Bad luck dogged this enterprise from the first. The transports were overtaken by a storm and dispersed in all directions. All the cavalry horses perished, and one ship containing siege artillery was lost. It was not till the end of January that the ships, many of them badly battered, appeared at the appointed rendezvous, the Island of Tybee, off the coast of Georgia, having spent five weeks over a voyage generally reckoned to last ten days. The troop of the Seventeenth was sent with Tarleton’s legion to Port Royal, a little to the north of Savannah, where it was landed and quartered at Beaufort, at the head of the harbour. With great difficulty it procured forty or fifty inferior horses; and after a time was ordered to join some reinforcements that were marching up from Savannah, and advance up country with them to unite with Clinton’s army before Charleston. Meanwhile the people of the country, knowing that the British had lost their horses, equipped themselves as cavalry to harass the column on the march. Nothing could have suited Tarleton better. A charge by the troop of the Seventeenth sufficed to disperse these irregular horsemen, and ensure the capture not only of several prisoners, but, better still, of their horses. After twelve days’ march through a difficult country broken up by flooded rivers, and in the thick of a hostile population, the legion arrived at its destination on the Ashley with its strength in horses multiplied by four or five, and a good supply of forage to boot.

Meanwhile General Clinton with the rest of the army had sailed to the river Edisto, a little to the south of Charleston, and advanced thence by slow marches upon the town. Charleston lies on a tongue of land which runs, roughly speaking, from north 1780. to south, being enclosed between the Cooper River on the east and the Ashley on the west. The British fleet having moved up to blockade it to the south or seaward, Clinton on the 30th March threw his army across the Ashley to the neck of the isthmus on which the town stands, and encamped over against the American entrenchments. As usual these were formidable enough, stretching across the isthmus from the Ashley to the Cooper, and strengthened by a deep canal, two rows of abattis, and other obstacles. Over and above the garrison of 6000 men within the town, the Americans kept a force of militia and three regiments of cavalry, under General Huger, on the upper forks and passes of the Cooper, whereby the communications between the town and the back country were kept open. The dislodgment of this corps of Huger’s was therefore indispensable to the complete investment of Charleston; and the execution of this task was intrusted to a picked force of 1400 men, including Tarleton’s legion and the detachment of the Seventeenth.

On the 12th April, therefore, Tarleton moved off to Goose Creek on his way to Monk’s Corner, thirty miles from Charleston, where there lay the American post that held Biggin’s Bridge over the Cooper. Knowing that the enemy was superior to him in cavalry, he had determined to make a night attack, and he had the good fortune on the way to pick up a negro who acquainted him with the enemy’s dispositions. Learning from this source that the American force was divided, the cavalry being on his own side of the river and the infantry on the other, he pushed on through the night, and at 3 A.M. surprised the main guard of the cavalry. Galloping hard on the backs of the fugitives he dashed straight into the camp, dispersed the far superior force that lay there, and captured 150 prisoners, 400 horses, and 50 ammunition waggons. The bridge being thus uncovered he at once ordered his infantry across it against the American post on the other side; and this having been captured, detached a force to seize Bowman’s Ferry, which commanded another branch of the Cooper. This was promptly done, and by the evening 1780. the American communications on the Cooper were cut through and Charleston completely isolated.

The Americans, however, were not so easily to be baulked. Huger himself and his principal officer, Colonel Washington,[7] had managed to escape by hiding in a swamp, and before the end of April had begun to collect another force of cavalry to the north of the Santee, a river which runs parallel to the Cooper, and at its nearest point is not above twenty miles from Biggin’s Bridge. On the 6th of May this force crossed the Santee, snapped up a British foraging party, and prepared to recross the river, a few miles lower down, at Lanew’s Ferry. Tarleton, who was patrolling with the detachment of the Seventeenth and some of his own dragoons, 150 men all told, learned what had happened, and pressed on with all haste to catch the Americans before they could repass the Santee. Once again he caught a superior force by surprise. Coming up at 3 P.M. with the American vedettes he at once drove them in upon the picquet, and was on the backs of the main body in an instant. Five officers and 36 men were cut down, 7 officers and 60 men made prisoners, and the rest, including Colonel Washington, driven into the river to escape as best they could by swimming. Tarleton, who had lost but two men and four horses killed, marched back to camp, twenty-six miles, on the same evening, with the result that twenty horses died of fatigue. But Tarleton, as we shall see, never spared men or horses.

