Besides, it was acknowleged publicly, that the notes were coined for that purpose. (See Dutot, Vol. I. p. 144.) In the next place, it is evident, that the notes which had been given in payment for those actions, had been borrowed back, to fill up the loan of 1600 millions of livres; which the company never could have otherwise lent to the King. And in the last place, it is certain that the public debts were paid off with these notes, so borrowed back from the company: because we shall find the notes in circulation at the blowing up of the system, in May 1720; and we shall see how they were paid and withdrawn in October following.
This detail I own is a little long, and perhaps too minute: but I thought it necessary to prove the solidity of my conjectures concerning the Regent’s motives in concerting this plan; which no French author, that ever I saw, has pretended to unfold, except by hints too dark to be easily comprehended.
What is now to follow, will still set my conjectures in a fairer light. We have seen already from the table, with what rapidity the creation of actions went on from the 13th of September to the 4th of October 1719. No less than 324,000 were created in that interval.
Yet Dutot, vol. ii. p. 169, et seq. positively says, that on the 4th of October, the company had not sold for more than 182,500,000 livres of their actions. Now the total value, as they were rated when created, extended to 1,797,500,000; so there was little more than one tenth part of the value sold off.
Why therefore create such immense quantities of actions, and so far beyond the demand for them, but to throw dust in the eyes of the public; to keep up the spirit of infatuation; and to pave the way for the final execution of the plan?
The actions being brought, by four successive creations, of the 13th and 28th of September, the 2d and 4th of October, to their full number, the company, during that interval, obtained the general receipt of the whole revenue. Thus, says Dutot, vol. ii. p. 197. the company was intrusted with the whole revenue, debts and expences of the state, and all unnecessary charge was avoided in collecting and administring it.
In the month of November 1719, the credit of the bank, and of the company, was so great, that the actions rose to 10,000 livres. Notwithstanding, says Dutot, vol. ii. p. 198. that the company did what they could to keep down the price, by throwing into the market, in one week, for no less than 30 millions. He assigns seven different reasons for this, which, all put together, are not worth one; to wit, that the Regent was ready to buy up every one that lay upon hand, in concert with the company.
If the company had been inclined to keep down the price of the actions, they had nothing more to do than to deliver part of the vast number they still had unsold, at the standard value of 5000 livres, at which they were rated when created; and this would have effectually prevented their rising to 10,000 livres.
But it was the interest of the Regent, who was at that time well provided with actions, to stock-job, and to buy with one hand, while he was selling with the other: these operations were then as well known in the street called Quinquempoix, as now in Change-alley.
As a proof of the justness of my allegation, that the Regent was doing all he could to raise the price of the actions, Dutot informs us, in the place above cited, that the bank, at this very time, was lending money, upon the security of actions, at 2 per cent. If that was the[the] case, how was it possible that an action, with 200 livres dividend, should sell for less than 10,000 livres, which is the capital corresponding to 200 livres, at 2 per cent.?