Jurisprudence

by Sir John W. Salmond

Y.B.—The Year Books, viz., the early Law Reports from the reign of Edward I. to that of Henry VIII. The Year Books of Edward I. and some others are published with a translation in the Rolls Series; others by the Selden Society. The rest are to be found in a black letter folio edition of 1678.

INDEX

• Abrath v. North Eastern Ry. Co., [289].
• Accessory rights, distinguished from principal, [216];
  • examples of, [216];
  • rights both accessory and dominant, [217].
• Accident, distinguished from mistake, [371];
  • culpable and inevitable, [372];
  • defence of, [372];
  • absolute liability for, [372].
• Actio furti, [86], n.
• Actio in rem and in personam, [207].
• Actio personalis moritur cum persona, [376], [377].
• Acts, their generic nature, [323];
  • positive and negative, [323];
  • internal and external, [323];
  • intentional and unintentional, [324];
  • their circumstances and consequences, [325];
  • place of, [330];
  • time of, [330]
• Acts in the law, [301]–304;
  • unilateral and bilateral, [302];
  • two classes of unilateral, [303].
  • See Agreements.
• Acts of the law, [302].
• Acts of Parliament, public and private, [30];
  • said formerly to be void if unreasonable, [146].
  • See Legislation, Statute law.
• Actus non facit reum, &c., [322], [474].
  • See Mens rea.
• Administration of justice, necessity of, [11], [65]–67;
  • logically prior to the law, [12];
  • possible without law, [13];
  • origin of, [67]–70;
  • civil and criminal, [70]–75;
  • specific and sanctional enforcement of rights, [85];
  • penal and remedial proceedings, [88];
  • secondary functions of courts of law, [89]–91;
  • an essential function of the state, [93];
  • compared with war or the extrajudicial use of force, [94]–98;
  • element of force usually latent in, [97];
  • not the substitution of arbitration for force, [97].
• Aequitas sequitur legem, [34].
• Agere non valenti non currit praescriptio, [412] n.
• Agreements, a source of law, [31], [54], [124];
  • constitutive and abrogative power of, [124], [307];
  • nature of, [303];
  • different uses of the term, [303];
  • unilateral and bilateral, [304] n.;
  • importance of, as a vestitive fact, [305];
  • grounds of operation of, [305];
  • compared with legislation, [306];
  • classes of, [307]–309;
  • void and voidable, [309];
  • unenforceable, [310] n.;
  • formal and informal, [310];
  • illegal, [311];
  • effect of error on, [312];
  • effect of coercion on, [313];
  • want of consideration for, [313]–317;
  • a title to property, [412]–416.
• Ahrens, his Cours de Droit Naturel, [2];
  • on proprietary rights, [208] n.;
  • his definition of property, [387].
• Alfred, laws of King, on private war, [69], n.;
  • on accidental homicide, [373].
• Alienative facts, [300].
• Aliens, members of the state if resident in its territory, [100];
  • disabilities of, [101].
• Allegiance, nature of, [105];
  • permanent and temporary, [105].
  • See Citizenship.
• Allen v. Flood, [192], [341], [342].
• Analogy, a source of judicial principles, [175].
• Ancona v. Rogers, [253].
• Animals, possess no legal personality, [273];
  • have no legal rights, [274];
  • effect of trusts for, [274];
  • punishment of, in early law, [273], [373];
  • liability of owner of, [273], [372].
• Animus possidendi, essential to possession, [242];
  • its nature, [242];
  • need not be rightful, [242];
  • must be exclusive, [242];
  • need not be a claim of ownership, [243];
  • need not be on one’s own behalf, [243];
  • need not be specific, [243].
• Anson, Sir W., his definition of contract, [303] n.
• Apices juris, [474].
• Appeals of felony, abolition of, [69], n.
• Aquinas, his distinction between jus naturale and jus positivum, [3] n.;
  • on equity, [36];
  • on the lex aeterna, [42];
  • on agreement as a title of right, [306];
  • his Tractatus de Legibus, [487].
• Arbitration, international, dependent on the development of international law, [22].
• Aristotle, on being wiser than the laws, [22], [478];
  • on the arbitrium judicis, [26];
  • on law and equity, [36];
  • on the law of nature, [45].
• Armory v. Delamirie, [249], [270], [408].
• Arndts, on Juridical Encyklopaedia, [7];
  • on customary law, [155].
• Asher v. Whitlock, [270], [408].
• Ashford v. Thornton, [69].
• Assignment. See Transfer.
• Assumpsit, [435].
• Attempts, criminal, their nature, [343];
  • distinguished from preparation, [343];
  • by impossible means, [345].
• Att.-Gen. v. Dean of Windsor, [165].
• Att.-Gen. v. Dimond, [394].
• Attornment, [258].
• Austin, on general jurisprudence, [6];
  • his definition of law, [47];
  • his use of the term legislation, [127];
  • his theory of customary law, [156];
  • on illimitable sovereignty, [469];
  • his influence on English thought, [488].
• Autonomous law, the product of autonomous legislation, [130];
  • its relation to conventional law, [131].
