Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. I

by Sir John Ross

Letter from Rear-admiral Linois to the Minister of the Marine, giving an account of the action:

Citizen Minister,

On the 9th of July a Spanish division, consisting of six sail of the line and three frigates, arrived at Algeziras from Cadiz, under command of his Excellency Lieutenant-general Moreno, in order to raise the blockade of four sail of the line and one frigate, which were under my orders, and to favour their escape to Cadiz. That officer accordingly gave me every assistance in his power in order to put my ships in a condition to put to sea, and to tow them out, in order to enable them to set sail. Our labour was continued day and night. General Moreno made his squadron anchor in a line N.E. and S.W. On the 12th, there was a tolerable fresh east wind, and it was determined to set sail at one o'clock in the afternoon, on account of the tide. The signal being given at that hour, the fleet set sail, the Spanish squadron being to windward of ours. The frigate L'Indienne towed the Hannibal, which we were sorry to perceive made very little way.

The calm which we experienced under Gibraltar necessarily deranged the regularity of our order; while the enemy, having a brisk gale at east, sailed from Gibraltar with five sail of the line, a frigate, a brig, and a Portuguese frigate, and formed the order of battle. As soon as the English Admiral had passed Europa Point, he made a signal, and immediately we saw to windward six sail, of which two had three masts. I was then with M. de Moreno on board the Sabina frigate. At sunset, the two last ships of our line doubled the Cape Carnero. Three only remained, with the Hannibal, which was under jury-masts, and which consequently could not carry much sail.

Night was coming on, and it was necessary to return to our anchorage, which afforded the enemy an opportunity of attacking us before we took a position. At all events every delay was dangerous, for the reinforcements which the enemy expected might arrive every moment. The breeze from the east becoming stronger, we were assured of the wind during the night. We determined to send the Hannibal back to Algeziras, and to pass the Strait with the combined squadron. We then manœuvred so as to facilitate the rallying of two of our vessels, which had fallen into the rear in consequence of the calm. The three French vessels, which sailed better than could have been expected, were in the van; and in that order it was proposed to pass the Strait.

At eight, the enemy showed a disposition to attack us. At nine we heard the reports of three cannon, and at the same time we saw fires at a considerable distance behind us. We presumed it might be some of the enemy's vessels making signals of their arrival. We congratulated ourselves upon seeing our squadrons so well collected together, and sailing so well, which made us confident that the plan of the enemy would not succeed.

At half-past eleven the wind was considerably increased. The night was very dark, and we heard a smart cannonade in the E.N.E.; and, soon after, we saw a conflagration, which made us apprehend that some of our vessels, in firing their stern guns, had taken fire, in consequence of the force of the wind. We thought also that they might be fire-ships of the enemy. We put about for a moment; but the vessel on fire approaching us, we continued our way, having constantly a light at our main-top-mast head, as a signal for rallying.

It could no longer be doubted that the enemy had passed the Strait, and had got into our wake. The cannonade became pretty general, but the wind was too strong to continue the action. We received several shots on board the frigate, which killed one man and wounded five. Several balls passed through our sails. We took down the signal we had at our mast-head, for fear the enemy would fall upon us. It was afterwards hoisted, in order to collect our ships. We made sail, directing our course to the W.N.W., not choosing to go more before the wind, lest the wind, which was very strong, would carry away our masts. We passed the night in the greatest disquietude, not knowing whether the vessels which were in sight were not enemies. At length the day dissipated part of our fears, and we found ourselves in the midst of our fleet, with the exception of the two ships of three decks, viz. the Hermenegildo and Real Carlos, and the Formidable and the St. Antoine. The wind having fallen calm, it became impossible to go in search of the vessels which had separated. We were then six leagues west of Cadiz.

At half-past four the Dessaix made a signal that she had sprung a leak, and that the water gained upon her thirty inches an hour. She demanded assistance, which was granted. At five o'clock we heard an action in the east, and perceived a smoke. The wind being then from the S.E., we made the signal for the line of battle to be formed as quickly as possible, without regard to places, in order to assist the vessel that was engaged. At half-past six the action ceased, and a most perfect calm succeeded. At eleven, the wind rising again, we perceived four vessels at a considerable distance from one another. We flattered ourselves at first that they were our ships, but we soon found by their manœuvres that they were enemies. We also distinguished the Formidable close under the land, making the best of her way to Cadiz. We stood for the port, from which a felucca brought me a letter from the captain of the Formidable, which had been anchored in the Road of Cadiz, stating that in the morning he had engaged two ships of the line and a frigate, and that one of the ships of the line had been completely dismasted, and had been towed away by a frigate. We then anchored in Cadiz.

I must acknowledge the consummate experience and talents of General Moreno, as well as the zeal and care which he displayed for the success of his mission. If separations have taken place, they must be attributed to the darkness of the night, and the necessity which there was of getting away from the vessels that were on fire. That officer, on hearing at Cadiz of the destruction of two ships of his squadron, Hermenegildo and Real-Carlos, was justly struck with grief on the occasion. He had, by his wise instructions, provided against almost every possible case. I have since been informed that the two Spanish vessels which were destroyed, cannonaded and run foul of one another, each supposing the other to be an enemy. We are uncertain about the fate of the St. Antoine. The violence of the wind made it extremely dangerous to fire to windward.