“The evidence collected by the Commissioners of Poor Law Inquiry in England, establishes the conclusion that out-door relief is inevitably open to abuse, and that its administration entails consequences prejudicial to the labouring classes, and to the whole community—in short, that there is no security for the prevention of abuse, nor any mode of ensuring a right administration of relief, but by restricting it to the workhouse. The facts and reasonings contained in the Reports on this subject, have been confirmed by the experience of the present Poor Law Commission; and although out-door relief has not yet been totally prohibited in any of the English unions, there can be no doubt that the intention of the Poor Law Amendment Act points eventually to the workhouse as the sole medium of relief, and requires that it should be so restricted as early as circumstances permitted. To establish out-door relief in Ireland, would therefore be in direct contradiction to English experience, and to the spirit of the English law. It would introduce a practice in the one country, under the prejudicial effects of which the other has long been suffering, and from which it has not yet entirely recovered. Some persons have recommended that out-door relief in Ireland, should be restricted to the aged, sick, and infirm; but even with this limitation, how is abuse to be prevented, and how is the precise limit to be defined of the age, sickness, or infirmity, entitling an individual to be relieved out of the workhouse?—I believe it to be impossible so to define the conditions as to prevent the occurrence of gross abuses, which would not only be a source of demoralisation, but would also serve to engender strifes jealousies and ill feeling in every locality. After the best consideration which I have been able to give the subject, in all its bearings, I still retain the opinion that in Ireland relief should be restricted to the workhouse, or in other words, that out-door relief in any shape should be prohibited.
The mode of Rating is objected to.—“The question of rating is obviously open to much contrariety of opinion. The mode of valuation, of assessment, of collection, and the proportions in which the rate shall be paid, are all questions on which different opinions might possibly be formed by different persons; and accordingly the views expressed upon these points have been various and conflicting. Some have contended that the whole of the rate should be charged upon the owner, on the ground that the tenant derives little profit, often no profit whatever from the occupation, and ought not therefore to be called on to pay any part of the rate. Those taking this view, appear to overlook the fact that the destitute classes in Ireland are now supported almost entirely by the occupiers, who will be relieved from this charge when the proposed measure shall have come into operation. To require the occupiers to pay half the rate, is not therefore to impose on them a new charge, but a portion only of an old charge, to which they had long been accustomed. Moreover the occupiers have an interest in the property rated—not permanent indeed like the owners, but more immediate; and on this ground also they are fairly chargeable with a portion of the rate. If the owners paid the whole, the occupiers would of course not be entitled to take part in the distribution of the funds, nor in the management of the business of the union—they would have no interest in common with their landlords, and would to a certain extent be arrayed against them; for their interest and their sympathies would probably lead them to increase the amount of the burthen, rather than lessen it. Even if there were a sufficient number of resident owners, it would be inexpedient to place the whole control of the unions in their hands, thus constituting them a separate class, and at the same time lowering the position of the occupiers; but in the present state of Ireland, such a proposition seems especially open to objection. The exemption in favour of occupiers of 5l. value and under, and the charging the owners of such property with the entire rate, forms an exception to the above reasoning, and will probably be disapproved by those whose interests may appear to be affected by it. But every such charge is eventually borne by the property, and in the long run it is perhaps not very material whether the rate is paid by the owner or by the tenant, it being in fact a portion of the rent. This arrangement is proposed, partly as a matter of convenience, on account of the difficulty and expense of collecting a rate from the vast number of small holdings of 5l. value and under which exist in Ireland, and partly also with the view of relieving this description of occupiers, who are for the most part in a state of poverty bordering on destitution, from a portion of the burthen; and it is gratifying to find that this proposition has on the whole been favourably received.
The Unions as proposed are too large.—“In almost every discussion during the progress of the bill last session, the proposed number and size of the unions were objected to. Yet the discretion of the commissioners is unfettered in these respects. They are left at liberty to form the unions, as may appear best adapted to the circumstances in each case. The same discretion was confided to the commissioners in England, and it must be equally necessary that they should possess it in Ireland. The objections to the intended size of the unions, do not therefore apply to the bill, but to my first Report, in which it is stated that, ‘If the surface of Ireland be divided into squares of twenty miles each, so that a workhouse placed in the centre would be about ten miles from the extremities in all directions, this would give about eighty workhouses for the whole of Ireland.’ Instead of eighty workhouses however, I assumed that a hundred might be required, and calculated the probable expense accordingly. But this was mere assumption, for it is obviously impossible to state what will be the precise number of unions, until some progress has been made in the work of formation. The commissioners are bound to form the unions in the best manner, according to the best of their judgment. Their credit as public functionaries would be compromised by any failure in this respect; and it may be fairly presumed that they will use due vigilance and impartiality, and avail themselves of all the experience which England affords in this matter.
