The full official strength of a Battalion of Infantry was 1,000 at the outbreak of the war, but a reduction to 900 had been authorized in July, 1918. No battalion in the Army was ever for long able to maintain itself at a strength of 900. Indeed, experience went to show that so long as the strength did not fall below 600, a unit could quite well carry out, in battle, a normal battalion task, provided that frequent periods of short rest could be assured.
Towards the middle of September, 1918, the successful course of the fighting, and the moderate rate of net wastage—by which I mean the excess of battle losses over replenishments from the rear—had convinced me that there was every reason to hope that the strengths of the 57 battalions could be maintained at a useful standard until the end of the campaigning season of that year. If the war were to go on into 1919, and provided that the Australian Corps could be kept out of the line over the three winter months, thereby avoiding the daily wastage of trench duty, I felt able to guarantee that by the spring of 1919 the whole of these battalions would again have become replenished to a sufficient extent for a spring campaign.
Map H
It may have been an optimistic view; it may have savoured of a desire to postpone the evil day. But I felt assured that the disbandment of a number of additional battalions would seriously impair the fighting spirit of the whole Australian Corps. I was prepared to take the chance of being able to carry on until the end of 1918 with the whole 57 battalions retained intact.
But I was not permitted to do so. At various times during the period June to August, 1918, an unimaginative department at G.H.Q. kept harassing me with inquiries as to when it was proposed to conform to the new Imperial organization in which all Brigades were to be reduced to three Battalions each. These inquiries were at first ignored, but early in September the Adjutant-General became insistent for a reply.
I set out the whole position as I saw it, and strongly urged a postponement of the question until the Corps should have completed the vitally important series of fighting operations on which it was then engaged. Looking back upon the course of events of that time, it is hardly credible now that, having regard to the reasons given, these representations should have been ignored. I procrastinated. Suddenly I received instructions from the War Office that some 6,000 men of the Corps, who had served continuously since 1914, were to be given six months' furlough to Australia, and that they were to be held in readiness to entrain en route for Australia at forty-eight hours' notice.
These orders were received only two days before the battle of Hargicourt. The First and Fourth Divisions, destined to fight in that battle, were those most affected by such a withdrawal of men, because these Divisions contained the battalions and batteries which had been longest in the field. I could not, obviously, take up any attitude which would postpone the well-earned furlough of these veterans; nor had I the smallest inclination to do so. My case against the main proposal for an immediate extinction of additional battalions, was, however, weakened thereby.
The responsible authorities overruled my objections, and on September 19th I received peremptory instructions to disband eight additional battalions forthwith. With many misgivings, I had no option but to comply. I called my Divisional Commanders together, and with them decided which battalions should suffer extinction.