The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign

by Sir Hugh Charles Clifford

SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
OPERATIONS AGAINST MEDO.

The boma, or entrenched camp, at Medo—originally a stronghold of a Portuguese revenue-farmer—occupied a situation on a piece of rising ground some six or seven miles up the main road from Rock Camp. To the south of the boma, and about three-quarters of a mile from it, lay the village of Medo; and the country, which is here both rocky and hilly, was for the most part parkland, studded with frequent trees and covered with grass and patches of bush. Though some of it had the appearance of being fairly open, it proved to be what is called “very blind,” no extended view being obtainable in any direction.

The main road runs east and west from Rock Camp to Medo, passing through broken country, and flanked on the left or southern side by Chirimba Hill. This is an eminence several hundred feet in height and about two miles in length—a mass of slate-grey rock rising out of a tangle of bush and low forest, which clothes its lower slopes and overflows to the very edge of the road. The summit of this hill is razor-edged and deeply serrated throughout its length, rising into three principal peaks divided by ravines; and its nature was such that no attempt could be made to advance along it. Running parallel to the main road at a distance of only a few hundred yards from it, Chirimba Hill commanded it for a matter of about two miles, and completely dominated the position.

As usual, the enemy had selected a very awkward place in which to offer this, his first serious resistance to the British advance in Portuguese East Africa. He was six companies strong—say about eight hundred men—with twelve machine-guns and one field gun which he had captured from the Portuguese at Ngomano. The whole force was under the command of Major Kohl, the ablest of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s lieutenants, to whom throughout the campaign the task of harassing and delaying the British advance, and of fighting rear-guard actions, was most frequently confided by his chief. He had posted men in the thick bush along the base of Chirimba Hill, and had occupied a strong position on high ground astride the road on a very extended front, and most effectually concealed in the bush.

When the Regiment moved forward on the afternoon of the 10th April, Captain Harris with fifty rifles was sent out on the left to try to establish himself on the eastern extremity of Chirimba Hill. This patrol ran into an ambush before it had proceeded far upon its way, Sergeant Flatman and one soldier being killed and several of the party wounded. Though, after this, Captain Harris was at first forced to retire, he succeeded in collecting his rather scattered men, and, advancing again, made good a post on the slopes of the hill which had been his objective.

Meanwhile the advance-guard had come into action about three miles down the road from Rock Camp, and it speedily became evident that the enemy could not be ejected from the position he had taken up until Chirimba Hill had been occupied. The Gold Coast Regiment accordingly camped at a place two miles from Rock Camp, with an advanced post thrown out a mile further down the road. Its further losses during the afternoon were 1 man killed, 10 wounded, and 1 carrier missing, who was believed to have been killed.

On the 11th April the rest of “Rosecol” moved forward to the camp which the Gold Coast Regiment had established over night, and at dawn the advanced guard, consisting of I Company and two Stokes guns, advanced to the forward post a mile further down the road. From this point an officer’s patrol consisting of one section of I Company under Captain Webber was sent out on the left to occupy the peak at the eastern extremity of Chirimba Hill, at the foot of which a post had been established by Captain Harris on the preceding evening. His right rested on the road, the section being thence strung out through the bush to the foot of the hill.

Simultaneously another section of I Company, under Lieutenant Barrett, was pushed out on the right of the road, its left keeping touch with Captain Webber’s right. Yet a third section of I Company, under Lieutenant Bisshopp, was deployed on Lieutenant Barrett’s right. Lieutenant Barrett’s section was the first to come into action, a small party of the enemy opening fire upon it and then retiring. It was also seen by one of the enemy’s observation-points posted on Chirimba Hill, for it was shelled by the Portuguese field-gun, which was posted in the bush somewhere in the neighbourhood of Medo boma to the right front of the advance. A section of A Company was sent out still more to the right to move along a track to the north which ran parallel to the main road, and was often described as “the telegraph road,” as there were vestiges on it of a line which had been constructed by the Portuguese and utilized by the enemy.

Major Shaw, who was in command of the advance, decided that it was not possible to push on further until Chirimba Hill had been cleared of the enemy, and a section of A Company was sent out to the left to reinforce Captain Webber’s party. This part of the line came into action early in the afternoon, and was engaged with the enemy, posted in the thick bush and low forest on the lower slopes of Chirimba Hill, until about 4.30 p.m. By the end of the day all that had been achieved was the establishment of a post, occupied by half of I Company under Captain Webber, on the slopes of Chirimba Hill, the eastern extremity of which had been cleared of the enemy; while on the right of the road a small post had been established under a native non-commissioned officer, about four hundred yards in advance of the point reached by Captain Webber on the left of the line.