"At a quarter before eleven, from the position of the squadron, the enemy's headmost ship commenced the action with the nearest situated to her ahead of the Trinidad, running along the whole of our rear, and successively bearing up before the wind. The Trinidad happened to be the last of our line, and consequently the centre and van remained out of the action.

"The rear of the enemy sailed but slowly, and for this reason, as well as to benefit by some means the fire from our van, I made a signal at half-past eleven for all the ships ahead to tack, in order to come round the enemy and attack their rear. My ordering this manœuvre appeared the most opportune for many weighty reasons; but, misunderstood by the ships to which it was directed, I now looked upon the loss of the Principe, Regla, and the whole of our rear, as unavoidable. The favourable moment for this movement being lost, I made a signal for the whole squadron to bear up at the same time, with a view to contract our distance with the enemy, and to bring into action several other ships in our centre and van. At the time of bearing up, the Trinidad was ahead in close action with the enemy, within musket-shot, and having been engaged by the whole English line, was very much damaged.

"So soon as their headmost ship had passed athwart our stern, she tacked, followed by five or six others passing our line to windward; the remaining ten ships, that were before on our larboard side, then bore up at the same time, and passed through our line in different positions, and consequently remained on the other tack fighting us in great order, with a heavy and well-directed fire: this manœuvre decided the action in their favour. I did not fail to guard against this from the commencement, and anticipated it by ordering the ships ahead to tack and gain the enemy's rear to leeward; and if the commanders of the Principe, Regla, Oriente, and Firmin had availed themselves of the opportunity to join six or eight ships of the van, they would have placed the enemy between two fires, and terminated the action in a very different manner.

"Although the Principe and Regla were not able to fall into the rear of our line, they notwithstanding did their utmost from their situation, engaging the enemy at the time of passing our line, till they had obtained the weather gage. The attack of the enemy was now principally on the Trinidad, which, from the crippled situation of her mast and rigging, fell to leeward. By word of mouth, and by signals, the Salvador, San Josef, Soberano, and San Nicholas were ordered to shorten sail, and to form in our rear, which they executed with celerity, maintaining a severe action. The van continually remaining to windward, at two I made them a signal to shorten sail, and bear down for a general attack.

"The Mexicano formed upon our bow about three in the afternoon, and engaged the foremost ship of the enemy's line; they now for the remainder of the day fixed their whole attention against the San Josef, Mexicano, San Nicholas, and San Yisidro, which were the only ships that bore the principal and hottest part of the action against the whole enemy's squadron.

"In this situation it would have been highly expedient that our centre and van should have come to our support, but it was out of my power to intimate to them the necessity of this movement, the ships being in want of masts, rigging, and every necessary for making signals. I cannot refrain from giving due praise to the valour of the above-mentioned ships formed at my stern, and expressing the gallant manner in which they behaved during the engagement: but at length, being dismasted and destroyed, some struck, and others left the action. The Trinidad was attacked the whole afternoon by a three-decker, and three ships of 74 guns, that raked her fore and aft at pistol-shot; and notwithstanding her having upwards of two hundred men killed and wounded, she still continued the action for a full hour longer. Such was the dreadful situation of the Trinidad at six o'clock, after an uninterrupted engagement, when the San Pablo and Pelayo, that in the morning had been detached by my orders, and crowded every sail from the moment of observing the action, now reached the squadron.

"The reinforcement of these two ships happened at the opportune junction of the Conde-de-Regla; the Principe arrived shortly after, and the enemy, observing our van standing towards them, immediately retired together, covering the captured ships San Josef, Salvador, San Yisidro, and San Nicholas.

"No one will be surprised at the ultimate consequences of the action, when the series of misfortunes and unforeseen events from the moment of our seeing the enemy is considered; and further, that when cruising, they should sail in a readier condition to form the line of battle than could be performed by our squadron, in the order of sailing with convoy, with the wind on our quarter. For the above reason, scarcely were they discovered, than they formed in regular order of battle, and so near as to oblige my forming the line hastily, without attention to posts, or the consequences that might result from this bad position of the ships and commanders; to which must be added, that the Pelayo and San Pablo were ahead by order,—that the Firmin and Oriente remained to leeward of both lines,—that notwithstanding the exertions made by the Principe, Regla, and Firmin, they did not enter into the line till the afternoon, the latter wanting a foretop-mast. So that of all the ships of my squadron, only seventeen formed in the line of battle, the St. Domingo included in the number, loaded with quicksilver, and of very inconsiderable force. Of the seventeen above mentioned, some were in action only at intervals, and many did not fire a gun; resulting from the circumstance of the enemy's line being entirely engaged against six Spanish ships, and their defence is the more praiseworthy, as they were all in want of men. The Trinidad remaining entirely dismasted, without the power of making signals with flags or lights, I desired Lieutenant General D. Juan Joachim Moreno to reestablish the line of battle close on the larboard tack, and gave orders that jury-masts should be fixed on the Trinidad and the Moredes frigate, to protect her to Cadiz, profiting by the wind and the situation of the enemy at night-fall.

"I embarked in consequence, with my Major General and Adjutants, on board the Diana frigate, and ordered several frigates along the line, that they should observe the order given, and repair the damages with all haste in order to return again to action. The squadron remained the whole night on the larboard tack, with the wind at W. to W.N.W. till six o'clock a.m. of the 15th, when I formed on the other tack, close hauled to the wind.

"My next attention was to inquire by signal the situation of the ships for action,—and it proved that the Concepcion, Mexicano, and Soberano were not in a state to renew the action; and that the Regla, Oriente, San Pablo, Pelayo, and San Antonio could enter into action, without my being able to gain any information regarding the others. Nevertheless I continued my course towards the enemy, that to the number of twenty ships had been seen since eight o'clock at S.S.W. My opinion as to the state of the ships of the squadron remaining still indecisive, in the afternoon I desired to know if it was advisable to attack the enemy; the ships Concepcion, Mexicano, San Pablo, Soberano, San Domingo, San Ildefonso, Nepomuceno, Atlante, and Firmin replied in the negative; the Gloriose, Pablo, Regla, and Firmin, that it was advisable to delay the attack; and only the Principe, Conquistador, and Pelayo, positively asserted that the attach was advisable. From the diversity of opinion, and considering the reply of each commander as an indication of the true state of his respective ship, I did not think it proper to force a press of sail towards the enemy, having likewise been informed that the Mexicano, San Domingo, and Soberano were considerably damaged, and the Atlante in want of men, which was general in every ship.