2. Law. This is the most usual application of the term, the juridical sense having a much greater predominance over the ethical in the case of jus, than in that of its modern representatives recht and droit. Jus, in its ethical signification, is distinguished as jus naturale, and in its legal sense as jus civile. It is often contrasted with fas, the one being human and the other divine law. Jus, however, is also used in a wider sense to include both of these—jus divinum et humanum.
3. A right, moral or legal: jus suum cuique tribuere.[[487]]
The origin and primary signification of jus are uncertain. It is generally agreed, however, that the old derivation from jussum and jubere is not merely incorrect, but an actual reversal of the true order of terms and ideas. Jussum is a derivative of jus. Jubere is, in its proper and original sense, to declare, hold, or establish anything as jus. It was the recognised expression for the legislative action of the Roman people. Legem jubere is to give to a statute (lex) the force of law (jus). Only in a secondary and derivative sense is jubere equivalent to imperare.
The most probable opinion is that jus is derived from the Aryan root YU, to join together (a root which appears also in jugem, jungo, and in the English yoke). It has been suggested accordingly that jus in its original sense means that which is fitting, applicable, or suitable. If this is so, there is a striking correspondence between the history of the Latin term and that of the modern words already considered by us, the primary sense in all cases being physical, the ethical sense being a metaphorical derivative of this, and the legal application coming last. The transition from the physical to the ethical sense in the case of the English fit and fitting is instructive in this connexion. Another suggestion, however, is that jus means primarily that which is binding—the bond of moral and subsequently of legal obligation. But no definite conclusion on this matter is possible.[[488]]
Δίκη. τό δίκαιον.—The Greek term which most nearly corresponds to the Latin jus is δίκη. These words cannot, however, be regarded as synonymous. The juridical use of jus is much more direct and predominant than the corresponding use of δίκη. Indeed, we may say of the Greek term that it possesses juridical implications, rather than applications. Its chief uses are the following, the connexion between them being obvious: (1) custom, usage, way; (2) right, justice; (3) law, or at least legal right; (4) judgment; (5) a lawsuit; (6) a penalty; (7) a court of law. The primary sense is said to be that first mentioned, viz. custom. The transition is easy from the idea of the customary to that of the right, and from the idea of the right to that of the lawful. In the case of the Latin mos we may trace an imperfect and tentative development in the same direction.[[489]] Professor Clark, on the other hand, prefers to regard judgment as the earliest meaning of δίκη, the other ethical and legal applications being derivatives from this, and δίκη in the sense of custom being an independent formation from the original root.[[490]] Such an order of development seems difficult and unnatural. Analogy and the connexion of ideas seem to render more probable the order previously suggested, viz. custom, right, law, and finally the remaining legal uses.[[491]]
Θέμις Θέμιστες.—As δίκη corresponds to jus, so θέμις apparently corresponds to fas. While fas, however, preserved its original signification as that which is right by divine ordinance, and never acquired any secondary legal applications or implications, the Greek term proved more flexible, and consequently has to be reckoned with in the present connection. The matter is one of very considerable difficulty, and no certain conclusions seem possible, but the following order of development would seem to commend itself as the most probable:—
1. Θέμις, divine ordinance, the will of the gods. The term is derived from the Aryan root DHA, to set, place, appoint, or establish, which appears also in θεσμός, a statute or ordinance.[[492]] This latter term, however, included human enactments, while θέμις was never so used. The Greek term is cognate with thesis and theme, and with our English doom, a word whose early legal uses we shall consider later.
2. Θέμις, right. The transition is easy from that which is decreed and willed by the gods, to that which it is right for mortal men to do.
3. Θέμιστες, the rules of right, whether moral or legal, so far as any such distinction was recognised in that early stage of thought to which these linguistic usages belong.
4. Θέμιστες, judgments, judicial declarations of the rules of right and law.[[493]]