• Azo, on equity, [37].
• Backhouse v. Bonomi, [331].
• Bacon, Sir F., on being wiser than the laws, [23], n.;
  • on the arbitrium judicis, [26].
• Barnet v. Brandao, [29].
• Battle, trial by, its origin, [69];
  • its duration in English law, [69], n.;
  • a mode of authenticating testimony, [451].
• Baudry-Lacantinerie, on proprietary rights, [208], n.;
  • on ownership, [224], n.;
  • on corporeal and incorporeal possession, [264], n.;
  • on movable and immovable property, [392], n.
• Beamish v. Beamish, [165].
• Beardman v. Wilson, [399].
• Beati possidentes, [265].
• Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, [150].
• Beneficial ownership. See Trust.
• Bentham, his objections to case-law, [134], n.;
  • on natural rights, [182];
  • his use of the term property, [387];
  • on compulsory examination of accused persons, [450], n.;
  • on the limitations of sovereign power, [470].
• Bill of Rights, [109].
• Bills of Exchange, formerly governed by law merchant, [29].
• Black v. Christchurch Finance Co., [372].
• Blackstone, his definition of law, [40];
  • on civil and criminal wrongs, [73];
  • on written and unwritten law, [128];
  • on the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, [129];
  • on customary law, [144];
  • his use of the term property, [385];
  • on implied contracts, [433].
• Bodin, his theory of sovereignty, [467];
  • his treatise De Republica, [488].
• Bona vacantia, [418].
• Bracton, on equity, [37].
• Bridges v. Hawkesworth, [248], [249], [270].
• Bromage v. Prosser, [341].
• Brown v. Burdett, [419].
• Brown, W. Jethro, on customary law, [156], n.;
  • on sovereignty, [473], n.
• Bruns, his theory of possession, [263], n., [264], n.
• Bryant v. Foot, [150].
• Bryce, on the sources of law, [49], n.;
  • on sovereignty, [473].
• Burlamaqui, on natural law, [8].
• By-laws, a form of special law, [30];
  • void if unreasonable, [146].
• Cain v. Moon, [257].
• Calvin’s case, [278], [295].
• Canon law, a form of positive law, [3], n.;
  • on immemorial custom and prescription, [150]–152;
  • on the distinction between jus commune and consuetudines, [151].
• Cartwright v. Green, [248].
• Castro v. R., [163].
• Cessante ratione legis, &c., [475].
• Chancery, precedents in, [162].
  • See Equity.
• Charge, a form of lien, contrasted with mortgage, [406].
• Chattel, meanings of the term, [395].
• Chisholm v. Doulton, [367], [374].
• Chose in action, a kind of incorporeal thing, [226];
  • nature of, [423];
  • history of the term, [423].
• Christian Thomasius, on law of nature, [46], [494].
• Cicero, on subjection to the law as the means of freedom, [22];
  • on jus and aequitas, [30], [39], n.;
  • on the law of nature, [45].
• Citizens’ Life Assurance v. Brown, [289].
• Citizenship, one form of state-membership, [99];
  • distinction between citizens and subjects, [100], n.;
  • distinction between citizens and aliens, [100];
  • privileges and liabilities of citizens, [101];
  • diminishing importance of, [101];
  • modes of acquiring, [101];
  • relation between citizenship and nationality, [103].
• Civil law, the subject-matter of civil jurisprudence, [1];
  • the term partly superseded by positive law, [3];
  • different meanings of the term, [3], n., [483].
  • See Law.
• Civil wrongs. See Wrongs, Liability.
• Clark, In re, [394].
• Cochrane v. Moore, [413].
• Code of Justinian, [488].
• Codification, [136].
• Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur, [345], [475].
• Coke, on customary law, [152], n.;
  • on the distinction between custom and prescription, [157];
  • on the personality of unborn children, [277];
  • on corporations aggregate and sole, [281];
  • on the ownership of the space above the surface of land, [390].
• Colonial Bank v. Whinney, [286], [424].
• Commissioners of Stamps v. Hope, [394].
• Common law, opposed to special law, [33];
  • different uses of the term, [33], [57];
  • opposed to equity, [34]–38;
  • history of the term, [33].
  • See jus commune.
• Communis error facit jus, [166], [168], [475].
• Compensation, one of the objects of civil justice, [85], [86].
  • See Penal redress.
• Compossessio, [256].
• Conditions precedent and subsequent, [234].
  • See Contingent ownership.
• Conservatism of the law, [24].
• Consideration, required in simple contracts, [313];
  • its nature, [313];
  • valuable, [314];
  • not valuable, [315];
  • rational grounds of the doctrine, [316];
  • compared with the causa of Roman and French law, [316].
• Consolidated Co. v. Curtis, [370].
• Constitution of the state, [105]–110;
  • nature of, [105];
  • rigid and flexible constitutions, [107];
  • law and practice of, [107];
  • extra-legal origin of, [108];
  • possibility of legally unchangeable, [473].
• Constitutional law, nature of, [106];
  • its relation to constitutional fact, [107]–110.
• Constitutum possessorium, [257].