On the 12th May Charleston surrendered to General Clinton, who thereupon prepared to return to New York. But first he sent three expeditions up three different rivers to the interior to pursue the advantages gained by the surrender. Of these three, one, under Lord Cornwallis, was ordered to cross the Santee River and pursue a large train of American stores and ammunition which, under the command of Colonel Burford, was retreating in all haste by the north-east bank towards North Carolina. Accordingly, on the 18th May, Cornwallis with a mixed force 1780. of 2500 men, including Tarleton’s legion and the Seventeenth, marched off and crossed the Santee in boats at Lanew’s Ferry. The legion and Seventeenth were then at once detached to Georgetown to clear the left flank of Cornwallis’s line of march, while the main body pursued its way up the river to Nelson’s Ferry. Having rejoined Cornwallis at that point on the 27th, Tarleton was detached once more with 40 men of the Seventeenth, 130 of the legion dragoons, 100 mounted infantry, and a three-pounder field-gun, to follow Burford by forced marches. So intense was the heat that many both of the men and of the horses broke down; but by dint of impressing fresh horses on the road the little column reached Camden (sixty miles distant as the crow flies) on the following day. There Tarleton learned that Burford was still far ahead of him, having left Rugeley’s Mills (twenty miles as the crow flies beyond Camden) on the 26th. Moreover, American reinforcements were on the march to join him from North Carolina, and both columns were making all haste to effect a junction. Seeing that such junction must at all hazards be prevented, Tarleton started off again at 2 A.M. on the 29th, reached Rugeley’s Mills at daylight, and there 29th May. obtained information of Burford still in retreat twenty miles ahead of him. In the hope of delaying him Tarleton sent him a message, wherein he exaggerated the strength of his force, to summon him to surrender. But Burford was too cunning either to pause or to surrender; so there was nothing for Tarleton to do but to leave his three-pounder behind and press on with his weary men and horses as best he could. At last at three in the afternoon the British advanced parties came up with Burford’s rear-guard, captured five men, and forced Burford to turn and fight. His force was 380 infantry, a detachment of cavalry, and 2 guns. The British had started but 300 strong, had marched a hundred and five miles in fifty-four hours, and had perforce left some men behind them on the way. Tarleton divided his little party into three columns, whereof the men of the Seventeenth, under Captain Talbot, formed the centre, and attacked at once. 1780. The Americans reserved their fire till the cavalry was within ten yards of them, but failed to check the charge of the British, who galloped straight into the middle of them and did fearful execution. Tarleton’s horse was killed under him; and the men, thinking that their leader was dead, became mad. The Americans lost 14 officers and 99 men killed; 8 officers and 142 men wounded, 3 officers and 50 men prisoners, also 3 colours, 2 guns, and the whole of their baggage train. The British lost but 2 officers and 3 men killed, 1 officer (Lieutenant Patteshall of the Seventeenth) and 11 men wounded, and 40 horses. After this action, known as the engagement of Waxhaws, the Americans who were advancing from North Carolina at once retired; and Tarleton rejoined Cornwallis at Camden. South Carolina was now virtually cleared of American troops; and Cornwallis having established a few outlying posts to keep order, and left Lord Rawdon in command at Camden, returned to Charleston to take up the business of civil administration.

General Washington now detached 2000 men from the North to North Carolina, which nucleus being reinforced by 4000 more men from Virginia, entered South Carolina once more on the 27th July, and advanced along the line of the Upper Santee upon Camden. To the great disgust and disappointment of the British commander the whole country welcomed the arrival of the Americans with joy, and Cornwallis in great anxiety hastened up to Camden in person. General Gates with 6000 men was advancing in his front, General Sumpter with 1000 men was threatening his communications with Charleston in rear; 800 of the garrison of Camden were in hospital, and a bare 2000 men fit for service. Nevertheless Cornwallis decided rather to advance against Gates than to retreat upon Charleston; and accordingly marched at 10 P.M. on the 15th August, almost exactly at the time when Gates started down the same road to meet him. 16th Aug. At 2 A.M. the advanced parties of the two columns met, fortunately just at a point where Cornwallis had reached a good position, his flanks being secured by swampy ground, and the line of 1780. Gates’s advance narrowed by the same cause to a point which prevented deployment of his far superior force. Cornwallis drew up his little army in two lines, holding Tarleton’s cavalry in reserve in the rear. Even this small force of mounted men had been weakened by the recall of part of the Seventeenth to New York; but the regiment was nevertheless represented. Cornwallis took the initiative, and after an hour’s hard fighting broke up the Americans completely. Then Tarleton was let loose with his men of the Seventeenth and dragoons of the legion, who pursued the defeated army for twenty-two miles, capturing seven guns, the whole of the baggage, and a great number of prisoners. Cornwallis lost 345 men killed and wounded, nearly all of them from the infantry, while the Americans lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, not far from 2000 men, a number equal to that of the whole British force engaged.

There still remained General Sumpter, with 1000 men well armed and equipped, on the south side of the Wateree (Upper Santee), who was now preparing to retreat to North Carolina. Tarleton with a mixed force of 350 men was at once sent across the river after him; but by noon on the day after the 17th Aug. battle his troops were so exhausted by fatigue and by the heat that he was forced to pick out 100 cavalry and 60 infantry, and proceed with these alone. After marching five miles further his advanced party came upon two American vedettes, who fired and killed one dragoon. But the shots caused no alarm in the American camp, for it was assumed that the American militiamen, according to their usual habit, were merely shooting at cattle. Tarleton’s men at once captured the vedettes, and moved on to a neighbouring height, from which on peering over the crest they discovered the Americans comfortably resting, without the least suspicion of danger, during the heat of the day. General Sumpter was not even dressed, so hot was the weather; and altogether Tarleton’s task, thanks to his own energy, was once more an easy one. The Americans were promptly attacked and dispersed with the loss of 150 killed and wounded, and 300 prisoners. 1780. Two guns, a great quantity of stores and ammunition, and 250 loyalist prisoners previously captured by Sumpter, also fell into Tarleton’s hands.

