[17] These were all artillery officers.
[18] The late General Sir David Wood, G.C.B., R.H.A.
[19] The history of the Crimean campaign by the Baron de Bazancourt is often incorrect, and sometimes unjust as regards the British army, and is therefore not altogether to be relied on. But in his account of the French views and proposals he has more complete knowledge, and, in fact, usually quotes official documents, and I have therefore made some quotations from his work, especially as to this critical juncture.
[CHAPTER VIII]
On April 9 the second bombardment, for which such incessant preparations had been made during the winter, at length commenced, and was vigorously maintained for the following ten days; and although the Russians carried out numerous sorties, and were also unceasing each night in repairing their shattered batteries, still it became evident that the allies had achieved a virtual mastery and had laid open paths for a general assault. It was a momentous crisis. As regards the condition of Sebastopol at that time, Todleben, writing of the Bastion du Mât, said[20] 'that after having undergone a constant and violent bombardment, the work was in a desperate plight. Its artillery had been dismounted, its embrasures and its merlons almost entirely demolished, and a part of its salient had fallen in,' ... 'that they were constantly expecting to see the enemy take advantage of the critical state to which the bastion was reduced, and advance to the assault of the work.' He adds, that the French might have advanced to the assault of the bastion with an absolute certainty of success ... and that would have carried with it the fall of Sebastopol.' ...
The allied armies were indeed in full expectation of being at length led to the assault, and the result was almost a foregone conclusion, but no order was issued and no decisive action taken. The real history of the case was not known at the time, but the accounts published by De Bazancourt in 1856, and confirmed long afterwards by Kinglake's account, have cleared up the mystery. De Bazancourt[21] said: 'La pensée d'une opération à l'extérieur planait toujours, on le voit, sur les décisions, et empêchait de tenter contre la place une action décisive. Les instructions secrètes du général Canrobert lui liaient les mains, à moins de force majeure.' Again, he quotes a despatch of Canrobert of April 24 as follows: 'Les officiers généraux des armes spéciales des deux armées, les chefs de nos deux corps d'armée, ont été unanimes pour céder dans cette circonstance aux cris de nos soldats français et anglais, demandant l'assaut. Lord Raglan partage fermement leur avis. J'ai pensé que mon devoir était de m'y joindre....' It seems remarkable, considering the unanimity which prevailed amongst the allied generals, and that the French Commander-in-Chief himself said he felt it his duty to join them, that no assault took place. Kinglake,[22] however, by means of French official documents brought to light after the fall of the Empire, proves that General Canrobert was in reality held back by instructions from Paris and by the influence of General Niel, and, in view of the expected arrival of the Emperor, would not join in a general assault.
Lord Raglan had apparently been informed of the expected arrival of the Emperor Napoleon, which he considered ill-advised, but both he and the English Government were kept for some time in the dark as to the special instructions which fettered the action of General Canrobert. Various interviews took place towards the end of April between the two Commanders-in-Chief, and in my journal I find a remark as follows: 'Met Lord Raglan out riding; he invited me to dinner, but added: "Canrobert is coming to a Council of War at half-past six, so we shall be late." The Council did not break up till ten P.M.'
Days thus passed away, and the allies were gradually losing the opportunity for which they had so long waited. In fact, the second bombardment of Sebastopol failed, from causes, however, very different from those which prevailed in the first. In October, 1854, our failure was due to want of power; in April, 1855, it was from want of will. Events, however, were hurrying on, and the crisis soon came.
Towards the end of April the Emperor Napoleon[23] relinquished his intention of coming to the Crimea, but sent out his proposed plan of an external campaign, to which, however, Lord Raglan strongly objected.[24] Whilst matters thus drifted, and whilst the batteries of the allies were again becoming weak and their ammunition exhausted, a new actor appeared on the scene in the person of General Pélissier, who was commanding the French corps d'armée on the left. Amongst other matters, he pointed out to Canrobert in clear and forcible language[25] that the Russians were establishing counter approaches in his front, and that he, and those under him, were fully convinced that the enemy's new position must be taken by a coup de main. He concluded: 'S'il m'était donner de décider, je n'hésiterais pas.' General Canrobert wavered, but at length accepted the responsibility, and the order for the attack was given for May 1. In my journal is a record as follows: 'Returned from Balaclava about 10 o'clock P.M. on the 1st of May and had an interview with Lord Raglan. Lord Stratford was there, when a message came that a severe battle was going on in front of the French trenches near the sea. We went off to a post of observation. The scene was striking. The sky was lit up with constant flashes—shells whizzing through the air; and amidst the incessant rattle of musketry could be heard the cheers of the troops as they stormed the works. It lasted four hours. Canrobert was with us, walking up and down, flourishing his stick and greatly excited. The result was that the French captured an outwork, and took eight mortars, and also five officers prisoners.'