In the forthcoming attack upon the Hindenburg defences, the process of "mopping up" became of supreme importance, because of the very fact, of which we had become well aware, that the whole defensive system had been provided, on quite an exceptional scale, with underground shelters, galleries, passages and dug-outs. I made the most of this knowledge in my talks to the Americans, emphasized the dangers as strongly as I was able, insisted that the "mopping up" organization of their infantry must be absolutely perfected, and ordered that of the total Infantry participating in the assault, not less than one-half should have the special role of safeguarding all underground exits and entrances.
The great fear was, of course, that these new troops, eager to show their mettle, would be carried away in the excitement of the moment, and would rush headlong forward, regardless of the dangers that lurked behind them. It is, after all, no small demand to make upon the discipline of an Infantry soldier, to expect him patiently and obediently to stand guard over some dug-out entrance, allowing the battle to sweep on, and his comrades to go forward to the excitement and glory of achieving the final objectives.
So indeed it happened. The American Infantry had either not been sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the need of it had not penetrated their understanding. In the attacks carried out by these troops, while under my command, the "mopping up" was always badly done, even in the few cases where it was attempted. The result was failure to achieve a clean success, and a great addition to their own casualty list. This criticism will be fully borne out by the narrative of the great battle itself.
A second and much larger conference was held at my Headquarters on September 26th, for the really complete and final co-ordination of the whole of the procedure for the forthcoming battle. It was attended not only by the American Divisional Generals and Brigadiers, but also by the Commanders of the Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, their Staffs, the Tanks, Air Force and Cavalry.
It was much the largest and was also destined to be the last of any assemblage of Commanders that it had been my privilege to call together in the course of this memorable campaign.
No one present will soon forget the tense interest and confident expectancy which characterized that meeting. America, a great English-speaking democracy on one shore of the Pacific, was to co-operate with Australia, its younger sister democracy on the opposite shore, in what was the greatest and what might be the most decisive battle of the great European War. Few present doubted that, if we were successful, the war could not last much longer—because the loss of the Hindenburg system would inevitably mean for the enemy his final enforced withdrawal from France.
While the conference was in full swing, the Field Marshal himself paid me a call. He had come to wish me success in the task before me. He was interested to find so many Divisional Commanders assembled, and was persuaded to address a few words to the gathering.
The conduct of the proceedings of this conference was a heavy strain. The main battle was to take place on September 29th, or within seventy-two hours, and part of my front line still stood a thousand yards west of the Hindenburg outpost lines. General Rawlinson had decided that this defect was to be made good prior to the main operation, and the attempt to do so had been timed to take place on September 27th, the day after the conference.
I had, therefore, to complete my organization upon the basis of a set of precedent conditions which had not yet been entirely realized. It was a new and a difficult situation. The whole of the powerful Artillery at my disposal for the battle, amounting now to over a thousand guns, was naturally clamouring for final decisions, so that final barrage maps could be submitted for my approval, printed by my very diligent and competent body of lithographic draughtsmen, and circulated to all the batteries and Infantry.