[40] Miami affair.
[41] Doubtless the afterwards celebrated Tecumseh, or his brother.
[42] An American fort on the river St. Lawrence, about seventy miles from Kingston, and one hundred and twenty-five miles from Montreal.
CHAPTER VI.
Our memoir having now reached the year 1812, in which the United States of America declared war against Great Britain, we proceed to give a brief review of the causes which led to that event; and in doing so it will be necessary to go back to the commencement of the century.
The first president of America, the immortal Washington,[43] and his successor, Adams, entertained friendly sentiments towards the British government and people; but early in 1801, Jefferson succeeded the latter functionary as president, being elected by ten of the sixteen states then constituting the Union. Jefferson was as inimical to England as he was favorable to France, so was his secretary of state, and successor in the presidential chair, Madison. Although there were many intervenient heart-burnings, it was not until the year 1807, when Jefferson was a second time president, that the government of the United States assumed a decidedly hostile attitude towards Great Britain. The Berlin decree, in which the French ruler ventured to declare the British islands in a state of blockade, and to interdict all neutrals from trading with the British ports in any commodities whatever, produced fresh retaliatory orders in council, intended to support England's maritime rights and commerce, and to counteract Bonaparte's continental system. The Berlin decree was a gross infringement of the law of nations and an outrage on neutral rights, which especially called for resistance from the Americans, a neutral and trading people; but they neither resisted nor seriously remonstrated against it. Other causes of dispute arose from the determination of the British government to exclude the Americans from the blockaded ports of France, and from that inexhaustible source of quarrel, the impressment of British seamen from American vessels, especially as the difficulty of distinguishing British from American seamen led occasionally to the impressment of American native born citizens. In June, 1807, occurred the rencontre between his majesty's ship Leopard and the Chesapeake, which terminated in the forcible extraction from the American frigate of four deserters from British ships of war. The British government instantly disavowed this act, and recalled Vice-Admiral Berkeley, who had given the order to search the Chesapeake. Jefferson, however, not only issued a proclamation interdicting all British ships of war from entering the ports of the United States, but proposed to congress to lay an embargo on American vessels, and to compel the trading ships of every other nation to quit the American harbours. This proposition was warmly opposed by the federalists, or Washingtonians, but it was nevertheless adopted by large majorities. Thus matters remained, with subsequent slight modifications, from the month of December, 1807, to the declaration of war in 1812, an interval which the commercial classes spent in a hopeless struggle against bankruptcy and ruin. Attempts were not wanting on our part to arrive at a friendly accommodation, but Jefferson demanded, as a preliminary, the revocation of the British orders in council, and the entire exemption of American ships from any search, or from any question as to their crews or cargoes. The British government pledged itself to repeal the orders in council as soon as the French decrees should cease to exist. In 1809, Jefferson was succeeded as president by Madison, who was compelled to yield somewhat to the popular outcry, and to repeal the universal embargo substituting a non-intercourse act with England and France, both which nations, it must be confessed, having by restraints on their commerce given the Americans just grounds for dissatisfaction. On the 23d June, 1812, the prince regent in council revoked the orders in council as far as regarded America, with a proviso that the revocation should be of no effect unless the United States rescinded their non-intercourse act with England. It has been thought that the revocation came too late, and that if it had been conceded a few weeks earlier, there would have been no war with America; but Madison had been treating with Bonaparte's government since the end of the year 1810, and the whole course of his conduct, with his evident desire to illustrate his presidency by the conquest of Canada, proved his determination to brave a war with England. He and his party nicely calculated on which side the greater profit was to be obtained—whether the United States would gain more by going to war with England than by hostility against Bonaparte and his edicts. "Every thing in the United States," says James in his naval history, "was to be settled by a calculation of profit and loss. France had numerous allies—England scarcely any. France had no contiguous territory; England had the Canadas ready to be marched into at a moment's notice. France had no commerce; England had richly-laden merchantmen traversing every sea. England, therefore, it was against whom the death-blows of America were to be levelled." The struggles of England against Napoleon enabled the American government to choose its own time. On the 14th April, congress laid an embargo on all ships and vessels of the United States during the space of ninety days, with the view of lessening the number that would be at the mercy of England when war was finally declared, and also of manning efficiently their ships of war and privateers. By the end of May their fastest merchant vessels were converted into cruisers, ready to start at a short notice. On the 18th of June, before the revocation of the orders in council was known in the United States, a declaration of war was carried in the house of representatives by seventy-nine to forty-nine votes, its supporters being chiefly from the western and southern states to Pennsylvania inclusive, while the advocates for peace were principally from the northern and eastern states.[44]
Sir George Prevost to Major-General Brock.
QUEBEC, January 22, 1812.
It is the opinion of the adjutant-general that you will not wish to avail yourself of the conditional leave of absence I have received authority to grant you. I shall hear with particular satisfaction that Baynes is not mistaken, as I value your services highly.