“In my inquiries with regard to these points, I endeavoured to exercise a care and vigilance proportioned to their importance. The inquiry was entered upon under an apprehension that the workhouse would be less efficient in Ireland, than experience had shown it to be in England; and that it would probably be applicable to the able-bodied in a limited degree only, if applicable to them at all. I was doubtful also, whether it would be practicable to control any considerable number of the able-bodied in a workhouse—whether the proneness of the Irish peasantry to outrage and insubordination would not, as had often been represented, lead them to break through all restraint, and perhaps demolish the building, and commit other acts of violence. The probability of such outrage is strongly insisted upon by the Commissioners of Inquiry, and the same argument was urged upon me by some persons with whom I communicated in Dublin. In the progress of my inquiries however, I soon found reason for concluding that there was no ground for apprehension, either as to the applicability of the workhouse for the purposes of relief, or as to any danger of resistance to such a system of classification and discipline within it, as would make it a test of destitution. In the several ‘houses of industry’ established in Ireland, a strict separation of the sexes is enforced, and a discipline more or less approximating to our workhouse discipline is established. No spirits are admitted, and on the whole, there is enough in these institutions to render them distasteful as places of partial restraint. Yet from no governor of a house of industry could I learn that resistance had ever been made to their regulations, and surprise was even expressed at my thinking it necessary to make the inquiry. I received the same opinion from the governors of gaols. In short, every man whom I conversed with, who had any experience of the habits of the people, declared that the peasantry are perfectly tractable, and never think of opposing authority, unless stimulated by drink, or urged on by that species of combination for securing the occupancy of land, which has become so common in certain districts. Neither of these influences will interfere with the establishment of a workhouse, or the regulation of its inmates, all of whom will have sought refuge in it voluntarily, and may quit it at any moment. As regards the security of the workhouse, therefore, and the establishment of a system of discipline as strict as that maintained in the English workhouses, I believe that there will be neither danger nor difficulty.

“How far the workhouse, if established, may be relied upon as a test of destitution and a measure of the relief to be afforded; how far it will be effectual for the prevention of pauperism, and for stimulating the people to exertion for their own support;—how far, in short, the workhouse system, which has been safely and effectually applied to dispauperise England, may be applied with safety and efficiency to prevent pauperism in Ireland, now remains for inquiry. The governing principle of the workhouse system is this:—that the support which is afforded at the public charge in the workhouse, shall on the whole be less desirable than the support obtained by independent exertion. To carry out this principle, it might seem to be necessary that the inmates of a workhouse should be in all respects worse situated—worse clothed, worse lodged, and worse fed, than the independent labourers of the district. In fact, however, the inmates of our English workhouses are as well clothed, and generally better lodged and better fed than the agricultural labourer and his family: yet the irksomeness of the discipline and confinement, and the privation of certain enjoyments, produce such disinclination to enter the workhouse, that experience warrants the fullest assurance that nothing short of destitution, and that necessity which the law contemplates as the ground for affording relief, will induce the able-bodied labourer to seek refuge therein; and that if driven thither by necessity, he will quit it again as speedily as possible, and strive (generally with increased energy and consequent success) to obtain subsistence by his own efforts.

“It would perhaps be in vain, even if it were desirable, to seek to make the lodging, the clothing, and the diet, of the inmates of an Irish workhouse, inferior to those of the Irish peasantry. The standard of their mode of living is so low, that the establishment of one still lower is difficult, and would under any circumstances be inexpedient. In Ireland therefore, there would not perhaps be found the same security in this respect for the efficiency of the workhouse test, which may in some degree be operative in England. There are countervailing circumstances in Ireland however, which more than balance this drawback, even if it were greater than it really is. The Irish are naturally, or by habit, a migratory people, fond of change, hopeful, sanguine, eager for experiment. They have never been practically limited to one spot by a law of settlement, as has been the case with the English peasantry. They have never been enervated by a misapplied system of parish relief. Rather than bear the restrictions of a workhouse, the Irishman, if in possession of health and strength, would wander the world over to obtain a living. All the opinions I have collected from persons most conversant with the Irish character, agree in this. Confinement of any kind is even more irksome to an Irishman than to an Englishman. Hence, although he might be lodged, fed, and clothed, in a workhouse, better than he could lodge, feed, and clothe himself—he will yet, like the Englishman, never enter the workhouse, unless driven thither by actual necessity; and he will not then remain there longer than that necessity exists. The test of the workhouse is then, I think, likely to be as efficient in Ireland, as it is proved to be in England; and if relief be there restricted to the workhouse, it will be at once a test of destitution, and a measure of relief, and will serve to protect the administration of a legal provision for the destitute poor, from those evils and abuses which followed the establishment, and led to the perversion, of the old Poor Laws in England. I speak of the workhouse as a test of destitution generally, without limiting its operation to age, infirmity, or other circumstances; for independent of the difficulty of discriminating between those who may fairly be considered as aged and infirm, and those who are not—as well as certain other difficulties, practical and theoretical, in the way of making any such distinction—I have found in the state of Ireland, no sufficient reason for departing from the principle of the English Poor Law which recognises destitution alone as the ground of relief, nor for establishing a distinction in the one country, which does not exist in the other.