• Constructive delivery, [257].
• Constructive intention, [361].
• Constructive possession, [237].
• Contingent ownership, [232];
  • distinguished from vested, [232];
  • distinguished from contingent existence of the right owned, [233];
  • distinguished from spes acquisitionis, [233];
  • distinguished from determinable ownership, [234].
• Contracts. See Agreements.
• Conventional law, created by agreement, [31], [54], [120], [124];
  • reasons for allowance of, [121], [122].
• Co-ownership, [226].
• Coppin v. Coppin, [278].
• Copyright, its subject-matter, [189];
  • nature and kinds of, [396].
• Cornford v. Carlton Bank, [288], [289].
• Corporation of Bradford v. Pickles, [342].
• Corporations, nature of, [281], ff.;
  • aggregate and sole, [287];
  • fictitious nature of, [282];
  • may survive their members, [283], [293];
  • realistic theory of, [284];
  • act through agents, [285];
  • exist on behalf of beneficiaries, [285];
  • membership of, [286];
  • may be members of other corporations, [287];
  • authority of agents of, [287];
  • liability of, [287]–289;
  • purposes of incorporation, [289]–293;
  • creation and extinction of, [293];
  • foreign, recognised by English law, [294], n.;
  • the state not a corporation aggregate, [294]–298;
  • the king a corporation sole, [295].
• Corporeal possession, [239].
• Corporeal property, [221], [225], [386], [396], n.
• Corporeal things, [225], [396], n.
• Corpus possessionis, essential to possession, [241];
  • its nature, [244]–251.
• Correality, See Solidary obligations.
• Coughlin v. Gillison, [355].
• Court of Appeal, absolutely bound by its own decisions, [165].
• Cowan v. O’Connor, [331].
• Crimes. See Wrongs. Liability.
• Crouch v. Crédit Foncier, [150].
• Crown of England, claims against, heard in courts of law, [90];
  • not a legal person, [296];
  • the supreme executive, [468].
• Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, [390], [475].
• Culpa, lata, and levis, [358].
• Cundy v. Lindsay, [312].
• Custody distinguished from possession, [237].
• Custom, local, a source of special law, [29];
  • mercantile, a source of special law, [29];
  • grounds of the operation of, [120]–122, [144]–146;
  • its relation to prescription, [124], [157];
  • all unenacted law deemed customary in earlier English theory, [129], [144];
  • importance of, gradually diminishing, [143];
  • its continued recognition, [144];
  • historical relation between law and custom, [144]–145;
  • general and particular customs, [148];
  • invalid if unreasonable, [146];
  • invalid if contrary to statute law, [147];
  • unless general must be immemorial, [148]
    • (see Time immemorial);
  • mercantile need not be immemorial, [148], [150] n.;
  • unless immemorial, must conform to the common law, [152];
  • reasons for gradual disappearance of, as a source of law, [153];
  • conventional customs, [153];
  • theories of the operation of custom, [154]–157;
  • has no legal validity apart from the will of the state, [155];
  • a material not a formal source of law, [156];
  • Austin’s theory of, [156];
  • the relation of custom to prescription, [157];
  • local and personal customs, [157].
• Customary law, [55].
  • See Custom.
• Damages, measure of 383.
• Damnum sine injuria, [329].
• Danubian Sugar Factories v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 394.
• Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell. 331.
• De Falbe, In re, [392].
• De minimis non curat lex, [25], [475].
• De mortuis nil nisi bonum, [276].
• Dead bodies, not subjects of ownership, [275];
  • indignities offered to, a criminal offence, [276].
• Dean, In re, [274], [276].
• Decisions, judicial. See Precedents.
• Delivery of possession, actual and constructive, [257];
  • traditio brevi manu, [257];
  • constitutum possessorium, [257];
  • attornment, [258];
  • a mode of transferring ownership, [406].
• Deodans, [373].
• Dependent states, [111]–113.
• Dernburg, on proprietary rights, [208], n.;
  • on possession, [245], n.;
  • his Pandekten, [489].
• Derry v. Peek, [354].
• Detention, distinguished from possession, [237].
• Determinable ownership, distinguished from contingent, [234].
• Dicta, judicial, their nature and authority, [163], [174].
• Digest of Justinian, [489].
• Dike, dikaion, meanings and derivation of the terms, [461].
• Diligence, archaic use of the term to mean care, [349], n.
• Diogenes Laertius, anecdote of Solon, [81], n.
• Disability, defined, and distinguished from liability and duty, [194].
• Divestitive facts, their nature and kinds, [300], [301].
• Dolus, meaning of the term, [341];
  • its relation to culpa lata, [359].
• Dominant rights. See Encumbrances.
• Dominium, its significance in Roman law, [207].
• Doom, early legal uses of the term, [464].
• Doorman v. Jenkins, [359].
• Droit, distinguished from loi, [10];
  • ethical and juridical significations of, [52];
  • different uses of term, [465];
  • derivation of term, [459].
• Droit de suite, [416], n.
• Duress, [313].
• Dutch West India Co. v. Van Moses, [294].
