“3. What you state as to Fortifications is truly correct. They must ever be regarded as auxiliaries, and no mode of defence would be more objectionable than ‘large fortifications,’ absorbing, as you observe, the men required in the field.

“4. ‘Should we not take our stand upon the ocean and the coast rather than assume that an enemy will make good his advance into the country?’ On this allow me to observe that, in war, one of its first principles is to ensure a ‘reserve.’ This, if we were defeated at sea (which I by no means anticipate), your small fortifications around your arsenals, docks, etc., and upon a few points on the most vulnerable side of the capital, would secure.

“7. A movable Column or Columns of Riflemen and Armstrong’s guns might not arrive at the point in time. Defences must be permanent and leave nothing to chance.

“8. The assertion that ‘No force would ever attempt a landing on a hostile shore in the face of 2000 Riflemen supported by good artillery,’ is very correct, but it must be observed that this small force would cover but an atom of the coast, and the enemy would land on either flank, leaving a force in front of the ‘atom of defence.’

“11. Arm the People, who have demonstrated their readiness. Place such an armament under a system of organization which would ensure obedience. That authority to emanate and be exercised direct from the Crown, and to descend by a continuous chain of responsibility from the Crown to the private. Thus would England be so armed as to prevent the melancholy exhibition of a Panic, as injurious to her trade throughout the world as it is degrading to her position as a State. Nothing so well ensures the friendship of nations as irresistible power.

“12. I conclude by asserting that the Navy, some small fortifications, the Army and Militia, and the ‘Rifle Volunteers’ (in other words, ‘the Armed People of invincible England’) will ensure her defence as effectually as they will re-establish her ‘prestige’ throughout Europe and the world.”

At Glasgow, when the survivors of the “Sharpshooters” of 1819 met to consider the question of re-embodying the old force, they wrote to their old commander, and received a letter from him full of reminiscences of his Glasgow days, and full of encouragement to them to do what they were proposing—

“London, Feb. 7, 1860.

“My war cry for England has ever been, Arm the people!... Some of my gallant and experienced comrades who write upon the subject of the defence of England take as extreme and one-sided a view as some of our leading journals do on the other—the one declaring the inutility of Volunteers, the other that they are omnipotent. I ask either of these extremities—If you saw a large French army in battle array, which must occupy a large tract of country, with artillery, cavalry, and their sharpshooters, how do you propose to check their advance? I cannot conjecture the reply of either. But this I will assert and maintain, with my last breath—It is alone to be done by a combination of regular troops, as a barrier and a reserve, with swarms of riflemen everywhere as powerful—most powerful—auxiliaries. We must bear in mind that the distance from our coast to London is barely three days’ march, hence the object of the enemy is to advance by a coup de main to seize London. Could I say loose troops would stop them? No. But a combination would ensure their defeat, and then let loose the sons of Britain, with this command—‘Forward and shoot; you shall all be supported at the requisite points.’ Should any enemy have the audacity to attempt our shores, could he avoid our ever invincible Navy, I as a General of some experience in war, would be proud to command a combined force as I have described, and ‘Let deeds show.’...

“One word more. Teaze not our youths as Volunteers with the minutiæ of drill—a few things are alone necessary. To march in quick time, to march in column, form line, gain ground to the right and left, to advance again in line, to extend and occupy bridges or walls; a rallying square may be practised. Soldiers require these alone in the field. Then, to be good shots. Pluck enough they have, and, with prompt obedience, England’s regular army, so nobly supported and its numbers so increased, can, may, and will defy the ——.