The outcome was a letter to the Fourth Army which foreshadowed, almost in its entirety, the battle plan which subsequently was actually employed. The substance of this letter is here reproduced. The text has been modified only by the omission of the reference letters to a large coloured map which accompanied it:
Corps Headquarters,
18th September, 1918.Fourth Army.
1. I beg to submit the outlines of a plan for a series of operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line in the Sector Bellicourt-Vendhuille, based upon the expectation that two American Divisions will be available immediately to supplement this Corps.
2. The resources of the Corps in Infantry, which will be available, are exclusive of the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, although the Artillery, Technical Troops and Machine Gun Battalions of those Divisions will continue to be available.
3. The plan is based upon the assumption that the objective Blue Line of the operations of September 18th is in our possession all along the Army Front, or can be seized in the very near future.
4. The accompanying Map shows the coloured lines referred to in the following description, as also the reference letters in blue.
5. This plan is in outline only, and the various objective lines and boundaries suggested are merely tentative, to form the basis for a general plan.
6. The Blue Line is the line of eventual exploitation for the operations of September 18th.
7. The present Corps front on the Blue Line extends a distance of 6,000 yards. It is suggested, either that the Corps front should be extended to a total frontage of 10,000 yards, or that it should be side-slipped northwards to a frontage of 6,000 yards. The latter would obviously be preferable, so far as the Corps is concerned, as enabling all its resources to be concentrated upon a smaller frontage.
8. The major outlines of the plan are as follows:
(a) An attack by two American Divisions for the capture of the Green Line.
(b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions for the capture of the Red Line.
(c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line, in an Easterly and north-easterly direction.
(d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through Bellicourt and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences, operating from north to south—or alternatively.
(e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating through Le Catelet northwards.
9. The details of the above plan will run on the following lines:
(a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the earliest possible moment by two American Divisions, each Division deploying for this purpose only one Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line six Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion about 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line defensively, and will, with the assistance of technical troops, prepare the battle front.
(b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions will thus comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions for each Division. The allocation of objectives to these troops will be as follows:
(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards frontage each) and two Battalions in support for "mopping up" duties. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.
(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Catelet.
(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.
(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be responsible for forming the north defensive flank.
(c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been drawn so as to include all ground giving good observation northward, eastward and southwards, and to deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate to the extreme limits of this proposed objective along the whole battle front without moving forward some of the batteries, particularly in the Northern Divisional Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of an hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be advanced.
(d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the Green Line should be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier. By mobilizing ample resources in technical troops, both American and Australian, and ample tools and engineering material, it should be easily possible to construct not less than four roads, sufficiently developed for horse transport, from the Blue Line to the Green Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be located so as to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings would be made by filling in with earth and not by bridging. It is estimated, therefore, that Mobile Artillery could move forward not later than 2 p.m. on Zero day.
(e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would move at such an hour as would enable them to reach and be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 p.m., shortly after which hour they would be joined by the necessary Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would also involve the capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is assumed that Tanks would be available to deal with the crossing of the wire entanglements covering this line.
(f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be allocated to American troops.
(g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the Green Line, the four American Regiments who had participated in the capture of the Green Line, would be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations eastwards.
10. The following considerations should be kept in view, in connection with this plan.
(a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not merely to provide an effective barrage for the time-table advance to the Green Line and its flanks, but also, in addition, sufficient Mobile Field Artillery, not employed in the barrage, to enable the Australian Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation.
(b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available for the first phase, in order absolutely to guarantee the breaching of the main Hindenburg trench systems. There should, in addition, be available not less than 30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through the Beaurevoir Line.
11. There should be a systematic destructive bombardment of the whole of the Hindenburg trench system on the battle front, lasting at least four days, in order not merely to destroy the defensive organization, but also to demoralize and starve the trench garrisons. This destructive bombardment should extend a considerable distance to the north and south of the battle front.
12. The rapid construction of usable roads, both for horse transport and mechanical transport, across the Canal tunnel, would have to be a special feature of the organization, so that the whole of our battle organization could be rapidly carried forward to maintain the battle eastward of the Red Line. This would involve the mobilization of a large amount of mechanical transport, ready loaded with road-stone, so that road-making can commence after Zero hour without any delay. For these works, there would be available the greater part of the Australian and American technical troops of seven Divisions, as well as Army Troops Companies.
John Monash,
Lieut.-General.
Commanding Australian Corps.
(a) An attack by two American Divisions for the capture of the Green Line.
(b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions for the capture of the Red Line.
(c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line, in an Easterly and north-easterly direction.
(d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through Bellicourt and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences, operating from north to south—or alternatively.
(e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating through Le Catelet northwards.
(a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the earliest possible moment by two American Divisions, each Division deploying for this purpose only one Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line six Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion about 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line defensively, and will, with the assistance of technical troops, prepare the battle front.
(b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions will thus comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions for each Division. The allocation of objectives to these troops will be as follows:
(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards frontage each) and two Battalions in support for "mopping up" duties. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.
(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Catelet.
(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.
(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be responsible for forming the north defensive flank.
(c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been drawn so as to include all ground giving good observation northward, eastward and southwards, and to deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate to the extreme limits of this proposed objective along the whole battle front without moving forward some of the batteries, particularly in the Northern Divisional Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of an hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be advanced.
(d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the Green Line should be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier. By mobilizing ample resources in technical troops, both American and Australian, and ample tools and engineering material, it should be easily possible to construct not less than four roads, sufficiently developed for horse transport, from the Blue Line to the Green Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be located so as to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings would be made by filling in with earth and not by bridging. It is estimated, therefore, that Mobile Artillery could move forward not later than 2 p.m. on Zero day.
(e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would move at such an hour as would enable them to reach and be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 p.m., shortly after which hour they would be joined by the necessary Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would also involve the capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is assumed that Tanks would be available to deal with the crossing of the wire entanglements covering this line.
(f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be allocated to American troops.
(g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the Green Line, the four American Regiments who had participated in the capture of the Green Line, would be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations eastwards.
(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards frontage each) and two Battalions in support for "mopping up" duties. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.
(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Catelet.
(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.
(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be responsible for forming the north defensive flank.
(a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not merely to provide an effective barrage for the time-table advance to the Green Line and its flanks, but also, in addition, sufficient Mobile Field Artillery, not employed in the barrage, to enable the Australian Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation.
(b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available for the first phase, in order absolutely to guarantee the breaching of the main Hindenburg trench systems. There should, in addition, be available not less than 30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through the Beaurevoir Line.
Some comment is necessary upon this proposal. The composition of the American Divisions, following the French and not the British precedent, differed materially from my own Divisions. The American Division consisted of two Brigades, each of two Regiments, each of three Battalions. Its total strength was nearly double that of an English Division.
It will be noted that my proposal involved a concentrated attack, not upon the canal, but upon that sector of 6,000 yards which lay over the Bellicourt-Catelet tunnel. This zone at that time lay clear of and to the north of my Corps area, and that is what involved the necessity of "side-slipping" the Corps front to the north.
Mont St. Quentin—Collecting Australian wounded under the protection of the Red Cross flag, September 1st, 1918.