[84] Henry Frederick Brock, Esq., jurat of the Royal Court of Guernsey; and Lieutenant Henry Brock, R.N. In his letter, (see page [194],) Sir Thomas Saumarez, speaking of the latter, says: "He was a most promising young officer, and, had the poor fellow lived, my brother James would probably have made him a commander this summer."
[85] His nephew, John E. Tupper, Esq., aged twenty, perished at sea in January, 1812, in the Mediterranean, the vessel in which he was a passenger from Catalonia to Gibraltar having never been heard of after sailing. He was educated at Harrow at the same time as Lord Byron, Sir Robert Peel, &c.
CHAPTER XIII.
After issuing a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Michigan territory, by which their private property was secured and their laws and religion confirmed, and leaving as large a force under Colonel Proctor as could be spared at Detroit, Major-General Brock hastened to return to the Niagara frontier; and while on his voyage across Lake Erie, in the schooner Chippewa, he was met on the 23d of August by the provincial schooner Lady Prevost, of 14 guns, the commander of which, after saluting the general with seventeen guns, came on board and gave him the first intelligence of the armistice which Sir George Prevost had unfortunately concluded with the American general, Dearborn. Major-General Brock could not conceal his deep regret and mortification at the intelligence, which he feared would prevent his contemplated attack on Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost, early in August, on hearing of the repeal of the British orders in council, which were the principal among the alleged causes of the war, had proposed a suspension of hostilities until the sentiments of the American government were received on the subject; and to this suspension General Dearborn readily agreed, with the exception of the forces under General Hull, who, he said, acted under the immediate orders of the secretary at war. But, by the terms of the truce, General Hull had the option of availing himself of its provisions if he thought fit, and that he would gladly have done so there can be no doubt. Happily, however, owing to the rapidity of Major-General Brock's movements, the news of the armistice did not reach the belligerent commanders in time to prevent the surrender of the one, or to snatch well-earned laurels from the brow of the other.[86] This armistice was attended with very prejudicial consequences, as it not only marred the attempt on Sackett's Harbour, but it rendered unavailing the command of the lakes, which was then held by the British.[87]
The successful commander, in transmitting by Captain Glegg his dispatches to the governor-general at Montreal, expressed, through his aide-de-camp, his intention of proceeding immediately to Kingston, and from thence to the attack of the naval arsenal at Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario. Had its destruction been accomplished—and no one can doubt that this was the proper period to attempt it, as the enemy, dispirited by the capture of Detroit, would probably have offered but a feeble resistance—the Americans could not, without much additional difficulty and future risk of destruction, have built and equipped the fleet which subsequently gave them the naval ascendancy on that lake, and enabled them twice in 1813 to capture the capital of Upper Canada. The armistice, however, caused a delay of nearly a fortnight in the necessary preparations, as Major-General Brock returned from Detroit to Fort George on the 24th of August, and the cessation of the truce was not known to him until his arrival at Kingston, on the 4th of September. The distance by water between Fort George and Kingston is about 160 miles, and from Kingston to Sackett's Harbour only 35 miles; so that the destruction of the arsenal might have been effected early in September, had not the armistice prevented the attempt. But, unhappily for the interests of his country and the credit of his own fame, Sir George Prevost disapproved of the proposition, and commanded Major-General Brock to relinquish all idea of the contemplated enterprize, although the official intelligence of the president's refusal to continue the suspension of hostilities reached him at Montreal on the 30th of August, a day or two before Captain Glegg, with the dispatches and trophies of the capture of Detroit. At the commencement of the war, a defensive attitude was perhaps excusable, especially as the British cabinet seems to have been anxious to accommodate the differences between the two countries; but after the American government had refused to continue the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government, and practised by no people of ancient or modern times. But notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief. We seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest more popular among them. It was under this impression that, in a general order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the American people for the invasion of their territory at Detroit. Whether this continued defensive policy was such as, under all the circumstances, ought to have been observed, we leave it to others to determine; but certainly the result did not justify its expediency, and the tree is usually judged of by its fruit. Forbearance in war, where success is probable, strikes us as a