On the 30th April, “Kartucol” passed through “Rosecol” with the intention of attacking an enemy position, which was known to be held by four companies and one gun. The Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment, with half the Stokes Battery, the Pioneers and I Company, marched in the rear of “Kartucol” as reserve troops. Touch was not gained with the enemy until the afternoon, but owing to the country traversed being very difficult and blind, the progress made was so slow that no attack could be delivered upon the German position owing to the lateness of the hour. The two columns, therefore, formed a perimeter camp at about 4.30 p.m. at a place on the Koronje road about four hundred yards west of the Montepuez River. One Battalion from “Kartucol” occupied an advanced camp about one thousand yards further down the road leading to Koronje.

On the 1st May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles advanced along the road toward Koronje, while the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment went out on the right to attempt to outflank the enemy’s left. The country was still very difficult and extremely blind, and progress was again very slow. It was subsequently discovered, moreover, that from an observation post on the summit of Koronje Hill, to the left of the road, the enemy could follow every movement of the British troops. While, therefore, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles was laboriously working its way round to the right, its attempt to surprise and outflank the enemy was foredoomed to failure from the outset. Meanwhile, of course, this movement greatly delayed the advance of the rest of the force.

The detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment which, under the command of Major Shaw, was with “Kartucol,” was employed to escort the 22nd D.M.B. and the ammunition column of that force.

At about 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles became heavily engaged, and simultaneously an enemy party of about forty rifles, which had worked its way through the bush to the rear, attacked the D.M.B. which was being escorted by fifty rifles of I Company. The latter, under Lieutenant Kay, acted with great steadiness and promptitude. At the moment when the attack was delivered, the Mountain Battery, which had just come out of action, was limbered up. For a moment the guns were in peril, but Lieutenant Kay held the enemy and beat off the attack while the mules and their loads were got away in safety.

The sound of the firing misled the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles, which was out on the right, with the result that it rejoined the column in the rear of the enemy.

A perimeter camp was formed for the night, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles digging themselves in at a point about eight hundred yards in advance of the main body.

On the 2nd May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles pushed out patrols which quickly came into touch with the enemy, who was soon after engaged by “Kartucol,” which drove him back. No progress, however, was made during the day, and on the morrow it was found that, while the enemy’s rear-guard was fighting “Kartucol,” the position at Koronje had been evacuated. “Kartucol” then advanced and camped near Koronje, the detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment under Major Shaw rejoining “Rosecol” in the afternoon.

On the 4th May “Kartucol” again advanced and located a strong enemy position near the Milinch hills, about six and a half miles west of Koronje, through which the road passes. On this day three officers and ten British non-commissioned officers belonging to the Gold Coast Regiment arrived from Port Amelia.

On the 5th May, “Rosecol” advanced and took over from “Kartucol,” which then fell back to the camp which the former had hitherto occupied. The 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles encamped at a point down the road about a mile in advance of the main body of “Rosecol”; and patrols were sent out to the right and left to try to find a way round the enemy’s position on the Milinch Hills. Both these patrols were furnished by A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, that on the right being commanded by Captain Harris and that on the left by Lieutenant Withers.

On the 6th May Captain Harris returned and reported that the country to the north was much more open than that through which the columns had recently been advancing, and that it would be almost impossible to make a flanking movement from the right side of the road. On the 7th May Lieutenant Withers came in from the south bringing a similar report; and meanwhile patrols sent out by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles had on both days come into touch with the enemy just east of the Milinch Hills, and reported that the position which he was occupying was a very strong one. This was indeed the case, for the enemy was posted on the crests and slopes of two hills, both of which commanded the gut between them through which the road runs; yet on the 8th May it was discovered that the Germans had retired, and two companies of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles went forward and occupied the position which he had evacuated.