With these they subdued the world, as I may call it, that is, all the polite nations then known; the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Asiatics. Had they remained satisfied, their empire might possibly have subsisted; because people who are rich, luxurious, and polite, are commonly peaceable. But nothing could satisfy their ambition: they conquered Gaul, and stretched the boundary of their empire from the streights of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Rhine. All was peaceable on that side, and in two or three centuries, both Spain and Gaul had adopted the spirit, language, and manners of the Roman people. But when they passed the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates, they found mankind still less cultivated, and very little known. Their enemies fled before them, and left a territory which was not worth possessing. This of all barriers is the strongest. By carrying on war against such people, the match was very unequal; those nations had every thing to gain, and nothing to lose; the Romans had all to lose, and nothing to win. Those wars continued until the Barbarians learned the Roman discipline, and became warriors. It was the most profitable trade for them, as well as the only means of safety. That this was the plan of their oeconomy appears plainly from the form of government every where established by them. Where every free man was a soldier, there was no occasion for a regular militia.
Men are governed by prejudice more than by reason: to this I attribute the sudden change in the government of Europe. In place of one man governing the world, as was the case of the Emperors, the new spirit was, that all soldiers were equal, and a King was but primus inter pares. The sudden revolution had the effect of ruining every thing: learning, industry, politics, all went to wreck. One hundred years of barbarity must ruin the effects of a thousand centuries of politeness. This is the date of the annihilation of standing armies. A powerful Prince, such as Charles the Great, who acted in a high sphere, and who made the world his own, might, during his lifetime, establish the old oeconomy. But the general establishment of the feudal form of government, which, no doubt, was the best for preserving a great empire, filled with barbarity every where, joined with the weakness of that Prince’s successors, introduced a new form less barbarous than the former, but equally compatible with a numerous standing militia. Every Baron became a sovereign, and his vassals were bred to arms; but as they were forced to attend the plough for subsistence, as well as the camp; wars were carried on consistently with agriculture. Certain months of the year were appropriated for war; others for peace. This was easily accomplished: war was constantly at the door; a campaign was finished in a week, because every man’s nearest neighbour was commonly his worst enemy.
Europe remained in this general state of confusion for some centuries. Princes had, during that period, a most precarious authority, and when any nation chanced to be under the government of one who had talents to unite his subjects, he became so formidable that there was no possibility of resisting him. In those days, it was a hard matter to form an idea of a balance of power; because there was no rule to determine the force of nations. Under the Otho’s, Germany threatned Italy with chains; under Edward and Henry, England seemed on the road of adding all France to her monarchy; Ferdinand the catholic, laid the foundation of the Spanish greatness, and his successors bid fair for the universal monarchy of Europe. In our days, the acquisition of a small province, nay of a considerable town, is not to be made by conquest, without a general convention between all the powers of Europe, and those who are conversant in foreign affairs, can estimate, in a minute, the force of Princes, by the troops they are able to maintain; nothing is so easy as to lay down, on a sheet of paper, a state of all the armed men in Europe. A Prince can hardly add a soldier to a company, but all the world is informed of it. Excepting the extent of their credit, and the talents of their generals and counsellors, every thing relative to power is become the object of computation. Hence the balance of power, formerly unknown, is now become familiar. So much is sufficient for the matter of fact; let us now examine why trade and industry have given rise to so regular a system of war.
The reason is, because in a state where those are introduced, every thing must be made regular, or all will go to wreck. The keeping up of large armies, is the remains of that turbulent spirit which animated royalty for so many centuries. All literature is filled with warlike sentiments, from.the books of Moses to the news papers of this day. A young person cannot learn to read without imbibing the fire of war. But as nothing is so evident, from the consideration of the total revolution in the spirit of the people of Europe, as that war is inconsistent with the prosperity of a modern state, I sometimes allow my imagination to carry me so far as to believe the time is at hand when war will come to cease. But there is no such thing as predicting in political matters: general peace is a contingent consequence which a thousand accidents may prevent; and one among the rest is, that the whole plan of modern policy may be broken to pieces, before Princes come to discover that it is their interest to be quiet. The ambition of one, arms all the rest, and when once they are at the head of their armies, want of money only assembles a congress, not to make peace, but that the parties may have some years to gather new force.
It is not therefore trade and industry which have given birth to standing armies, they have only rendred war impossible without them. It is the ambition of Princes to extend their dominion, and even sometimes to extend their commerce, which gives occasion to war. And we see daily how difficult it becomes to provide troops for this purpose, from no other reason so much as from the progress of trade and industry. Those who have the money cannot have the men, those who have the men cannot have the money. Do we not see how the greatest monarchy in Europe, the Prince who has the most millions of subjects, cannot preserve the rank of power he has prescribed to himself (his political-necessary for war) without a body of above thirty thousand strangers, in the time of the most profound peace, and after the greatest reduction judged consistent with the safety of the country? These cost vastly more than national troops, and brave men of all countries are alike; so that the only reason for keeping up so large a body of foreigners, is to facilitate augmentations when occasion requires it; and not to spare the subjects who are willing to serve, but to spare agriculture and industry, after the superfluities of these have fallen in, to compleat that body of troops which experience has determined to be proportioned to such superfluities.
From this short exposition let me deduce a principle. That since every state has occasion, according to the present system of Europe, for a certain number of armed men for their defence, the first care of a statesman, is, to discover to what number those of his subjects, who willingly prefer the conditions offered for military service to the occupations of industry, may amount. If he finds these exceed the number wanted for recruiting the army, it is a good reason to diminish the pay; until the encouragement comes upon a level with the supply demanded. If on the contrary, the number of volunteers falls below the standard required, he must examine the state of the balance of work and demand, before he can give any farther encouragement. If this balance stands even, he must take care that the pay given to soldiers be not carried so high, as to engage those of the lowest class of profitable industry to desert it.
What measures, therefore, can be fallen upon? There are two. Either to hire foreign troops, as many states do; and I suppose for good reasons, only because it is done. But I should prefer another method, which is to create a new class of inhabitants, appropriated for supplying the army, upon the principle above laid down, that he who feeds may have as many mouths as he pleases.
I would therefore fix the military pay at a rate below the profits of useful industry, and accept of such as should offer. For the augmentation of this class, I would receive all male children who should be given or exposed by their parents. These should be bred to every sort of labour for which the state has occasion, and their numbers might be carried to twenty per cent. above that which might be judged necessary in time of the hottest war. Out of this class only, the standing forces might be recruited: those who remained might be employed in every public service; such as working in arsenals, docks, highways, public buildings, &c. By taking care of the children of this whole class, their numbers would rise to whatever height might be judged necessary. The same spirit would be kept up; they might serve by turns, and all become disciplined. This is a good scheme, in many cases, and is an improvement upon the distribution of the inhabitants: the execution is gradual; therefore no sudden revolution is implied. But it is fit only for a state which can augment its numbers, without seeking for subsistence from without. It would spare the land and manufactures, and be a ready outlet for all supernumeraries in every class.
This subject shall be resumed in the fifth book, when we come to the application of the amount of taxes. At present it has found a place, only because the support of a national force has been ranked among the objects of attention of those statesmen who are at the head of rich and luxurious nations which have lost their foreign trade.
Quest. 6. What are the principles upon which the relative force of nations is to be estimated?