positive evil that a very doubtful good may ensue—it is seldom properly appreciated; and the governor-general appears to have seen his error when too late, as in the following year he was himself ignobly foiled in an attack on Sackett's Harbour. We cannot understand why the attack under Sir George Prevost, in May, 1813, was more politic than it would have been in September the year preceding, under Major-General Brock; and although Captain Glegg met with a very chilling reception from the former officer, yet we would willingly acquit him of any jealous feeling where such important interests were at stake. At the same time it is due to the memory of this unfortunate officer to add, that his civil administration was as able as his military one in Canada was inglorious; and that although his conduct as a soldier was on more than one occasion the subject of much and just animadversion in England, yet he acquired the warm attachment of the French Canadians, who speak highly of him to this day. Those leading men who, during the administration of Sir James Craig, had been considered almost as enemies, were treated with confidence by his successor, who gradually appointed them to situations of trust, and by this wise measure secured their aid and influence in the defence of the province. Certain it is, on the other hand, that Major-General Brock did not approve of the defensive warfare to which he was restricted, and subsequent events too truly proved that had he been permitted to pursue that course which his zeal and foresight dictated, his valuable life might have been spared, and a very different series of incidents in that war claimed the attention of the historian. The high-minded soldier could not brook a state of inaction with such promising prospects before him. His best feelings revolted at being compelled to languish within the strict pale of military obedience, when so rich a field for doing good service presented itself; and in place of becoming the assailant, he was soon doomed, by awaiting the attacks of his opponents, to sacrifice not only life, but, what is far dearer, the opening prospects of honorable ambition.
On the 16th December, 1812, the inhabitants of the Niagara district addressed a spirited letter to Sir George Prevost, from which we copy the following extract, as confirming what we have already stated on the same subject: "Nevertheless, such was the popularity of the general, such the confidence he had inspired, that he was enabled to carry with him to Detroit, though under great privations, a large body of volunteers, which, in addition to the small regular force at Amherstburg, enabled him to capture an entire army of our invaders, with the fortress from which they had made their descent into Canada—a success unparalleled in the annals of war. Here, for the first time, we got a supply of good arms. The success of this first enterprize, in which the militia were engaged, acted like an electric shock throughout the country: it awed the disaffected, of whom there were many; it confirmed the timid and the wavering; and it induced the Six Nation Indians, who had until that time kept aloof, to take an active part in our favor. At that moment such was the energy and confidence that had been excited by our illustrious chief and the success of his plans, that had he been permitted, he could, and would, have destroyed and laid waste the whole American frontier, from Sandusky to St. Regis. Your excellency doubtless recollects the armistice which immediately preceded the capture of Detroit, which gave the enemy an opportunity to recover from their consternation, to fortify and strengthen their lines, to accumulate in security the means of annoying us at pleasure along our whole frontier, and which sent at least 800 of our Indian allies in disgust to their own homes."
Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock.
MONTREAL, August 13, 1812.[89]
I wrote to you from Albany on the 8th instant, but as my letter was submitted to the inspection of General Dearborn, I of course confined myself to the sole subject of the armistice entered into with that officer.... A clause, admitting reinforcements to pass with stores, was readily agreed to on my part. General Dearborn told me that a considerable reinforcement with stores was on its way to Niagara, and that he could not delay or alter its destination. I informed him that we were also forwarding reinforcements and stores, and that it would be advisable to agree that all movements of that nature on either side should be suffered to proceed unmolestedly by troops under instructions to preserve defensive measures. I am apprehensive that General Dearborn may not explicitly explain all these points; and I have therefore cautioned all the officers, to whom I have communicated them, to act with the utmost caution, and to be prepared for all events that may arise. I feel extremely prepossessed in favor of General Dearborn, whose manners appear to evince great candour and sincerity: he assured me that no event of his life would afford him so much satisfaction and happiness as resigning his command in consequence of our honorable adjustment of differences. He told me that General Hull was placed under his orders merely for form sake, but that he acted by particular instructions from the war department, and would not consider himself bound to obey any order that was not in conformity to them.