“The expense of providing workhouses, will not, I apprehend, be so considerable as has by some been anticipated. If the surface of Ireland be divided into squares of twenty miles each, so that a workhouse placed in the centre would be distant about ten miles from the extremities in all directions, this would give about eighty workhouses for the whole of Ireland. A diameter of twenty miles was the limit prescribed for the size of unions by Gilbert’s Act, but it was often exceeded in practice—it may however, be assumed as a convenient size on the present occasion. In some cases, owing to the position of towns, or other local causes, the unions will probably be smaller; in others, especially in the thinly-peopled districts of the west, they may be larger: but still, there is, I think, every probability that the number of workhouses required will not greatly exceed eighty. In aid of this number, the houses of industry, and mendicity and other establishments, which will be unnecessary as soon as a legal provision is made for the relief of the destitute, will become available at probably a small expense. In some instances, moreover, barracks, factories, or other buildings suitable for conversion into workhouses, may perhaps be obtained on easy terms:—but excluding all such considerations, and assuming that instead of eighty workhouses, a hundred will be required, and that the cost of erecting each will be about the same as for the largest class of English workhouses, namely, about 7,000l.—this would give a gross outlay of 700,000l. for the whole of Ireland—a sum not disproportionally large, when the nature of the object is taken into account. If government were to advance the sum necessary for providing the workhouses by way of loan, as has been done to the unions in England, requiring an instalment of five per cent. of the principal to be paid off annually out of the rates, it would make the whole charge so easy, that it would scarcely be felt. The payment of 35,000l. per annum for twenty years, with the interest on the constantly-decreasing principal, could not be considered a hardship on Ireland; and this is in fact the whole of the new or additional outlay proposed: for as regards the relief of the destitute, that would not be a new charge, the destitute classes being now supported, although in a manner calculated to injure and depress the general character of the people.

“As respects the means for local management in Ireland, if it were attempted to establish a parochial machinery similar to that which exists in England, I believe the attempt would fail. The description of persons requisite for constituting such a machinery, will not be found in the majority of Irish parishes. In some parts however, and especially in the north and the east, competent individuals would be found in many, if not in most of the parishes. If an Irish Poor Law were established, the uniting of parishes for the purpose of securing the benefits of combined management, is therefore more necessary even than it was in England; and by making the unions sufficiently large, there can be no doubt that in almost every instance, such a board of elected guardians may be obtained as would secure the orderly working of the union, under a due system of supervision and control.

“In the first instance, and until a rate for the relief of the destitute is established, the contributors to the county-cess might be empowered to elect the guardians. But in some cases an efficient board may not be obtainable by election, and this is most likely to occur at the commencement, when individuals will be ill instructed as to their duties, and when the public will perhaps have formed erroneous notions of what is intended to be done. To meet such a contingency, it seems essential that large general powers should be vested in some central authority, to control and direct the proceedings of the boards of guardians, and even to supersede their functions altogether, whenever such supersession shall be necessary. Power should also be given to declare unions, and to appoint paid officers to conduct the business, under the direction of the central authority, without the intervention of a board of guardians; and in order to guard against mistakes to be expected on the first introduction of an entirely new order of things, and to prevent the mischief that might ensue from failure or misconduct at the outset, the central authority should also, I think, be empowered to dispense with the election of the first board of guardians, and to appoint such persons as may appear most fit and competent to act as guardians of the union, until the Lady-day next ensuing, or the Lady-day twelvemonths. The number and selection of such specially-appointed guardians to be at the discretion of the central authority. These powers are greater than were given to the English commissioners by the Poor Law Amendment Act: but they are, in my opinion, necessary in the present state of Ireland. With such powers confided to the central authority, no difficulty can arise for which it will not be prepared; and it will, I think, be enabled to establish the unions, and to constitute an adequate machinery for their government throughout the whole of Ireland, with certainty and efficiency.

