Never did I contemplate more real greatness of mind than was displayed on this occasion by our heroic chief. The calmness and cheerfulness with which he met and sustained the sad reverses of this most trying day, were objects worthy of remark and admiration. Whilst going into the Bay of Algeziras, he desired me to look over my signal-book, and to mark such signals as might be likely to be called for. He had already done the same, and when, during the heat of the action, any of the flags were destroyed, or the halliards shot away, I was astonished at the readiness with which he ordered one signal to be substituted for another, according as the signification might answer the purpose, without any reference to the book.

On reaching our anchorage off the Mole of Gibraltar, after giving the necessary orders for the disposal and refitting of his squadron, he returned to his cabin with a deep sense of the responsibility he had incurred; but supported by the unqualified conviction that every exertion had been made to obtain success, and that the disappointment resulted from circumstances over which he had no control.

The action terminated, as appears by the log, at thirty-five minutes after one; and the squadron proceeded to Gibraltar. As soon as the ship was secured, the Admiral sent me on shore to the governor, to relate to him the events of the two preceding days. I found him sitting in his balcony, which commanded a view of the Bay and Algeziras, evidently deeply affected by the unlooked-for termination of an attack upon the French squadron, and anxiously reflecting on the probable results.

On my return on board, the Admiral had retired to his cot; and I had no means of communicating with him until next morning. I could then, however, perceive that under all the severity of disappointment he experienced from our failure, and the loss of the Hannibal, he felt that no honour had been lost; that every effort had been made to obtain success; and that he derived comfort from the sanguine hopes he entertained that an opportunity might present itself in which he should be able to retrieve the loss.

He ordered me to take a flag of truce and wait upon the French Admiral, and propose an exchange of prisoners; which M. Linois refused, alleging that it was not in his power to establish a cartel for the purpose until he obtained the sanction of the Minister of the Marine at Paris, to whom he had sent off an express as soon as the firing had ceased on the preceding day; but he consented to send over the officers on parole. The object of the French Admiral was very obvious. He concluded we wanted the men to replace those that had been killed and wounded; but he thought, justly, that sending over officers on parole would be a harmless act of courtesy, from which we could reap no immediate benefit. It will be seen that, subsequently to the second action, (only six days after the first,) when his despatches from Algeziras had scarcely reached Paris, he did not wait for an answer from the Minister of the Marine: but circumstances had altered. We had taken a line-of-battle ship, and burned two first-rates; and he now wished to get as many of the crew back as possible.

We shall now transcribe the Rear-admiral's official account of the battle: this affords additional particulars, and proves that every step had been taken to insure success; which, but from circumstances that often blight the fairest prospects, would have had a very different result. We shall venture to add, that, had the gallant Admiral hesitated to make the attempt, he would have rendered himself obnoxious to animadversions, not only from all the squadron under his command, but from every one on the Rock of Gibraltar who witnessed the enemy's squadron of inferior force setting, as it were, that of Sir James at defiance; while it would have afforded the French and Spaniards a just, or, at least a plausible subject of exultation. But Sir James, with that decision of character and coolness, when in the presence of an enemy, for which he was always remarkable, did not hesitate one moment on the attack, which was made with consummate skill, and maintained with a perseverance never surpassed.

Cæsar, Gibraltar, 6th July 1801.

Sir,

I have to request you will be pleased to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, conformable to my letter of yesterday's date, I stood through the Straits, with his Majesty's squadron under my orders, with the intention of attacking three French line-of-battle ships and a frigate that I was informed were at anchor off Algeziras. On opening Cabrita Point, I found the ships lay at a considerable distance from the enemy's batteries; and having a leading wind up to them, every reasonable hope of success in the attack was afforded.

I had previously directed Captain Hood in the Venerable, from his experience and knowledge of the anchorage, to lead the squadron, which he executed with his accustomed gallantry; and, although it was not intended he should anchor, he found himself under the necessity of so doing, from the wind failing,—a circumstance so much to be apprehended in this country, and to which I have to attribute the want of success in this well-intended enterprise. Captain Stirling anchored, conformably to the enclosed order of attack, opposite to the inner ship of the enemy, and brought the Pompée to action in the most spirited and gallant manner; an example which was followed by the commanders of every ship in the squadron.