• Duties, defined, [180];
  • moral and legal, [180];
  • of imperfect obligation, [180], [197], [198];
  • correlation of rights and duties, [184];
  • alleged distinction between absolute and relative duties, [184];
  • distinguished from liabilities and disabilities, [194];
  • personal and proprietary, [209].
• Easements. See Servitudes.
• Edelstein v. Schuler, [29], [150].
• Edie v. East India Co., [29], [153].
• Edmundson v. Render, [331].
• Electricity, deemed a chattel in law, [395], n.
• Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., [273], [372], [391].
• Elmore v. Stone, [254], [255], [258].
• Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., [249], [250].
• Emphyteusis, [400], n.
• Employer’s liability, [374]–376.
• Enacted law, distinguished from unenacted, [128].
  • See Statute law.
• Encumbrances, [212]–216;
  • distinguished from ownership, [221];
  • termed jura in re aliena by the civilians, [212];
  • distinguished from the natural limits of rights, [213];
  • are concurrent with the property encumbered, [214];
  • not necessarily rights in rem, [215];
  • classes of, [216];
  • often accessory to other rights, [217];
  • always incorporeal property, [223].
• Encyclopædia, juridicial, a branch of German legal literature, [7].
• Equitable rights, distinguished from legal, [217];
  • distinction not abolished by the Judicature Act, [217];
  • present importance of distinction, [218];
  • destroyed by conflict with legal rights, [218], [415].
• Equitable ownership, [231];
  • distinguished from legal, [231];
  • distinguished from equitable rights, [231];
  • distinguished from beneficial ownership, [231].
• Equity, different meanings of the term, [34]–38, [460];
  • origin of jurisdiction of Chancery, [34], [37];
  • fusion of law and equity by Judicature Act, [35];
  • equity in the courts of common law, [36];
  • compared with jus praetorium, [38].
• Equity of a statute, [39], n.
• Equity of redemption, [403].
• Error, effect of, on agreements, [312];
  • essential and unessential, [312].
• Estate, distinguished from status or personal condition, [208], [209].
  • See Proprietary rights.
• Evidence, nature of, [440];
  • judicial and extrajudicial, [441];
  • personal and real, [442];
  • primary and secondary, [442];
  • direct and circumstantial, [443];
  • valuation of, [444]–449;
  • conclusive, [439], [445];
  • presumptive, [446];
  • insufficient, [447];
  • exclusive, [439], [447];
  • inadmissible, [448];
  • of accused persons, [449];
  • policy of law of evidence considered, [27], [452].
• Ex facto oritur jus, [172], [409].
• Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, [314], [476].
• Ex turpi causa non oritur actio, [476].
• Exall v. Partridge, [433].
• Executors, [417].
  • See Inheritance.
• Expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium, [170].
• Expiation, as the end of punishment, [83].
• Extinctive facts, [300].
• Fact, distinguished from law, [15]–18.
• Fas, distinguished from jus, [461].
• Fay v. Prentice, [391].
• Federal states, their nature, [115];
  • distinguished from unitary states, [115];
  • distinguished from imperial states, [115].
• Fiducia, [405].
• Filburn v. Aquarium Co., [372].
• Finding, as a title of right, [248]–250.
• Fixtures, [391].
• Flexibility of the law, advantages of, [27].
• Flitcroft’s case, [282].
• Fookes v. Beer, [167].
• Forbearance, distinguished from omission, [324].
• Foreign law, recognition of, in English courts, [30];
  • a form of special law, [30];
  • no judicial notice of, [31].
• Formalism of the law, [25].
• Foster v. Dodd, [276].
• Fraud, in law and in fact, [18];
  • meanings of the term, [341];
  • distinguished from force and malice, [341];
  • its relation to gross negligence, [359]–361.
• Freeman v. Pope, [366].
• French law, on time of memory, [152];
  • precedents in, [159], n.;
  • on possession, [264], n.;
  • on requirement of cause in a contract, [316];
  • possession vaut titre, [416];
  • jurisprudence, [8].
• Gaius, on natural law, [46];
  • his Institutiones, [489].
• Gautret v. Egerton, [355].
• George and Richard, The, [277].
• German law, as to immemorial prescription, [152];
  • as to precedents, [159], n.;
  • as to mediate possession, [252], n.;
  • as to malicious exercise of rights, [342], n.;
  • as to criminal attempts, [344];
  • as to the jus necessitatis, [349], n.
• Gierke, on the nature of corporations, [285], n.
• Glanville, on equity, [37], n.
• Good-will, a form of immaterial property, [397].
• Goodwin v. Robarts, [150], [152].
• Gorgier v. Mieville, [150].
• Grant, distinguished from assignment, [308].
• Grant v. Easton, [432], [433].
• Great Eastern Ry. Co. v. Turner, [282].
• Green v. London General Omnibus Co., [289].
• Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Colliery, [332].
• Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., [349], [359].
• Grotius, De Jure Belli, [490].
• Haig v. West, [254].
• Hale, on customary law, [143];
  • on precedents, [161];
  • on subjects and aliens, [100], n.
• Hall v. Duke of Norfolk, [331].