“In England, the county magistrates residing and acting within a union, are ex-officio members of the board of guardians. The number and position of the magistracy in Ireland seem to require some modification in this respect. The principle of administration established in England by the Poor Law Amendment Act, is based essentially upon popular representation. The guardians are elected by the occupiers and owners of the property rated, and in the hands of the guardians the administrative power is vested. The county magistrates, it is true, in virtue of their office, sit and act as members of the board; but this does not destroy its elective character, as the number of elected so far exceeds that of the ex-officio guardians, that the popular character of the board is maintained; whilst the presence of the magistrates, who in virtue of their office are permanent members, and therefore connecting links between the successive boards of elected guardians, secures a stability and continuity of action, which, if based entirely upon election, the board might not possess. This is the constitution of the boards of guardians in England, and nothing can work better: but in Ireland, the number of magistrates who would be entitled under a similar provision to act as ex-officio guardians, would in general greatly exceed the number so qualified in England, and in some cases might outnumber the elected guardians. If this should occur, the elective character of the board would of course be destroyed; but even if this should not be the case, yet any undue preponderance of the permanent ex-officio guardians would detract from the popular character of the governing body, and lower it in the confidence of the people. With a view therefore of keeping as nearly as possible to the practical constitution of the English boards of guardians, I propose in the Irish unions,—1st. That the number of ex-officio guardians shall never exceed one-third the number of elected guardians: 2dly. That immediately on the declaration of a union, the county magistrates residing and acting within its limits, shall nominate from among themselves a number nearest to, but not exceeding, one-third of the elected guardians,—which magistrates so nominated by their compeers, shall be entitled to act as ex-officio guardians of the union, until the Michaelmas twelvemonth after such nomination: and 3dly. That at each succeeding Michaelmas, the magistrates entitled as aforesaid, shall proceed to a new election. These regulations will, I think, not only preserve a due proportion in the constitution of the boards of guardians, but also ensure the co-operation of the most efficient portion of the magistracy in the government of the unions; as the magistrates will doubtless nominate those members of their body who are most active and able.

“A different practice from that established in England, seems also to be necessary with respect to the Clergy. Under the provisions of the Poor Law Amendment Act, ministers of religion of every denomination are eligible for the office of guardian, elected or ex-officio. In the present condition of Ireland, I fear this would be attended with inconvenience, and might destroy the efficiency of the boards of guardians. I therefore propose that no clergyman, or minister of any religious denomination, shall be eligible to act either as elected or ex-officio guardian. This exclusion is not proposed from any notion of the general unfitness of the clergy to fill the office of guardian; but with reference solely to the present state of religious opinion in Ireland, and to the importance of keeping the functions of the boards of guardians free from the suspicion of sectarian bias. If the ministers of one persuasion were to be admitted, the ministers of every persuasion must be so; and then the deliberations would too probably he disturbed by religious differences. On no point have I taken more pains to arrive at a sound conclusion than on this, being fully sensible of the objections, on principle, to the exclusion of any class of men from office: but the great majority of the clergy themselves with whom I have conversed, Roman catholic and protestant, have agreed in thinking that it will be, on the whole, inexpedient to admit any of the ministers of religion to act as guardians; and after the fullest consideration and inquiry, I therefore recommend that they should all be declared ineligible.

“In England, under the provisions of the Poor Law Amendment Act, every parish or township rated for the maintenance of its poor, and included in a union, is entitled to return a guardian. In Ireland it will, I think, be essential that the central authority should be empowered to fix the limits of a union, without being restricted to parish boundaries. It should be enabled to divide parishes, either for the purpose of electing guardians, or for joining a portion of a parish to one union, and another portion to another union. It should also be empowered to consolidate parishes for the purpose of electing one or more guardians, and likewise to form election districts for this purpose, without reference to parochial boundaries. And lastly, the central authority should be empowered to add to, take from, and remodel unions, whenever such change might be found necessary. These powers would have enabled the English Poor Law Commissioners to make their unions more compact and convenient than they at present are, local prejudices and local interests having frequently compelled them to abandon the arrangement which would have been best for the general interest. In Ireland, full powers in these respects are, I think, indispensable for enabling the central authority to deal with the various circumstances under which the unions will there have to be formed. But with adequate powers, and with such modifications as are before described, the principle of union which has been established in England by the Poor Law Amendment Act, may I think be advantageously extended to Ireland; and as it has been shown that no insurmountable difficulty exists to prevent the introduction of the workhouse as a test of destitution—so neither will there be any insurmountable difficulty in establishing an adequate machinery for the government of the unions when formed.

Part the Third.—“Assuming that a system of Poor Laws ought to be established in Ireland; that the workhouse system may there be relied upon, as a test of destitution; and that the means of forming and governing unions exist there, as well as in England—It now remains to describe the several points which require attention in framing a measure comprising these objects; and also to offer such further observations, as did not seem to come within the scope of the preceding divisions.