Those desirous of obtaining a full account of the two battles of the Plains are referred among other works, to "Quebec Past and Present." I shall merely borrow from Col. Beatson's very rare volume details not to be found in the ordinary histories.
"It has," says Col Beatson, "been alleged that Montcalm in hastening to meet the British on an open plain, and thereby to decide in a single battle, the fate of a fertile Province nearly equal in extent to one-half of Europe, was not only forgetful of his usual caution, but acted with culpable temerity."
Such action, however, proceeded from no sudden impulse, but from a noble resolve deliberately formed after the most mature consideration and recorded some time previously.
Painfully convinced how little security the weak defences of the city could afford against the determined assault of well disciplined and ably led troops, he believed that however great the risk of meeting his daring adversary in the open field, this course was the only one that seemed to promise him any chance of success. Besides, he had a force numerically [204] superior to that of the English General, could he have concentrated them at one spot. Bougainville with the flower of the French army, the grenadiers and volunteers, 3,000 strong, according to professor Dussieux, was at Cap Rouge, six miles from the battlefield and took no part in the fight, having arrived there more than one hour after the fate of Canada was decided. 1,500 men had been left at the Beauport camp to repel the feint by Admiral Saunders' ships, on the morning of the 13 Sept., 1759. The Charlesbourg, Lorette and Beauport militia had been granted leave to return home that week, to look after their harvest: a curious coincidence.
The French army was as follows, viz:
Left | The Royal Roussillon Regiment, a battalion Regulars. Militia.
Wing | of the marines, or colony troops, and
| Canadian militia……………………… 1,300 2,300
Centre.—The Regiments of Béarn and militia. …… 720 1,200
Right | The Regiments of La Sarre and Languedoc,
Wing | a battalion of the marine, and militia….. 1,600 400
——- ——-
3,620 3,900
Wolfe's field-state on the morning of the 13th September, showed only 4,828 men of all ranks, from the General downwards; but of these every man was a trained soldier.
And within little more than an hour's march from the Plains, he could not honourably have remained inactive while believing that only a part of the enemy's force was in possession of such vantage ground; and neither the dictates of prudence [205] nor his own chivalrous spirit and loyal regard for the national honour, would permit him to betray a consciousness of weakness by declining the combat, on finding himself unexpectedly confronted by the whole of Wolfe's army. Relying, doubtless, on the prestige of his victories during the campaign of the proceeding year (1758) in which he had been uniformly successful, and in which at Ticonderoga, with four thousand men he had defeated General Abercromby at the head of nearly four times that number—he endeavoured by a confident bearing and encouraging expressions [206] to animate his troops with hopes which he himself could scarcely entertain; and though almost despairing of success, boldly resolved to attempt, by a sudden and vigorous onset, to dislodge his rival before the latter could intrench himself in his commanding position, and it is surely no blot on his fame that the superior discipline and unflinching steadiness of his opponents, the close and destructive volley [207] by which the spirited but disorderly advance of his battalions was checked, and the irresistible [208] charge which completed their confusion, rendered unavailing his gallant effort to save the colony; for (to borrow the words of the eloquent historian of the Peninsular War), "the vicissitudes of war are so many that disappointment will sometimes attend the wisest combinations; and a ruinous defeat, the work of chance close the career of the boldest and most sagacious of Generals, so that to judge a commander's conduct by the event alone is equally unjust and unphilosophical."
In the remarkable letter said to have been addressed to his cousin, M. de Molé, Président au Parlement de Paris, and dated from the camp before Quebec, 22nd August, 1759,"—a fortnight before the battle— MONTCALM thus pathetically describes how hopeless would be the situation in the event of WOLFE effecting a landing near the city; and, with a firm heart, foretold his own fate,
"Here I am, my dear cousin, after the lapse of more than three months still contending with Mr. WOLFE, who has incessantly bombarded Quebec with a fury unexampled in the attack of any place, which the besieger has wished to retain after his capture.
"Nearly all the whole of Lower Town has been destroyed by his batteries and of the Upper Town a great part is likewise in ruins. But even if he leaves not one stone upon another, he will never obtain possession of the capital of the colony whilst his operations continue to be confined to the opposite side of the river.