The Australian Victories in France in 1918

by Sir John Monash

The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the part of the 13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd Brigade of the First Division in the capture of tactical points, and in the bloody repulse of all attempts by the enemy to recapture them. In this way our line was carried up to and a little beyond what had been the old British reserve line of trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000 yards of the final objective of the first phase of the contemplated operations.

On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders who were to participate in the next great battle, Maclagan (Fourth Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage (Tanks), Chamier (Air Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the four Generals of my own Staff. The conference took place in a Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near Maclagan's Headquarters, and I was able to announce that the date had been fixed for September 18th.

The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features. The methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this time we all began to understand each other so well that most of what I had to say could almost be taken for granted. Each Commander was ready to anticipate the action that would be required of him, almost as soon as I had unfolded the general plan.

The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me. I felt that it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the contemplation of losses among our splendid men, which might be lessened by the more liberal use of mechanical aids, always sorely troubled me. I endeavoured to meet the situation by adopting two unusual expedients.

The first was to double the machine-gun resources of the two battle Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete machine-gun battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and adding them to those of the line Divisions. This gave me a total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns on a frontage now reduced to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver so dense a machine-gun barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the infantry, that to quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who was captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely too terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but to crouch down in our trenches and wait for you to come and take us."

The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective. This was to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating a number of dummy ones. As soon as the word went round Engineers and Pioneers vied with each other in rapid "Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were clandestinely robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and some weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible of them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle. Four men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position from which it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there abandoned it. There is little doubt that this trick contributed its share to the day's astonishing success.

Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall the shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly straight across the whole front, so as to avoid all complexities in fire direction.

The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery "Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by regular leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel lines, until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had shown that such a start line for the Artillery should be at least 200 yards in advance of the line on which the Infantry were to form up ready for the assault. A liberal margin of space had to be allowed, in order to minimize the risks to our own Infantry.

The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps. The guns were laid upon it by methods which depended upon accurate surveys, on the ground, of the exact position of every gun. When that had been determined, the map and compass helped to decide the range and alignment upon which the gun should open fire.

On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of, or on our side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called the Infantry "Start Line." It then became necessary to determine, upon the actual ground, the position of this Infantry Start Line, and to mark it in such a way that the Infantry would be enabled to take up their correct positions. This would ensure that the Infantry would know that the fall of our opening barrage would be 200 yards in advance of the line so marked.