and amphibians, especially with a view to facilitating their landing on "carriers" and the decks of battleships. There has also been considerable progress in the construction and use of torpedo aircraft.
The war lasted long enough to prove the effect of the strategic offensive by air. In spite of the dictates of humanity, it cannot be eliminated. It is true that modern war is inimical to the progress of mankind and brings only less suffering to the victors than to the vanquished. To ensure peace should therefore be our ideal. But a great war once joined is to-day a war of peoples. Not only armies in the field, but men, women, and even children at home, are concentrated on the single purpose of defeating the enemy, and armies, navies, and air forces are dependent upon the application to work, the output of war supplies, and, above all, the morale of the civil population. Just as gas was used notwithstanding the Hague Convention, so air war, in spite of any and every international agreement to the contrary, will be carried into the enemy's country, his industries will be destroyed, his nerve centres shattered, his food supply disorganized, and the will power of the nation as a whole shaken. Formidable as is the prospect of this type of air warfare, it will become still more terrible with the advent of new scientific methods of life-destruction, such as chemical and bacterial attack on great industrial and political centres. Various proposals, such as the control of the air effort, service and civil, of all countries by the League of Nations, and even the complete elimination of aviation, have been put forward as a means of avoiding the horrors of aerial warfare and its appurtenances, but they are untenable, and any power wishing and able to sweep them aside will undoubtedly do so.
A future war, as I see it, will begin something after this manner, provided either side possesses large air forces. Huge day and night bombers will assemble at the declaration of war to penetrate into the enemy's country for the attack of his centres of population, his mobilization zones, his arsenals, harbours, strategic railways, shipping and rolling stock. Corps and Army squadrons will concentrate in formation to accompany the armies to the front; reconnaissance and fighting patrols will scatter in all directions from coastal air bases to discover the enemy's concentrations and cover our own; the fleet, whatever its nature, will emerge with its complement of reconnaissance and protective machines and torpedo aircraft for direct action against the enemy's fleet. A few fighting defence units will remain behind.
But it must not be imagined that these functions will be carried out unopposed. Local battles in the air will occur between fighting machines for the protection of specialized machines, while the main air forces in large formations will concentrate independently to produce, if possible, a shattering blow on the enemy and obtain from the outset a supremacy in the air comparable to our supremacy on the sea in the last war.
In mobilization the time factor is all-important. Our national history has been one of extraordinary good fortune in this respect, but the margin allowable for luck is becoming very narrow and, whereas in 1914 it was some twenty days between the declaration of war and the exchange of the first shots, in the next war the air battle may be joined within as many hours, and an air attack launched almost simultaneously with the declaration of war. In modern war the mobilization period tends to shorten, and every effort will be made towards its further reduction, since mobilizing armies are particularly vulnerable from air attack.