Sir James, having anchored the Swedish ships farther out, persevered as long as it was possible, and the fleets rode out two heavy gales of wind in that exposed situation; while the Russian ships lay moored, with yards and topmasts struck, in the position given as second in the diagram (page 116).
The Swedish army in Finland had fought with great bravery, but were at length overpowered by numbers; Åbo, the capital of Finland, was in the end taken, and that valuable country for ever lost to Sweden. The King, and subsequently the remains of his army, retreated to Stockholm, and the campaign terminated decidedly in favour of Russia.
After what has been stated, it will not excite surprise that Sir James should have had some anxiety about the opinion of the public, as will be seen by the following short extract, dated 26th September, &c.
I am anxious to hear what will be said of the occurrences here, although I am conscious of having acted for the good of my country to the utmost in my power; and I trust the whole of my conduct since my first coming upon the station will be entirely approved of by government: it is very possible there may be those who will be disposed to find fault, however unjustly.
It will be seen hereafter, that this apprehension was not ill-founded.
Before the arrival of the Victory and squadron off Rogerwick, Sir Samuel Hood had despatched his first lieutenant with the intelligence of the capture and destruction of the Russian seventy-four, Sewolod, and of the position of the Russian fleet. This officer was, of course, the bearer of many letters, which described the enemy's ships to be in a situation easily to be attacked, when the commander-in-chief should arrive. The expectations of the nation, from the known prowess of Sir James Saumarez, were therefore raised to the highest pitch. When the information subsequently reached England that he had not attacked them, it is not to be wondered at that blame should be attached to him by the public, who could not be aware of the existence of those circumstances which frustrated his intentions; and so long did this impression last, that it was only in 1834 that the Author explained the causes to his late Majesty, who had always been impressed with the idea that it was Sir James, and not the Swedish Admiral and Sir Samuel Hood, that objected to the attack; though certainly the very reverse was the fact. There can be no doubt that, if Sir James had been authorised to take command of the Swedish fleet, he would, even against the opinion of Sir Samuel, have attacked the enemy's fleet on the 31st of August; and, as the wind changed on the following morning, he would have been able to carry off all his prizes without any difficulty. We have ever since lamented that the attempt, as planned by Sir James, was not promptly made.
The official description of the action with the Russian fleet will be found in the Appendix; as also Sir James's correspondence with his Swedish Majesty on the subject.
As it was hoped that some shift of wind would enable us to attack the enemy, we remained in a state of anxiety for three weeks. In the interim, intelligence was received of the success of the British arms in Spain, and of the expulsion of the French from Portugal. Sir James, in consequence of this information, and of the opinions before mentioned, and seeing that the enemy could neither be attacked nor blockaded any longer, weighed anchor on the 30th of September, and in company with the Swedes proceeded to Carlscrona, where he arrived on the 9th of October.