Emboldened by this success, Lord Cornwallis advanced into North Carolina, but owing to the destruction of one of his detachments was compelled to fall back once more into South Carolina, and thus, notwithstanding his victory at Camden, found himself in as bad a position as ever. In November the indefatigable Sumpter, undismayed by previous defeats, collected another force and again threatened the British communications between Camden and Charleston. Once again Tarleton was ordered to checkmate him; but this time fortune sided with Sumpter. Tarleton on receiving his instructions moved off with his usual swiftness, and interposing between Sumpter’s force and the line of retreat into North Carolina, was on the point of cutting him off before Sumpter had received the least warning of an enemy’s approach. Unluckily, however, a deserter betrayed Tarleton’s movements, and thus enabled Sumpter to get the start of him on his retreat. Tarleton none the less followed hard after him, and having overtaken his rear-guard, and cut it to pieces, hurried forward with a handful of 170 of the Seventeenth and legion cavalry, and 80 mounted infantry, to catch the main body before it could cross a rapid river, the Tyger, that barred its line of march. At 5 P.M. on the 20th November he finally overtook Sumpter at Blackstocks, and with his usual impetuosity attacked him forthwith. The American force was 1000 strong, skilfully posted on difficult ground, and sheltered by log huts. Tarleton’s men were beaten back from all points, and being very heavily punished, were forced to retire. But by chance Sumpter himself had been badly wounded; and the Americans, without a leader to hold them together, retreated and dispersed. Tarleton, therefore, although defeated, was successful in gaining his point, and received particular commendation for this action from Lord Cornwallis.

1780.

In December reinforcements from New York were sent to South Carolina, and among them a troop of the Seventeenth, which was added to Tarleton’s command for the forthcoming operations. Cornwallis designed to march once more into North Carolina. The Americans, true to their habitual tactics, resolved to keep him in the South by harassing his outlying posts, and to this end sent 1000 men under General Morgan across the Broad River to attack Lord Rawdon in the district known as “Ninety-six,” on the western frontier of South Carolina. Cornwallis replied to this by detaching Tarleton, with a mixed force of about 1000 men, to the north-west to cut off Morgan’s retreat. 1781. On the night of the 6th January, Tarleton, after a very fatiguing march, managed to get within six miles of Morgan, who retreated in a hurry, leaving his provisions half-cooked on the ground. 7th Jan. At three next morning Tarleton resumed the pursuit, and at 8 A.M. came up with the American force, disposed for action, at a place called the Cowpens. As usual Tarleton attacked without hesitation, in fact so quickly that he barely allowed time for his troops to take up their allotted positions. The 7th Foot and legion infantry formed his first line, flanked on each side by a troop of cavalry; the 71st Foot and remainder of the cavalry were held in reserve. The Americans were drawn up in two lines, whereof the first was easily broken, but the second stood firm and fought hard. Seeing that his infantry attack was failing, Tarleton ordered the troop of cavalry on the right flank to charge, which it duly did under a very heavy fire, but being unsupported, was driven back by Morgan’s cavalry with some loss. Tarleton then ordered up the 71st, which drove back the Americans brilliantly for a time, but being, like the rest of the British force, fatigued by the previous hours of hard marching, could not push the attack home. The Americans rallied and charged in their turn, and the British began to waver. Tarleton ordered his irregular cavalry to charge, but they would not move; and then the American cavalry came down upon the infantry, and all was confusion. 1781. “Where is now the boasting Tarleton?” shouted Colonel Washington, as he galloped down on the broken ranks. But the boasting Tarleton, who had driven Washington once to hide for his life in a swamp, and once to swim for his life across the Santee, was not quite done with yet. Amid all the confusion the troop of the Seventeenth rallied by itself, and with these, a mere 40 men, and 14 mounted officers who had formed on them, Tarleton made a desperate charge against the whole of Washington’s cavalry, hurled it back, and pressing on through them, cut to pieces the guard stationed over the captured English baggage. Cornet Patterson of the Seventeenth, maddened by Colonel Washington’s taunt, singled him out, and was shot dead by Washington’s orderly trumpeter. Lieutenant Nettles of the Seventeenth was wounded, and many troopers of the regiment likewise fell that day. The survivors of that charge were the only men that left the field with Tarleton that evening. The irregular cavalry was collected in the course of the following days; but the infantry men were cut down where they stood. Both the 7th and the 71st had done admirably throughout their previous engagements in the war, and felt that their detachments had not received fair treatment at Cowpens. The 71st, it is on record, never forgave Tarleton to the last.