The decision actually given by me was that "Zero" would be ten minutes past three, and every watch had been carefully synchronized to the second, to ensure simultaneous action. A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony. The whole programme is controlled by an exact time-table, to which every infantryman, every heavy or light gun, every mortar and machine gun, every tank and aeroplane must respond with punctuality; otherwise there will be discords which will impair the success of the operation, and increase the cost of it.
The morning of July 4th was ushered in with a heavy ground mist. This impeded observation and made guidance difficult, but it greatly enhanced the surprise. The unexpected occurrence of this fog lessened the importance of the elaborate care which had been taken to introduce into the Artillery barrage a due percentage of smoke shell, and to form smoke screens by the use of mortars on the flanks of the attack. But the fog largely accounted for the cheap price at which the victory was bought.
No battle within my previous experience, not even Messines, passed off so smoothly, so exactly to time-table, or was so free from any kind of hitch. It was all over in ninety-three minutes. It was the perfection of team work. It attained all its objectives; and it yielded great results. The actual assault was delivered, from right to left, by two battalions of the 6th Brigade, three battalions of the 4th Brigade, and three battalions of the 11th Brigade. It was also part of the plan that advantage was taken by a battalion of the 15th Brigade to snatch from the enemy another slice of territory far away in the Ancre Valley, opposite Dernancourt, and so, by extending the battle front, further to distract him.
The attack was a complete surprise, and swept without check across the whole of the doomed territory. Vaire and Hamel Woods fell to the 4th Brigade, while the 11th Brigade, with its allotted Tanks, speedily mastered Hamel Village itself. The selected objective line was reached in the times prescribed for its various parts, and was speedily consolidated. It gave us possession of the whole of the Hamel Valley, and landed us on the forward or eastern slope of the last ridge, from which the enemy had been able to overlook any of the country held by us.
Still more important results were that we gathered in no less than 1,500 prisoners, and killed and disabled at least as many more, besides taking a great deal of booty, including two field guns, 26 mortars and 171 machine guns—at a cost to us of less than 800 casualties of all kinds, the great majority of whom were walking wounded. The Tanks fulfilled every expectation, and the suitability of the tactics employed was fully demonstrated. Of the 60 Tanks utilized, only 3 were disabled, and even these 3 were taken back to their rallying points under their own power the very next night. Their moral effect was also proved, and, with the exception of a few enemy machine-gun teams, who bravely stood their ground to the very last, most of the enemy encountered by the Tanks readily surrendered.
Shortly after the battle, G.H.Q. paid the Australian Corps the compliment of publishing to the whole British Army a General Staff brochure,[10] containing the complete text of the orders, and a full and detailed description of the whole of the battle plans and preparations, with an official commentary upon them. The last paragraph of this document, which follows, expresses tersely the conclusions reached by our High Command:
"81. The success of the attack was due:
(a) To the care and skill as regards every detail with which the plan was drawn up by the Corps, Division, Brigade and Battalion Staffs.
(b) The excellent co-operation between the infantry, machine gunners, artillery, tanks and R.A.F.
(c) The complete surprise of the enemy, resulting from the manner in which the operation had been kept secret up till zero hour.
(d) The precautions which were taken and successfully carried out by which no warning was given to the enemy by any previous activity which was not normal.
(e) The effective counter-battery work and accurate barrage.
(f) The skill and dash with which the tanks were handled, and the care taken over details in bringing them up to the starting line.
(g) Last, but most important of all, the skill, determination and fine fighting spirit of the infantry carrying out the attack."
Of the extent to which the tactical principles, and the methods of preparation which had been employed at Hamel, came to be utilized by other Corps in the later fighting of 1918 no reliable record is yet available to me. But within the Corps itself this comparatively small operation became the model for all enterprises of a similar character, which it afterwards fell to the lot of the Corps to carry out.
The operation was a small one, however, only by contrast with the events which followed, although not in comparison with some of the major operations which had preceded it—by reference to the number of troops engaged, although not to the extent of territory or booty captured. Although only eight Battalions (or the equivalent of less than one Division) were committed in the actual assault, the territory recovered was more than four times that which was, in the pitched battles of 1917, customarily allotted as an objective to a single Division. The number of prisoners in relation to our own casualties was also far higher than had been the experience of previous years. Both of these new standards which had thus been set up may be regarded as flowing directly from the employment of the Tanks.