The Seventeenth being left in garrison at New York, of course took no share in Howe’s operations. The fact was that in November 1776 it received some 200 recruits and 100 fresh horses from England, so that its time must have been fully occupied in the task of knocking these into shape. Nevertheless small detachments of the regiment were employed in two little affairs which must be related here.
The Americans, after retreating across the Croton in 1776, had formed large magazines on the borders of Connecticut, at the town of Danbury and elsewhere. These magazines General Clinton judged that it would be well to destroy. Accordingly, on the 25th April, 2000 men, drafted from different regiments, including twelve from the Seventeenth for the needful reconnaissance and patrol duties, embarked on transports and sailed up Long Island Sound to Camp’s Point, where they landed. At ten that night they marched, and at eight next morning they reached Danbury, to the great surprise of the Americans, who evacuated the town with all speed. The British, having destroyed the whole of the stores, prepared to return to their ships, but found that the Americans had assembled at a place called Ridgefield, and had there entrenched themselves to bar the British line of march. Weary as they were after twenty-four hours’ work, the English soldiers attacked and carried the entrenchments; and then, as night came on, they lay on their arms, prepared to fight at any moment. At daybreak they continued their march, and were again attacked by the Americans, who had received reinforcements during the night. Still they fought their way on till within half a mile of their ships, when General Erskine, losing all patience, collected 400 men, and taking the offensive at last beat the enemy off. The men had had no rest for three days and three nights, and were fairly worn out; but we may guess that the little detachment of the Seventeenth was not the last to answer to the call of its Brigadier. This expedition cost the British 15 officers and 153 men!
The second of the two affairs to which we have alluded was an expedition made by Clinton as a diversion to help Burgoyne, and was directed against two American forts on the right bank of the Hudson, which barred the passage of the British warships to Albany; Albany being the point to which Burgoyne hoped to penetrate. A force of 3000 men, including one troop of the 1777. Seventeenth, embarked on the 5th October and sailed up the 5th Oct. Hudson to Verplanks Point, forty miles from New York, on the east bank of the river. Here Clinton landed a portion of his force under the fire of a small American field-work, drove out the enemy, and pursued them for some little way. This feint produced the desired effect. The American general of the district at once concluded that Clinton meant to advance to meet Burgoyne on the east bank of the Hudson, and hurried away with most of the garrison of the river ports to occupy the passes on the roads. Clinton meanwhile quietly embarked 6th Oct. two-thirds of his force on the following morning, leaving the remainder to hold Verplanks, and landed them on the opposite bank. Thence he advanced over a very steep mountain, along very bad roads, to attack two important posts, Forts Clinton and Montgomery, from the rear. Though Fort Clinton, the lower of the two, was but twelve miles distant, it was not reached before sunset, owing to the difficulties of the march. Opposite Fort Clinton the force divided into two columns, one of them standing fast, while the other made a detour to reach Fort Montgomery unobserved—the design being to attack both posts, which were only three-quarters of a mile apart, simultaneously. The upper post, Fort Montgomery, was easily captured, being at once abandoned by its garrison of 800 men. Fort Clinton, however, was a more difficult matter, the only possible approach to it being over a plain covered with four hundred yards of abattis, and commanded by ten guns. The British, though they had not a single gun, advanced under a heavy fire, pushed each other through the embrasures, and, in spite of a gallant resistance on the part of the Americans, drove them out of the fort. The American loss was 300 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British loss, 140 killed and wounded. Having destroyed the American shipping and some other batteries farther up the river, Clinton’s little expedition returned to New York. The troop of the Seventeenth formed part of the column that stormed Fort Clinton—a service which, if the original plan of campaign had been 1777. adhered to, would have been one of the most valuable in the war.
With this the campaign of 1777 came to an end, decidedly to the disadvantage of the British, who had lost the whole of Burgoyne’s division and gained nothing but Philadelphia. The winter of 1777–78 the British army spent in the city of Philadelphia, where it was kept inactive, and allowed to grow slack in discipline and efficiency; and this although Washington lay for five whole months but 26 miles distant, at Valley Forge—his position weak, his guns frozen into the entrenchments, his army worn to a shadow by sickness and desertion, and absolutely destitute of clothing, stores, and equipment. Howe had 14,000 men, and Washington a bare 4000, yet for the fourth time Howe allowed him to escape; and this time inaction was fatal, for the new year was to bring with it an event which changed the whole aspect and conduct of operations.
1778.
In February 1778 the French Government, still smarting under the loss of Canada, concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with the young American Republic, and despatched a fleet under D’Estaing to operate on the American coast. The British Government no sooner heard the news than it sent instructions for the army to evacuate Philadelphia and retire to New York, from whence half of it was to be forthwith despatched to attack the French possessions in the West Indies. The burden of this duty fell, not upon Howe, to whom it would have been a just retribution, but upon Clinton, who succeeded to the command on Howe’s resignation in the spring of 1778.
