What was even more interesting was that we came for the first time in the war upon French civilians, who had been under the domination of the enemy since the autumn of 1914. These unfortunate folk were found hidden away in cellars and underground shelters, and their joy at their deliverance from foreign bondage was pathetic. It was evident that the enemy had not had time to carry out the evacuation of the civilians, as had been his practice throughout the whole area over which the Australian Corps had hitherto advanced.
By the night of October 5th the Corps had, by the victory of Montbrehain, advanced its line to a point six miles to the east of the Bellicourt Tunnel, and had thereby confirmed the irretrievable collapse of the whole of the Hindenburg defences.
This achievement is, above everything else, an illustration, which should become classic, of the maxim that in war the moral is to the material as three to one. The enemy had all the advantages of position, of carefully prepared field works, of highly-organized defences, of detailed acquaintance with our lines of approach from the west, and of all the other tactical benefits of the defence.
Yet we had the advantage of moral factors. For the past nine weeks the enemy had suffered defeat after defeat. He had at one time been surprised and overwhelmed. He had at another time been driven from strong positions under conditions when surprise played no part. He had been defeated in gunnery, in the air, and in close Infantry fighting. The moral of his troops had steadily declined. They no longer hoped for victory, but anticipated defeat. They knew that they were a beaten army.
The victory won in the series of battles from September 29th to October 5th was a victory of moral, the resolute determination of our troops to overcome all obstacles prevailing against the failing spirits of the defenders. It was a signal illustration that no defences, however powerful, can resist an energetically pressed assault, unless the defenders meet the attack with equal resolution. Verdun and the cliffs of Gallipoli are examples of resolute defence. Port Arthur and the Hindenburg line are equally striking instances of the collapse of formidable field works through failure of the moral of the defenders.
Montbrehain was the last Australian battle in the Great War, and the fighting career of the Australian Army Corps had, as events turned out, come to an end. On that same day my Second Division was relieved by the 30th American Division, and I handed over command of the battle front to General Read. I had borne continuous responsibility, as a Corps Commander, for a section of the battle front in France varying from four to eleven miles for 128 consecutive days without a break.
On that same day, too, Prince Max of Baden accepted the programme of the President of the United States of America, and requested him to take in hand the restoration of peace. On behalf of the German Government he also asked for an immediate Armistice on Land, Water and in the Air.
The long-drawn-out negotiations which followed need only a brief reference. It was first necessary for the Entente Powers to agree upon a common line of action; then followed negotiations between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and hostilities did not actually cease until after the conditions of the Armistice had been signed in the early morning of November 11th.
During this period of five weeks, however, fighting went on. It was of an altogether different character from that in which the Australian Corps had been engaged. The enemy had no line of defence left in France. He was compelled to a retreat which became general along his whole front, and gathered momentum day by day. He gave up Lens, Armentières and the Aubers Ridge without a struggle, thus enabling the Second and Fifth Armies to advance to the occupation of Lille and the adjacent industrial centres.