This may be a decision, in case a nation be rivalled in a branch where she has not equal advantages with her neighbours; and when she cannot compensate this inconvenience, either by her frugality or industry, or by the means of a proper application of her national wealth. These operations have been already fully explained, and are now considered as laid aside; not that we suppose they can ever cease to operate their effects in all nations, but in order to simplify our ideas, and to point out the principles which ought to direct a statesman upon occasions where he finds better expedients impracticable, from different combinations of circumstances.

Let me next suppose a nation to be rivalled, in her staple manufactures; that is, in those where she has the greatest natural advantages in her favour.

Whenever such a case happens, it must proceed from some vice within the state. Either from the progress of luxury in the workmen, which must proceed from consolidated profits, or from accidental disadvantage; such as dearness of subsistence, or from taxes injudiciously imposed. These (I mean all, except the taxes, of which afterwards) must be removed upon the principles above laid down: and if this cannot be compassed, no matter why; then comes the fatal period, when all foreign reciprocal commerce in manufactures must be given up. For if no profit can be made upon branches where a nation has the greatest natural advantages, it is more than probable, that every other branch will prove at least equally disadvantageous. If upon this revolution the ports of the nation be not shut against the importation of foreign manufactures, merchants will introduce them, and this will drain off the nation’s[nation’s] wealth, and bring the industrious to starve.

It is upon this principle that incorporations are established. Of these we shall say a word, and conclude our chapter.

Cities and corporations, may be considered as nations, where luxury and taxes have rendred living so expensive, that work cannot be furnished but at a high rate. If labour, therefore, of all kinds, were permitted to be brought from the provinces, or from the country, to supply the demand of the capital and smaller corporations, what would become of tradesmen and manufactures who have their residence there? If these, on the other hand, were to remove beyond the liberties of such corporations, what would become of the public revenue, collected in these little states, as I may call them?

By the establishment of corporations, a statesman is enabled to raise high impositions upon all sorts of consumption; and notwithstanding that these have the necessary consequence of increasing the price of labour, yet by other regulations, of which afterwards, the bad consequences thereby resulting to foreign trade may be avoided, and every article of exportation be prevented from rising above the proper standard for making it vendible, in spite of all foreign competition.

The plan of modern taxation seems first to have been introduced into cities, while the country was subject to the barons, and remained in a manner quite free from them. Cities having obtained the privilege of incorporation, began, in consequence of the power vested in their magistrates, to levy taxes: and finding the inconveniences resulting from external competition (foreign trade) they erected the different classes of their industrious into confraternities, or corporations of a lower denomination, with power to prevent the importation of work from their fellow tradesmen not of the society.

Here arises a question.

Why are corporations complained of in many countries, as being a check upon industry; if the establishment of them proceeds from so plain a principle as that here laid down?

Let me draw my answer from another question. Why are they not complained of in all countries?