In Memorandum No. 2, dated “Simla, 29th August,” he states that his policy has been adopted. But the method involved “A division of force; an advance into the heart of the enemy’s country; the siege of two cities with no positive means, one the venerated city of the Prophet, Guznee, the other Cabool, the capital; a retreat; the destruction of the base of these operations, Candahar.” The plan, therefore, involved too many risks.
In Memorandum No. 3, dated “Simla, 7th September,” he says that the evacuation of Candahar before Cabool and Guznee had been reduced was contrary to all military science. “Nott’s column is now a single ship in the midst of the Atlantic Ocean surrounded by hostile fleets.” “The science of war dictates that as rapid a concentration as can be effected of the forces of Nott and Pollock should be made to Guznee—reduce it, hence to Cabool. Thus the union of force ensures one of the primary objects in war—‘one line of operations, one base, and a union of resources.’” “A kind of drawn battle with fluctuating advantages is worse to the general cause than if no attempt whatever had been made to ‘strike a blow.’” “Our force is on the verge of winter in the prosecution of two sieges—having abandoned its base previously to the reduction of either, and it has a fair probability of being distressed for food and forage.” “Our present base Jellalabad is of the most difficult and almost inaccessible character—and a whole country, the Punjaub, between it and our natural frontier.” “If the enemy knew how to apply his means, he would fall upon either Nott or Pollock.”
These Memoranda, marked “confidential,” were sent to a number of Indian officers of high rank, civil and military, and their answers (preserved) show a general acceptance of Harry Smith’s views. Among them is the following letter from Henry Havelock and note from Broadfoot to Havelock:—
“My dear General,
“I have the pleasure to return the Minutes which Broadfoot, the most gallant and talented fellow that I met beyond the Indus, has read, as you will see by the accompanying note.
“I too, though all unworthy to be mentioned in the same day, have perused them, and agree with you in every point, excepting one or two minor matters which those only who were in Afghanistan could be correctly informed upon.
“I feel like a man worn out, which is perhaps not surprising after having had my mind pretty much on the stretch for four years, but will come and speak to you upon General Skelton’s affairs to-morrow morning, by God’s help, and try to get a look at the charges.
“I thought Sir R. S[ale] would not go home. He is to blame, but generally takes odd views of things and then is not easy to move. He ought to make a personal fight for his pension.
“Ever yours very truly,
“H. Havelock.”
“My dear Havelock,