• Hallett, In re, [162], [173].
• Hammack v. White, [357].
• Heineccius, on natural law, [8].
• Hereditas jacens, [186], [275].
• Hill, Ex parte, [340].
• Hinton v. Dibbin, [359].
• Hoare v. Osborne, [276].
• Hobbes, his definition of law, [48];
  • men and arms make the force of the laws, [49];
  • on the law of nature and nations, [59];
  • bellum omnium contra omnes, [65];
  • on the swords of war and justice, [94];
  • on the jus necessitatis, [347];
  • his use of the term property, [386];
  • his definition of an oath, [451];
  • his theory of sovereignty, [467];
  • as to limitations of sovereignty. 469.
• Holmes, on the sources of judicial principles, [176];
  • his definition of an act, [320];
  • his definition of intention, [335], n.
• Hooker, on laws as the voices of right reason, [19];
  • his definition of law, [40], [43];
  • on the law of nature, [43], [46];
  • on the impartiality of the law, [22];
  • his Ecclesiastical Polity, [490].
• House of Lords, absolutely bound by its own decisions, [164];
  • formerly a supreme judicature, [469].
• Hypotheca, [405].
• Ignorantia juris neminem excusat, [368], [476].
• Ihering, on the imperative theory of law, [54];
  • his definition of a right, [182];
  • on possession, [247], n., [264], [264], n., [266], n.;
  • on Savigny’s theory of possession, [259], n.
• Illegality, a ground of invalidity of agreements, [311].
• Immaterial property, [189], [395]–397.
• Immovables, their nature, [390]–392;
  • rights classed as, [392], [393].
• Immunities, distinguished from rights, liberties, and powers, [194], n.
• Imperative theory of law, [47]–54;
  • historical argument against, [49];
  • answer to this argument, [49]–51;
  • defects of imperative theory, [51]–54;
  • no recognition of idea of justice, [51];
  • no recognition of non-imperative rules, [52].
• Imperfect rights, [184], [197]–199;
  • their nature, [197];
  • imperfect nature of rights against the state, [199]–201;
  • may serve as a defence, [199];
  • sufficient to support security, [199];
  • may become perfect, [199].
• Imperial states, [115].
• Imperitia culpae adnumeratur, [353].
• Impossibilium nulla obligatio est, [476].
• Inadvertence, not identical with negligence, [349], [361]–363.
• Incorporeal ownership and property, [221]–224, [387].
• Incorporeal possession, [239], [261]–264.
  • See Possession.
• Incorporeal things, [225];
  • classed as movable or immovable, [392];
  • local situation of, [393].
• Informality, a ground of invalidity in agreements, [310].
• Inheritance, [416]–419;
  • heritable and uninheritable rights, [416];
  • the representatives of a deceased person, [417];
  • the beneficiaries of a deceased person, [417];
  • testamentary and intestate succession, [418];
  • limits of testamentary power, [418].
• Injury. See Wrongs, Liability.
• Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co.’s Margarine, [331], [393], [394].
• Innominate obligations, [435].
• Intention, nature of, [324], [335]–338;
  • distinguished from expectation, [336];
  • extends to means and necessary concomitants of the end desired, [337];
  • immediate and ulterior, [338];
  • distinguished from motive, [338];
  • actual and constructive, [360].
• Inter arma leges silent, [96], [477].
• International law, [56]–64;
  • its influence in maintaining peace, [22];
  • has its source in international agreement, [57];
  • definition of, [57];
  • conventional and customary law of nations, [57];
  • common and particular law of nations, [58];
  • different views as to nature of, [58];
  • viewed as a form of national law, [59], [60];
  • viewed as a form of customary law, [60], [61];
  • viewed as a form of imperative law, [61]–64;
  • distinguished from international morality, [63];
  • private international law, [31], [482].
• Interpretation of contracts, [141], n.
• Interpretation of enacted law, [137]–142;
  • grammatical and logical, [138];
  • litera legis and sententia legis, [138];
  • when logical interpretation allowable, [139];
  • strict and equitable interpretation, [139];
  • extensive and restrictive interpretation, [139].
• Intestacy, ownership of property of intestate, [186], [275].
  • See Inheritance.
• Investitive facts, [300].
• Invito beneficium non datur, [305], [477].
• Italian Civil Code definition of possession, [264], n.
• Jefferys v. Boosey, [100].
• Jewish law, lex talionis, [83];
  • as to the offences of beasts, [273], [373];
  • as to vicarious liability, [374].
• Joint obligations. See Solidary obligations.
• Judicial notice, nature of, [28];
  • test of distinction between common and special law, [28], [32].
• Judicium Dei, [69], [445], [451].
• Juris praecepta, [477].
• Jurisprudence, [1]–8;
  • the science of law in general, [1];
  • civil, the science of civil law, [3];
  • systematic, [3];
  • historical, [3];
  • critical, [3];
  • theoretical, [4]–7;
  • foreign, compared with English, [7], [8].
• Juristic law, produced by professional opinion, [120].
• Jury, questions of fact to be answered by, [17], [176].
