(a) The greater the mischief of any offence the greater is the punishment which it is profitable to inflict with the hope of preventing it. For the greater this mischief the less is the proportion which the evil of punishment bears to the good of prevention, and therefore the greater is the punishment which can be inflicted before the balance of good over evil attains its maximum. Assuming the motives of larceny and of homicide to be equal, it may be profitable to inflict capital punishment for the latter offence, although it is certainly unprofitable to inflict it for the former. The increased measure of prevention that would be obtained by such severity would, in view of the comparatively trivial nature of the offence, be obtained at too great a cost.
(b) A second and subordinate reason for making punishment vary with the magnitude of the offence is that, in those cases in which different offences offer themselves as alternatives to the offender, an inducement is thereby given for the preference of the least serious. If the punishment of burglary is the same as that of murder, the burglar has obvious motives for not stopping at the lesser crime. If an attempt is punished as severely as a completed offence, why should any man repent of his half-executed purposes?
3. The character of the offender. The worse the character or disposition of the offender the more severe should be his punishment. Badness of disposition is constituted either by the strength of the impulses to crime, or by the weakness of the impulses towards law-abiding conduct. One man may be worse than another because of the greater strength and prevalence within him of such anti-social passions as anger, covetousness, or malice; or his badness may lie in a deficiency of those social impulses and instincts which are the springs of right conduct in normally constituted men. In respect of all the graver forms of law-breaking, for one man who abstains from them for fear of the law there are thousands who abstain by reason of quite other influences. Their sympathetic instincts, their natural affections, their religious beliefs, their love of the approbation of others, their pride and self-respect, render superfluous the threatenings of the law. In the degree in which these impulses are dominant and operative, the disposition of a man is good; in the degree in which they are wanting or inefficient, it is bad.
In both its kinds badness of disposition is a ground for severity of punishment. If a man’s emotional constitution is such that normal temptation acts upon him with abnormal force, it is for the law to supply in double measure the counteractive of penal discipline. If he is so made that the natural influences towards well-doing fall below the level of average humanity, the law must supplement them by artificial influences of a strength that is needless in ordinary cases.
Any fact, therefore, which indicates depravity of disposition is a circumstance of aggravation, and calls for a penalty in excess of that which would otherwise be appropriate to the offence. One of the most important of these facts is the repetition of crime by one who has been already punished. The law rightly imposes upon habitual offenders penalties which bear no relation either to the magnitude or to the profit of the offence. A punishment adapted for normal men is not appropriate for those who, by their repeated defiance of it, prove their possession of abnormal natures. A second case in which the same principle is applicable is that in which the mischief of an offence is altogether disproportionate to any profit to be derived from it by the offender. To kill a man from mere wantonness, or merely in order to facilitate the picking of his pocket, is a proof of extraordinary depravity beyond anything that is imputable to him who commits homicide only through the stress of passionate indignation or under the influence of great temptation. A third case is that of offences from which normal humanity is adequately dissuaded by such influences as those of natural affection. To kill one’s father is in point of magnitude no worse a crime than any other homicide, but it has at all times been viewed with greater abhorrence, and by some laws punished with greater severity, by reason of the depth of depravity which it indicates in the offender. Lastly it is on the same principle that wilful offences are punished with greater rigour than those which are due merely to negligence.
An additional and subordinate reason for making the measure of liability depend upon the character of the offender is that badness of disposition is commonly accompanied by deficiency of sensibility. Punishment must increase as sensibility diminishes. The more depraved the offender the less he feels the shame of punishment; therefore the more he must be made to feel the pain of it. A certain degree of even physical insensibility is said to characterise the more degraded orders of criminals; and the indifference with which death itself is faced by those who in the callousness of their hearts have not scrupled to inflict it upon others is a matter of amazement to normally constituted men.
We are now in a position to deal with a question which we have already touched upon but deferred for fuller consideration, namely the apparent paradox involved in the rule that punishment must increase with the temptation to the offence. As a general rule this proposition is true; but it is subject to a very important qualification. For in certain cases the temptation to which a man succumbs may be of such a nature as to rebut that presumption of a bad disposition which would in ordinary circumstances arise from the commission of the offence. He may, for example, be driven to the act not by the strength of any bad or self-regarding motives, but by that of his social or sympathetic impulses. In such a case the greatness of the temptation, considered in itself, demands severity of punishment, but when considered as a disproof of the degraded disposition which usually accompanies wrongdoing it demands leniency; and the latter of these two conflicting considerations may be of sufficient importance to outweigh the other. If a man remains honest until he is driven in despair to steal food for his starving children, it is perfectly consistent with the deterrent theory of punishment to deal with him less severely than with him who steals from no other motive than cupidity. He who commits homicide from motives of petty gain, or to attain some trivial purpose, deserves to be treated with the utmost severity, as a man thoroughly callous and depraved. But he who kills another in retaliation for some intolerable insult or injury need not be dealt with according to the measure of his temptations, but should rather be excused on account of them.
§ 151. The Measure of Civil Liability.
Penal redress is that form of penal liability in which the law uses the compulsory compensation of the person injured as an instrument for the punishment of the offender. It is characteristic of this form of punishment that it takes account of one only of the three considerations which, as we have seen, rightly determine the measure of penal responsibility. It is measured exclusively by the magnitude of the offence, that is to say, by the amount of loss inflicted by it. It takes no account of the character of the offender, and so visits him who does harm through some trivial want of care with as severe a penalty as if his act had been prompted by deliberate malice. Similarly it takes no account of the motives of the offence; he who has everything and he who has nothing to gain are equally punished, if the damage done by them is equal. Finally it takes no account of probable or intended consequences, but solely of those which actually ensue; wherefore the measure of a wrongdoer’s liability is not the evil which he meant to do, but that which he has succeeded in doing; and his punishment is determined not by his fault, but by the accident of the result. If one man is dealt with more severely than another, it is not because he is more guilty, but because he has had the misfortune to be more successful in his wrongful purposes, or less successful in the avoidance of unintended issues.
Serious as are these lapses from the due standard of penal discipline, it is not to be suggested that this form of civil liability is unjustifiable. The use of redress as an instrument of punishment possesses advantages more than sufficient to counterbalance any such objections to it. More especially it possesses this, that while other forms of punishment, such as imprisonment, are uncompensated evil, penal redress is the gain of him who is wronged as well as the loss of the wrongdoer. Further, this form of remedy gives to the persons injured a direct interest in the efficient administration of justice—an interest which is almost absent in the case of the criminal law. It is true, however, that the law of penal redress, taken by itself, falls so far short of the requirements of a rational scheme of punishment that it would by itself be totally insufficient. In all modern and developed bodies of law its operation is supplemented, and its deficiencies made good, by a co-ordinate system of criminal liability. These two together, combined in due proportions, constitute a very efficient instrument for the maintenance of justice.