During the winter the Seventeenth had been moved down from New York to join the main army at Philadelphia, where, in March 1778, we find them reduced to a nominal total of 363 men, of whom no fewer than 67 were in hospital, and 162 horses. Fortunately for its own sake the regiment was busily employed during the spring in the duty of opening communications and bringing in supplies, by which it was prepared for the heavy work that lay before it. On the 3rd of May a strong detachment of the 1778. Seventeenth formed part of a mixed force of 1000 men which was sent out to reduce a hostile post at Crooked Billet, seventeen miles from Philadelphia. The business was neatly managed, for the British, with trifling loss, killed, wounded, or captured 150 of the Americans, and, thanks to the Seventeenth, took the whole of their baggage. Three weeks later the regiment was again employed in a small expedition against 3000 Americans, who had been posted by Washington in an advanced and isolated position at Barren Hill under the command of Marquis Lafayette. This time the affair was sadly bungled, and the Americans, who should have been captured in a body, would have got off scot free but for a dash made on the rear-guard by the light Dragoons, wherein 40 or 50 American prisoners were taken.
By constant excursions of this kind, on a larger or smaller scale, the regiment was prepared for the very arduous duty that lay before it. On the 18th June, at 3 A.M., the evacuation of Philadelphia was begun, and by 10 A.M. the whole British army had crossed the Delaware at the point of its junction with the Schuylkill. It then advanced up the left bank, on a road running parallel to the river, as far as Cornell’s Ferry, where it left the line of the Delaware and turned off on the road to Sandy Hook. Up to the 27th June the British, though constantly watched by small parties of the enemy, were allowed to pursue their march through this difficult country without molestation; but on that day an advanced corps of 5000 Americans appeared close in rear, with the main army of Washington but three miles behind it, while other smaller bodies came up on each flank. On 28th June. the 28th, Clinton, expecting an attack, divided his army into two parts, the first of which he sent off at daybreak in charge of the baggage (which was so abundant that the column was twelve miles long), leading off the second, under his personal command, at 8 A.M. The Seventeenth was attached to the baggage column, and must have marched with it for some eight or nine hours, when it was hurriedly sent for to join the rear-guard under General Clinton. The rear column had just come down from the 1778. high ground into a plain about three miles long by one mile wide, when the Americans appeared in force in the rear and on both flanks. Their first attempt was made on the right flank, and was likely to have been serious, had it not been checked, to use Clinton’s words, by the resolute bearing and firm front of the Seventeenth. The Americans had not lost their respect for the Light Dragoons. From that point the regiment was swiftly moved to others; and the general impression left on the mind by Clinton’s rather confused description is, that the Seventeenth were kept manœuvring round the column, frequently under Clinton’s immediate direction, wherever the Americans threatened most danger. The 16th Light Dragoons, more fortunate than the Seventeenth, had a chance of charging the American cavalry, and made admirable use of it; but they lost a great number of horses, which was a serious matter considering the weakness of the British mounted force. Finally Clinton made his dispositions for a pitched battle in the plain; but the Americans knew better than to accept it, and retired to the hills from which they had originally come down. Clinton thereupon attacked them with the infantry and drove them back. They retreated to a second position. Again Clinton attacked, and after hard fighting forced them out. They then fell back on a third position, where, Clinton feeling by this time assured of the safety of his baggage, thought best to leave them. And so ended the very hard day’s work which takes its name from the heights of Freehold, at the foot whereof the combat was fought. So terrible was the heat in the confinement of the valley that fifty-nine of the infantry dropped dead while advancing to the attack. The total loss on the English side was 358 men. The Seventeenth had no casualties, though Clinton’s testimony shows that they did good work. The Americans lost 361 men, and from that day abandoned the pursuit, having had for the present enough of it. Clinton, therefore, made the rest of his way untroubled to Sandy Hook, and on the 5th July embarked his army for New York. A flying expedition to Rhode Island, which arrived too late to catch 1778. the French force that had threatened it, and a successful inroad into Georgia in the south, brought the campaign of 1778 to a close.
In November, Clinton, in obedience to his orders, sent away half of his army to England and the West Indies. He was so sensible of the injury inflicted on his forces by the loss of some of his best troops, that he begged to be allowed to resign his command, and required some pressure to induce him to retain it. His difficulties were great enough, for everything was going wrong in New York. In December there was not a fortnight’s flour in store, and not a penny in the military chest. The clothing provided for the men proved to be bad, and was condemned right and left by their officers. “The linen is coarse and thin, and unfit for soldiers’ shirts, the stockings of so flimsy a texture as to be of little service, and the shoes of the worst kind.” One consignment of shoes was found to consist of “thin dancing pumps,” and even these too small for the men to wear. Moreover the Government in England, which had always given Howe a free hand, thought it right to tie down Clinton, who was far the better man, with every kind of order. “For God’s sake, my Lord,” the General wrote at last, “if you wish me to do anything leave me to myself.”
Such was the state of things when the Seventeenth went into their winter quarters at Hampstead, Long Island, in 1778. It was now the only British cavalry corps on the American Continent, the 16th having gone home, leaving all its horses and a certain number of men with the sister regiment. Though its numbers were thus raised to 414 men, we shall not again find it in the field entire during the remainder of the war. From this winter onward the scene of the main contest shifts from the north to the south, and we shall find the Seventeenth divided between these two points of the compass.