• Jus, distinguished from lex, [10], [132], [457];
  • ethical and legal meanings of, [52], [457];
  • different senses of, [460];
  • derivation of, [461];
  • disappearance of term from modern languages, [463].
• Jus ad rem, [206].
• Jus accrescendi, [227], [416].
• Jus civile, [3], n., [39].
• Jus commune, history of the term, [33];
  • different meanings of the term, [33], [34];
  • in Roman law, [33], n.;
  • in the Canon law, [33];
  • adopted by the English from Canon law, [33];
  • in the sense of natural law, [44].
• Jus edicendi, the legislative power of the Roman praetor, [134].
• Jus gentium, [44], [46].
• Jus in re aliena, [212]–216.
  • See Encumbrances.
• Jus in re propria, [212]–216.
  • See Ownership.
• Jus in rem and in personam, significance of the terms, [202]–207;
  • origin of the terms, [207].
  • See Real rights.
• Jus naturale. See Natural law.
• Jus necessitatis. See Necessity.
• Jus positivum. See Positive law.
• Jus possessionis, [241], n.
• Jus possidendi, [241], n.
• Jus praetorium, [38], [134].
• Jus publicum, [311], [482].
• Jus scriptum and jus non scriptum, [44], [129].
• Jus singulare. 33, n.
• Jus strictum, opposed to aequitas, [35].
• Jus tertii, defence of, [269], [408].
• Justice, natural and positive, [43], [44];
  • an essential element in the idea of law, [51].
  • See Administration of justice and Natural law.
• Justinian, on law of nature, [46].
• Kant, on retributive punishment, [82];
  • his Rechtslehre, [491].
• Kettlewell v. Watson, [349], [360].
• King, the source of justice, [37], [294];
  • a corporation sole, [295].
• King’s peace, [70], n.
• King v. Smith, [312].
• Land, nature of, in law, [390]–392;
  • ownership of, [389].
• Lavy v. L.C.C., [165].
• Law, definition of, [9];
  • abstract and concrete senses of the term, [9];
  • relation of, to the administration of justice, [12]–14;
  • law and fact, [15]–18;
  • advantages of fixed rules of law, [19]–22;
  • defects of the law, [23]–27;
  • contrasted with equity, [34]–39;
  • imperative theory of, [48]–54;
  • includes rules governing the secondary functions of courts of justice, [91];
  • sources of (see Sources of the law);
  • origin of the term, [464].
• Law, merchant. See Mercantile Custom.
• Law of nations. See International law.
• Law of nature. See Natural law.
• Lawrence v. Hitch, [150].
• Law reports, mode of citation of, [491].
• Leases, nature of, [216], [397]–400;
  • subject-matter of, [398];
  • may be perpetual, [399].
• Leask v. Scott, [163].
• Legal ownership, distinguished from equitable, [231].
• Legal rights, distinguished from equitable, [217].
• Legislation, its efficiency as an instrument of legal reform, [25];
  • private legislation a source of special law, [30];
  • nature of, [127];
  • various senses of the term, [127], [128];
  • direct and indirect, [128];
  • supreme and subordinate, [129];
  • colonial, [129];
  • executive, [130];
  • judicial, [130];
  • municipal, [130];
  • autonomous, [130];
  • not necessarily the act of the state, [130];
  • late development of the conception of, [132];
  • merits and defects of statute law, [133]–136;
  • codification, [136];
  • interpretation of statute law, [137]–142;
  • subordinate legislation sometimes invalid if unreasonable, [146];
  • legal limitations of the power of the legislature, [471]–473.
• Le Lievre v. Gould, [354], [360].
• Lex, distinguished from jus, [10], [132], [457];
  • different meanings of term, [462];
  • derivation of, [465].
• Lex aeterna, [42].
• Lex posterior derogat priori, [148].
• Lex talionis, [82].
• Liability, civil and criminal, [70], [319];
  • penal and remedial, [88], [321];
  • distinction between penal and criminal liability, [89];
  • distinguished from duty and disability, [194];
  • remedial, theory of, [320];
  • penal, theory of, [321];
  • absolute, [332], [366]–368;
  • vicarious, [374]–377;
  • employer’s, [375];
  • survival of, [376];
  • measure of criminal, [377]
    • (see Punishment);
  • measure of civil, [382].
• Libel, on dead person, [276].
• Liberties, classed as rights in a wide sense, [190];
  • distinguished from rights in strict sense, [190];
  • distinguished from powers, [193].
• Licence, revocation, of, [193], n.
• Lien, distinguished from mortgage, [402];
  • classes of, [406].
• Lightly v. Clouston, [434].
• Lilley, on expiation as the purpose of punishment, [83].
• Limitation of actions, at common law, [149], n.;
  • by the Statute of Westminster, [49], n.
  • See Prescription.
• Limited liability, of shareholders, [292].
• Littleton on customary law, [152], n.
• Locke, on the necessity of fixed principles of law, [21];
  • his classification of laws, [48], n.;
  • on the state of nature, [68];
  • his use of the term property, [386].
• London and Midland Bank v. Mitchell, [199].
