Recollections of a Military Life

by Sir John Adye

[107] See Appendix to Fifth Report of Committee of House of Commons on Army and Navy Estimates, 1887, in which correspondence is quoted between the Treasury, War Office, and Admiralty, confirming the above views.

[108] The British Army in 1875: a Reply to Mr. John Holms, M.P.

[CHAPTER XXVII]

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1878-79

The gradual advance of Russia, and its conquest of the ancient principalities of Central Asia during the present century, have from time to time formed subjects of great interest to the people of this country, chiefly on account of the possible effect of the Russian approach to the borders of our Indian empire; and, having studied the question for many years, I propose to give a short summary of its rise, progress, and present position, more especially from a military point of view. At the beginning of the century, the southern boundary of Russia extended from the north of the Caspian by Orenburg and Orsk, and then across to the old Mongolian city of Semipalatinsk, and was guarded by a cordon of forts and Cossack outposts. This line was no less than 2,000 miles in length, and abutted on the great Kirghis steppe, and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing in its vicinity, but by no means established the hold of Russia on that pathless, and for the most part lifeless waste. Nevertheless, even in those early days, we experienced occasional alarms from imaginary invasions of our Eastern possessions. In 1801 we were threatened with a joint attack of the French, Persian, and Afghan armies; but finally we made a treaty with the Shah, in which it was stipulated that 'should an army of the French nation, actuated by design and deceit,' attempt to establish themselves in Persia, a conjoint force of English and Persians should be appointed to put an end to them.

In 1808, another great expedition against the East India Company's possessions was planned—on paper—between Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander of Russia; but this danger was also averted by a second treaty at Teheran in 1809, in which the Shah covenanted 'not to permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia.' Again, for a third time, in 1837, we were supposed to be threatened by a combined attack of Persians, Russians, and Afghans, of which Kaye gives the following account: 'It was believed,' he says, 'that the danger was great and imminent. There was a Persian army, under the command of the King of kings himself, investing Herat, and threatening to march upon Candahar and Cabul. There were Russian diplomatists and Russian engineers in his camp, directing the councils of the Shah and the operations of the siege. The Barukzye sirdars of Afghanistan were intriguing with the Persian Court; and far out in the distance, beyond the mountains of the Hindoo Koosh, there was the shadow of a great northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping across the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards the frontier of Hindostan.'[109] All these shadows, however, passed harmlessly away; and the so-called great northern army, as we now know, but as we did not know then, was the Russian column of Perofski, consisting of a few thousand men, which had left Orenburg with a view to chastise the Khan of Khiva, and which perished from famine and pestilence in the snowy wastes of the Barsuk desert, north of the Aral.

It was not until 1847, contemporaneously with our final conquest of the Punjab, that the Russian advances in Central Asia assumed an important aspect. She had held nominal sway since 1730 over the Kirghis tribes in the western division of the great steppe; but, except in the vicinity of Orenburg, had little real control. In 1847-8, however, Russia erected three fortresses in the heart of the steppe—thus forming a connecting link with the Sir Daria—and established Fort Aralsk, near the embouchure of the river. The Russians having thus crossed the great desert, came permanently into contact with the three khanates of Central Asia, and their progress and conquests since that date have been comparatively easy and rapid. The principalities had no military strength which could long withstand the advance of a great Power, and the Russians are now predominant in that part of the world, and are masters on the Aral and Caspian Seas. Drawing a line from east to west, their outposts are dotted along the crests of the Tian-Shan mountains, looking down on Kashgar; in the centre their frontier touches the outlying provinces of Afghanistan which lie to the north of the Hindoo Koosh; whilst on the west their possessions run along the border of Persia.

What we have to consider, therefore, is the fact that a great Power, within the last forty or fifty years, has virtually advanced its old frontier for many hundred miles southwards, rapidly overrunning the country like a tidal wave over sands; absorbing decaying principalities, establishing forts at strategic points, taking possession of inland seas, routes, and river communications, until its frontier posts not only approach our own, but are on the confines of countries with which we are closely associated, and some of which are more or less under our direct influence and control. Her long line of frontier is devious, and not always perfectly defined; it wanders along the crests of mountains, is marked sometimes by the course of rivers, and occasionally almost lost in pathless deserts. So far as the principalities themselves are concerned, it is admitted that their conquest by Russia is an unmixed blessing to the inhabitants. In their bare outline these changes are certainly matters of interest to us; but they do not necessarily constitute a great danger. There is undoubtedly a difference between the present and the past. The military forces of a great Power are now in comparative proximity to our Indian empire, and hold ground formerly in possession of governments which, although usually unfriendly, had no real means of injuring us. We need not now discuss the causes of Russian activity; whether they have been the result of the apocryphal will of Peter the Great, or of the military restlessness and ambition of her generals on the spot, or the inevitable consequence of collision with half-civilised decaying States. What we have to consider is the effect on our position in India.

Perhaps the most striking feature is the vast extent of country absorbed by Russia. From Orenburg in the north to Samarcand in the south is more than 1,000 miles in a straight line, and from the Caspian to Kuldja, west to east, about 1,500 miles. Increased military power is not, however, a necessary result of extended dominion. The annexation of a country well peopled, fertile, rich, and civilised, and whose inhabitants are in accord with their new rulers, may give a great accession of strength, but when none of these conditions are fulfilled, conquest may lead to military weakness. The population of Central Asia is not only extremely sparse, but, owing to extensive deserts and to the vicissitudes of climate, many of the tribes are nomadic in their habits. The whole population is estimated not to exceed four millions and a half. When we consider that our empire of India, which approximately is of about the same geographical area as Russian Central Asia, contains a population of over 250 millions, we have at once a striking example presented to us of the difference of the two regions.

The power of conducting military operations on a great scale depends not only on the resources of the country to be traversed as regards supplies of food, pasture, fuel, and water, but also on facilities of communication and transport. In discussing, therefore, the possible future danger to our Eastern possessions from a further advance of Russia, the sterility and general characteristics of the country in which she has established herself, and also the great distance of her troops from the main resources of the empire, become important elements for consideration. War is a science which depends for its success not only on the courage of well armed, disciplined hosts, and of skilled generals as leaders, but also on the means of rapid concentration and of bringing up reserves of munitions and matériel. Modern armies are specially tied by such considerations. Now Central Asia is exceptionally deficient in all these essential requirements, and these conditions are abiding. It therefore forms a very weak base of operations against a great empire like India, whose general characteristics are of an exactly contrary character; and although the construction in recent years of a railway from the Caspian to Samarcand will to a certain extent give facility for transport, still it will not in itself alter the general features of the pathless deserts of which the greater part of the country consists.