The suppression of Mendicancy objected to.—“Objections have been made to the vagrancy clauses, and it has been contended that if such provisions were necessary, they should be established by a separate Act. Whether the suppression of mendicancy be provided for in the Poor Law Bill, or by a separate bill, does not seem very material; but it is important that the provision should be made concurrently with the Poor Law measure. To establish a poor-law, without at the same time suppressing mendicancy, would be imperfect legislation, especially with reference to the present condition of the Irish people. It is true there are now vagrancy laws in Ireland, which enact whipping, imprisonment, and transportation as the punishments of mendicancy; but these laws are inoperative, partly from their severity, and partly from other causes. Ireland wants a vagrancy law that shall operate in unison with the Poor Law, for without such concurrent action, both laws would be in a great measure ineffective. The suppression of mendicancy is necessary for the protection of the peasantry themselves. No Irish cottier, however poor, closes his door whilst partaking of his humble meal. The mendicant has free access, and is never refused a share. There is a superstitious dread of bringing down the beggar’s curse, and thus mendicancy is sustained in the midst of poverty, perpetuating itself amongst its victims. Much of the feeling out of which this state of things has arisen may, I think, be traced to the absence of any provision for relieving the destitute. A mendicant solicits charity on the plea of destitution. His plea must be admitted, for it cannot be disproved; and to refuse relief, may occasion the death of a fellow-creature, which would be a crime of great magnitude. Hence the admission of the mendicant’s claim, which is regarded in the light of an obligation by the Irish peasantry. To make provision for relieving mendicants at the public charge, without at the same time preventing the practice of begging, would leave the peasant exposed to much of the pressure which he now sustains from this source; for the mendicant class would generally prefer the vagrant life to which they are accustomed, to the order and restraint of a workhouse. To suppress mendicancy, is therefore necessary both as an adjunct of the proposed Poor Law, and for the protection of the labouring classes throughout Ireland.
Objections to cumulative voting, &c.—“It might perhaps be sufficient to say, in answer to the objections which were made to cumulative voting, voting by proxy, and constituting magistrates ex-officio guardians, that the Irish bill follows in these cases the example of the English Poor Law Amendment Act. There are, however, weighty reasons in favour of each of these provisions, some of which it may be useful to notice.
“With respect to cumulative votes, it may be observed, that the raising and disbursing of a poor-rate involves nothing political, but is to be regarded rather in the light of a mutual assurance, in which the community joins for the purpose of being protected against the effects of pauperism, each member contributing in proportion to his means, and each having an interest according to the amount of his contributions. If therefore the amount contributed be the measure of each ratepayer’s interest, it ought in justice also, within certain convenient limitations, to be the measure of his influence; and these limitations the bill provides, by fixing a scale according to which every ratepayer is entitled to vote. As regards the voting by proxy, such a power is necessary for enabling the owner to protect his property, his interest in which is permanent, although he may not always be present to represent it by his personal vote; and the bill therefore provides for his doing so by proxy. The occupier is always present, and may vote in person; not so the owner, whose interest would be unprotected without this power of voting by proxy. That the owner’s interest ought to be represented will not be denied. The rate is levied upon property, and thus in fact becomes a portion of the rent, which would be increased by the amount of the rate, if this were not levied for Poor Law purposes; so that in reality it is the landlord, the permanent owner of the property, who finally bears the burthen of the rate, and not the tenant or temporary occupier. It seems consonant with justice therefore, that every facility should be afforded to the owner for protecting his interest by his vote.
“There are many reasons why magistrates should form a portion of every board of guardians. The elected guardians will for the most part consist of occupiers, or renters, not the owners of property; and their interest will be temporary, whilst the interest of the owner is permanent. Some union of these two interests seems necessary towards the complete organization of a board of guardians; and as the magistrates collectively may be regarded as the chief landed proprietors of the country, the bill proposes to effect this union by creating them ex-officio members of the board. The elected guardians are moreover subject to be changed every year, and their proceedings might be changeable, and perhaps contradictory, and confusion might arise through the opposite views of successive boards. The ex-officio guardians will serve as a corrective in this respect. Their position as magistrates, their information and general character, and their large stake as owners of property, will necessarily give them much weight; whilst the proposed limitation of their number to one-third of the elected guardians, will prevent their having an undue preponderance. The elected and the ex officio members may be expected each to improve the other, and important social benefits may arise from their frequent mingling, and from the necessity for mutual concession and forbearance which such mingling cannot fail to teach. Each individual member will feel that his influence depends upon the opinion which his colleagues entertain of him, or upon the respect or regard which they feel towards him; and hence will arise an interchange of good offices, and a cultivation of mutual good-will, beginning with the board of guardians, and extending throughout the union, and eventually it may be hoped throughout the country; and thus the union system may become the means of healing dissensions, and reconciling jarring interests in Ireland. On these grounds, I consider that the establishment of ex-officio guardians, voting by proxy, and cumulative voting, as provided in the bill, should be adhered to.
“Many measures, local as well as general, have been suggested, either for removing restrictions to the application of capital, or for giving direct encouragement to its application in Ireland; and some of these measures, I understand government intend taking into early consideration. In the survey which I have been able to take of the state of Ireland, and of the condition of the Irish people, it has appeared to me that quiet, and the absence of excitement, is the object chiefly to be desired. With repose would come security, and the investment of capital, and thence would arise employment, and the development of the productive powers of the country. The proposed Poor Law will not of itself accomplish these objects, but it will be found a valuable accessory; and with the progress of education, and that orderly submission to lawful authority which is at once the cause and the consequence of peace and prosperity, all those other objects will, we may hope, be eventually secured for Ireland.”[[78]]
My Report was considered by the Cabinet,[[79]] and the whole subject was again very fully discussed, and several minor alterations in the bill were decided upon. It was also determined to bring it forward as the first measure of the session. The subject continued to occupy a good deal of public attention, as well in England as in Ireland. It was discussed in the papers, and pamphlets were written upon it. In this instance however, as in most others, the opponents were the most active, and much ingenuity was displayed in animadverting on the asserted incongruities of the proposed Irish Poor Law. The inquiry commissioners also had their advocates, and in Ireland especially their recommendations were, as might be expected, more popular than the government bill. However, on the whole, the measure may be said to have held its ground, and to be regarded as a matter of first-rate importance.
The bill reintroduced, December 1, 1837.