• London Street Tramways Co. v. L.C.C., [165].
• Lorimer, his Institutes of Law, [2].
• Low v. Routledge, [100].
• Macarthy v. Young, [355].
• Magna Carta, the prohibition of extrajudicial force, [96], n.
• Maine, Sir H. S., his influence on English jurisprudence, [492].
• Maitland, on corporations sole, [282], n.;
  • on the nature of corporations, [285], n.
• Malice, meanings of the term, [340];
  • when a ground of liability, [342]–346, [478].
• Marais, Ex parte, [96].
• Marvin v. Wallace, [254], [258].
• Maxims, legal, their nature and uses, [474];
  • list of, [474]–480.
• Mediate possession, [252]–256.
• Mens rea, a condition of penal liability, [322], [332];
  • its two forms, intention and negligence, [322], [332];
  • exceptions to requirement of, [332], [366].
• Mercantile custom, a source of special law, [29];
  • judicial notice of, when once proved, [29];
  • possesses no abrogative power, [124];
  • need not be immemorial, [150], n.
• Mercer, Ex parte, [360].
• Merger, nature of, [279].
• Merkel, on negligence, [250], n., [252], n.
• Merry v. Green, [244], [248].
• Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Jackson, [357].
• Middleton v. Pollock, [304].
• Midland Ry. Co. v. Wright, [392].
• Mills v. Jennings, [165].
• Mistake, effect of, on agreements, [312].
• Mistake of fact, a defence in criminal law, [370];
  • no defence in civil law, [370];
  • origin of the rule, [370];
  • distinguished from accident, [371].
• Mistake of law, no defence, [368];
  • reasons for the rule, [368].
• Modus et conventio vincunt legem, [31], [124], [307], [311], [477].
• Mogul, SS. v. McGregor, [341].
• Monti v. Barnes, [391], [392].
• Moral law, [43], [48], n.
  • See Natural law.
• Morris v. Robinson, [427].
• Mortgage, distinguished from liens, [402];
  • not necessarily a transfer of the property, [402];
  • involves equity of redemption, [403];
  • what may be mortgaged, [404];
  • complexity of, as compared with liens, [405].
• Moses v. Macferlan, [433].
• Motives, nature of, [338];
  • distinguished from intention, [338];
  • concurrent, [339];
  • relevance of, in law, [341].
• Moult v. Halliday, [29].
• Muller and Co’s Margarine v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [331], [393], [394].
• Musgrove v. Toy, [192].
• Nasciturus pro jam nato habetur, [277].
• Nation, its relation to the state, [103].
• Nationality, its relation to citizenship, [103].
• Natural law, the subject-matter of natural jurisprudence, [1], [7];
  • opposed to positive law, [3]. n., [44];
  • in the sense of physical law, [41];
  • in the sense of moral law, [43]–47;
  • synonyms of, [44];
  • various definitions of, [45], [46];
  • relation of, to jus gentium, [46], [47];
  • relation of, to international law, [59].
• Natural rights, [182];
  • denial of, by Bentham and others, [182].
• Nature, state of, transition from, to civil state, [68].
• Necessitas non habet legem, [347], [478].
• Necessity, a ground of justification, [347];
  • limited recognition of, by English law, [348].
• Negligence, subjective and objective uses of the term, [349];
  • opposed to intention, [349], [351];
  • not necessarily inadvertent, [349], [362];
  • consists essentially in indifference, [350];
  • defined, [350];
  • Merkel’s definition of, [350], n.;
  • a sufficient ground of liability, [351];
  • simple and wilful, [351];
  • want of skill is negligence, [353];
  • culpable only when carefulness is a legal duty, [354];
  • the standard of care, [355]–358;
  • in law and in fact, [357];
  • no degrees of negligence in English law, [358];
  • equivalence of gross negligence and intention, [359];
  • negligence and constructive intent, [360];
  • negligence distinguished from inadvertence, [362];
  • objective theory of negligence, [363].
• Negotiable instruments, [29], [415].
• Nemo plus juris, &c., [414], [478].
• Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, [449], [478].
• Newby v. Van Oppen, [294].
• Nomos, different uses of the term, [464].
• Non dat qui non habet, [415], [478].
• Northey Stone Co. v. Gidney, [331].
• Noxal actions, [373].
• Oath, form of judicial, [13];
  • nature of 451;
  • utility of, [451].
• Object of a right, its nature, [185];
  • different uses of the term, [185];
  • an essential element in every right, [187];
  • classes of objects, [187]–190;
  • sometimes identified with the right by metonymy, [222]–224.
• Obligatio, significance of the term in Roman law, [207], [422].
• Obligations, law of, [422], [484];
  • obligations defined, [422];
  • solidary, [424]
    • (see Solidary obligations);
  • contractual, [427]
    • (see Agreements);
  • delictal, [428];
  • quasi-contractual, [432]
    • (see Quasi-contract);
  • innominate, [435].
• Occupatio, [407].
• Omission, meaning of the term, [323].
• Opinio necessitatis, one of the requisites of a valid custom, [147].
• Ordeal, theory of, [450].
