We may at least assume that another great war will not be allowed in our generation. But war, in spite of its horrors, in spite of its bereavements, is only too quickly forgotten. A comparatively few years, and those who have passed through its fire are no more. New wealth is created; new antagonisms arise; and a new generation remembers only the romantic stories and the martial deeds of its fathers, or, more fatally, organizes itself to avenge defeat. Then, once again, forgetful of the terrible lesson we have learned, the great nations of the world may unsheathe the sword as the only solution to their problems. Our only hope lies in using the ensuing years to educate mankind to the principle that war brings misery and impoverishment to all engaged in it, that in the final victory it is not a question of which is left the strongest, but which is the least exhausted, and that national are as susceptible as personal differences to discussion and arbitration. Above all, let us guard against the old mistake of competitive armaments. There is no reason, for instance, why, because France, our friend and ally, is adopting a policy of air armaments, we should blindly pile up aeroplane against aeroplane, pilot against pilot, and thus provoke mutual suspicion.
The possibility of war remains, however, and I wish in conclusion to emphasize the fact that in my belief the security of this country in the event of war will depend upon our strength in the air. The development of the offensive powers of aviation have already destroyed "the silver streak" on which we relied in the past. When we remember that it is less than twenty years since the first successful aeroplane was flown, when we recall the almost miraculous development of the fighting powers of aircraft during the four and a half years of war, and also the further developments which were on the point of being utilized when the war ended, it seems certain that from the point of view of war Britain has ceased to be an island. The "silver streak" would have been little protection but for our naval supremacy, and in the future our security will depend as much upon superiority in the air as it has depended in the past upon our superiority at sea. And this superiority in the air can only be attained in the same way in which we secured our supremacy at sea. That supremacy was not really gained by developing great navies. It was gained by our mercantile marine, which made the great navies possible. Our future security can only be gained by the development of commercial aviation.
Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Frome and London.
Transcriber's Note: Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. Variant spellings, e.g. Frankfort and Frankfurt, remain as printed. Significant amendments have been listed below:
Page [67], 'Poperighe' amended to Poperinghe.
Page [117], 'Junker' amended to Junkers.