On the 15th instant I received letters, by express, from Major-General Brock, with orders to adopt the most prudent measures either for offence or defence, which circumstances might point out; and having received intelligence from the best information, that large reinforcements were expected to be thrown into this garrison, with the thorough conviction that my situation at St. Joseph's was totally indefensible, I determined to lose no time in making the meditated attack on this fort.
On the 16th, at ten o'clock in the morning, I embarked my few men, with about 180 Canadians, and two iron 6-pounders. The boats arrived without the smallest accident at the port of rendezvous, at three o'clock the following morning: by the exertions of the Canadians, one of the guns was brought up a height commanding the garrison, and ready to act about ten o'clock. A summons was then sent in; a copy of the capitulation which followed I have the honor to enclose. At twelve o'clock, the American colours were hauled down, and those of his majesty were hoisted. A committee has been appointed to examine into the state of the public stores.
Enclosed also are the returns of the ordnance and military stores found in the fort, and the strength of the garrison. The greatest praise is due to every individual employed in the expedition; to my own officers I am indebted, in particular, for their active assistance in carrying all my orders into effect.
No. 3. Page 275.
Extracts from "The Letters of Veritas;"[156] containing a succinct Narrative of the Military Administration of Sir George Prevost during his command in the Canadas, whereby it will be manifest that the merit of preserving them from conquest belongs not to him. 8vo. Montreal, July, 1815.
"Then or before was communicated to him (Major-General Brock) the information of that deadly armistice concluded by Sir George Prevost with General Dearborn, which had so fatal an effect upon all the future operations, and which tied up the hands of the gallant Brock from executing his intended plan of sweeping the American posts to Sackett's Harbour, inclusive—an operation that most certainly would have been then effected.
"This armistice, proposed by Sir George Prevost, merits serious consideration, from its operation being so greatly in favor of the enemy at that time, and so disadvantageous to us. A period most precious to us, if we had profited by it with vigour, was thereby lost in inaction, and the enemy in consequence allowed to recover from the panic into which they were thrown by Hull's capture.
"The transport of the American stores, ordnance, and provisions, of each of which they were much in want, not being prohibited by that armistice, was accordingly protected and facilitated by it on Lake Ontario and along the Niagara frontier beyond the enemy's most sanguine hopes, whilst their then only disposable and invading force, under General Hull, on the Detroit frontier, was left at full liberty to profit by circumstances, the armistice as to him being at his option.
"Most fortunately, however, Hull's business was settled by capitulation before the armistice was known to General Brock or him; but had it reached him in time, he of course would gladly have accepted it, to gain delay for the arrival of reinforcements and a supply of provisions, from which would have resulted the salvation of his army, the prejudicial consequences whereof to us are incalculable; for, had a knowledge of it reached the Indian nations at that time, such a disgust and distrust would have been thereby excited as could never have been removed; and the first effect of which would have appeared in the immediate dispersion of the Indians, whose powerful and indispensable aid at that early period of the contest would have been totally lost to us.
"Madison's rejection of this armistice was followed by that chilling defensive system which General Brock was instructed by Sir George to follow, and which palsied his operations until his country had to mourn over his fatal loss at the battle of Queenstown, on the 13th of October, 1812.