The numeral force of the militia in the vicinity of Amherstburg exceeds by a trifle seven hundred rank and file; consequently, very little assistance can be derived from that source in any offensive operation. Should, therefore, the aspect of affairs hereafter give stronger indications of a rupture, I propose augmenting the garrison of Amherstburg with two hundred rank and file from Fort George and York. Such a measure I consider essentially necessary, were it only calculated to rouse the energy of the militia and Indians, who are now impressed with a firm belief, that in the event of war they are to be left to their fate. Great pains have been taken to instil this idea into their minds, and no stronger argument could be employed than the weak state of that garrison.
The army now assembled upon the Wabash, with the ostensible view of opposing the Shawnese, is a strong additional motive in my mind in support of this measure; for I have no doubt that, the instant their service in the field terminates, a large portion of the regulars will be detached to strengthen the garrison of Detroit. I have prepared Colonel Proctor for such an event, and after weighing the inconvenience to which the service would be exposed if the district were placed under a militia colonel, (an event obvious, unless superseded by a regular officer of equal rank) I have directed Lieut.-Colonel St. George to be in readiness to repair to Amherstburg and assume the command; and I hope his situation of inspector of militia will not be considered a bar to the arrangement. The state of the roads will probably stop this projected movement until the end of this month or beginning of the next; nor do I intend that the troops should leave their present quarters, unless urged by some fresh circumstances. I therefore look to receive your excellency's commands previous to their departure.
From Amherstburg to Fort Erie, my chief dependance must rest on a naval force for the protection of that extensive coast; but, considering the state to which it is reduced, extraordinary exertions and great expense will be required before it can be rendered efficient. At present, it consists only of a ship and a small schooner—the latter of a bad construction, old, and in want of many repairs; yet she is the only king's vessel able to navigate Lake Huron, whilst the Americans have a sloop, and a fine brig capable of carrying twelve guns, both in perfect readiness for any service. If, consequently, the garrison of St. Joseph's is to be maintained, and an attack on Michilimakinack undertaken, it will be expedient to hire, or purchase from the merchants, as many vessels as may be necessary for the purpose. The Americans can resort to the same means, and the construction and number of their vessels for trade will give them great advantage: besides, their small craft, or boats, in which troops could be easily transported, exceed ours considerably; indeed, we have very few of that description. I therefore leave it to your excellency's superior judgment to determine whether a sufficient number of gun-boats for both lakes, so constructed as to draw little water, ought not be added to our means of offence and defence. It is worthy of remark, that the only American national vessel on Lake Ontario, built two years ago, and now lying in Sackett's harbour, has remained without seamen until within the last fortnight, when the officers began to enter men as fast as possible. A lieutenant with a party came to Buffalo, a tolerably large village opposite Fort Erie, and procured several hands, but, not satisfied, a petty officer was sent to our side to inveigle others. The magistrates, hearing of this, sent to apprehend him; but he escaped with difficulty.
The strait between Niagara and Fort Erie is that which, in all probability, will be chosen by the Americans for their main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. All other attacks will be subordinate, or merely made to divert our attention. About three thousand militia could, upon an emergency, be drawn by us to that line, and nearly five hundred Indians could also be collected; therefore, with the regulars, no trifling force could hope for success, provided a determined resistance were made; but I cannot conceal from your excellency, that unless a strong regular force be present to animate the loyal and to control the disaffected, nothing effectual can be expected. A protracted resistance upon this frontier will be sure to embarrass the enemy's plans materially. They will not come prepared to meet it, and their troops, or volunteer corps, without scarcely any discipline, so far at least as control is in question, will soon tire under disappointment. The difficulty which they will experience in providing provisions will involve them in expenses, under which their government will soon become impatient.
The car brigade will be particularly useful in obstructing their passage; and I cannot be too urgent in soliciting the means, both as to gunners and drivers, and likewise as to horses, to render this arm complete for service. A small body of cavalry would also be absolutely necessary, and I have already offers from many respectable young men, to form themselves into a troop. All they seem to require are swords and pistols, which the stores below may probably be able to furnish.
The situation of Kingston is so very important in every military point of view, that I cannot be too earnest in drawing your excellency's attention to that quarter. The militia, from the Bay of Quinti down to Glengary, is the most respectable of any in the province. Among the officers several are on half pay, and still retain a sound military spirit. Those from the Bay of Quinti would be properly stationed at Kingston, but all downwards would naturally desire to be employed to resist any predatory excursions to which their property would be so much exposed from the opposite shore. Besides, I have always been of opinion that a strong detachment would follow the route of Lord Amherst, and attempt to enter the province by Ozwegatchie.[42] The militia on the whole of that communication cannot, therefore, be more usefully employed than in watching such a movement; and should the enemy direct the whole of his force by St. John's, the greater part can with the utmost facility join the army acting upon that frontier.
The militia act, which I have the honor to enclose, provides for such an emergency, but your excellency will readily observe, that among many wise and salutary provisions, there are but few means of enforcing them. No exertions, however, shall be wanting in my civil capacity to place that body upon a respectable footing. Mr. Cartwright, the senior militia colonel at Kingston, possesses the influence to which his firm character and superior abilities so deservedly entitle him; but as I cannot possibly give the necessary attention to so distant an object, and as a regular officer will be indispensable to direct the operations, one of high rank ought, if possible, to be nominated to that command. So much will remain to be done, and such high expenses to be incurred in the quartermaster-general's departments, that I cannot too earnestly request your excellency to select an officer who may be equal to discharge the various duties of that office. A head to the commissariat will be likewise indispensable.
I have trespassed greatly on your excellency's time, but I beg to be permitted to entreat your excellency to honor me with such advice and counsel as your experience may suggest, and be assured it will ever be my utmost pride to meet your views and to merit your approbation.
Major-General Brock to Lieut.-General Sir G. Prevost.
YORK, December 3, 1811.