• Osborne v. Rowlett, [173].
• Ownership, no rights without owners, [186];
  • rights owned by incertae personae, [186];
  • defined, [220];
  • contrasted with possession, [220], [264]–267;
  • contrasted with encumbrances, [221];
  • kinds of, [221];
  • corporeal and incorporeal, [221];
  • corporeal ownership a figure of speech, [222];
  • the right of ownership and the ownership of rights, [224];
  • defined by Sir F. Pollock, [224]. n.;
  • co-ownership, [226];
  • trust and beneficial ownership, [227];
  • direct ownership, [228], n.;
  • legal and equitable, [231];
  • vested and contingent, [232].
• Ownership of material things, [221], [387]–390.
• Ownership of immaterial things, [395]–397.
• Pandektenrecht, nature of, [7].
• Parker v. Alder, [374].
• Parliament, Imperial, its supreme authority, [129], [472].
• Parsons, In re, [163].
• Patent rights, [189], [396].
• Penal actions, nature of, [86];
  • pertain to civil justice, [86].
• Penal proceedings, distinguished from remedial, [88].
• Penal redress, [87], [88];
  • not justified except as punishment of defendant, [366];
  • merits and defects of the system, [383].
  • See Liability.
• Penalty. See Punishment.
• Perry v. Clissold, [408].
• Personal property, distinguished from real, [394];
  • origin of the distinction, [394].
• Personal rights, ambiguity of the term, [208], n.;
  • as opposed to real rights—See Real rights;
  • as opposed to proprietary rights—See Proprietary rights.
• Persons, the subjects of rights and duties, [185];
  • rights of unborn, [186], [277];
  • the objects of rights, [189];
  • not capable of being owned, [190];
  • nature of, [272];
  • natural and legal, [273];
  • animals are not persons, [273];
  • dead men are not persons, [275];
  • double personality, [278], [417];
  • legal persons the product of personification, [279];
  • kinds of legal persons, [280].
  • See Corporations.
• Persons, law of, [211].
• Petitions of right, their nature, [90];
  • a secondary function of courts of law, [90].
• Petitorium opposed to possessorium, [267].
• Phillips v. Homfray, [434].
• Philo Judaeus, on law of nature, [46].
• Physical law, [41].
• Pickard v. Smith, [372].
• Plato, on the offences of animals, [373];
  • on vicarious liability, [374].
• Pledge v. Carr, [165].
• Pluckwell v. Wilson, [358].
• Plures eandem rem possidere non possunt, [256].
• Pollock, Sir F., on the sources of law, [49], n.;
  • his definition of ownership, [224], n.;
  • on acts in the law, [302], n.;
  • his use of the terms contract and agreement, [303], n.
• Pollock and Wright, on possession, [245], [246].
• Positive law, origin of the term, [3], n.;
  • improperly used to signify civil law exclusively, [3], n.
• Possession, distinguished from ownership, [224], [264]–267;
  • difficulty of the conception, [236];
  • consequences of, [236];
  • possession in fact and law, [237];
  • constructive, [237];
  • possession and detention, [237];
  • possession and seisin, [238];
  • corporeal and incorporeal, [239];
  • a matter of fact, not of right, [240];
  • corporeal possession defined, [241];
  • its two elements, animus and corpus, [241];
  • animus possidendi (q.v.), [242];
  • corpus possessionis, [244]–251;
  • possession of land not necessarily that of chattels thereon, [247];
  • mediate and immediate possession, [252]–256;
  • concurrent possession, [256];
  • acquisition of possession, [256]–258;
  • Savigny’s theory of, [258]–261;
  • incorporeal, [261]–264;
  • generic nature of possession, [264];
  • possession and ownership, [264]–267;
  • possessory remedies, [267]–270;
  • possessory titles, [407];
  • possession a title of ownership, [407];
  • delivery of, required for transfer of property, [413];
  • modes of delivery, [257], [258];
  • constructive delivery, [257].
• Possessorium, opposed to petitorium, [267].
• Possessory ownership, [407].
• Possessory remedies, nature of, [267];
  • origin of, [267];
  • reasons for, [268];
  • rejection of, by English law, [269].
• Pothier, his definition of a contract, [303], n.;
  • his works, [492].
• Power, political, [110];
  • legislative, judicial, and executive, [110];
  • sovereign and subordinate, [111].
  • See Sovereignty.
• Powers, classed as rights in wide sense, [192];
  • distinguished from rights in strict sense, [192];
  • distinguished from liberties, [193].
• Practical law, [56].
• Precedents, reasons for their operation as a source of law, [121], [170];
  • possess no abrogative power, [123], [168];
  • their relation to codified law, [136];
  • not originally regarded as a source of law, [143];
  • their importance in English law, [159];
  • declaratory and original, [160];
  • declaratory theory of, [161];
  • their operation in Chancery, [162];
  • authoritative and persuasive, [163];
  • classes of persuasive precedents, [163];
  • absolute and conditional authority of precedents, [164];
  • disregard of, when justified, [165];
  • effect of lapse of time on, [167];
  • distinction between overruling and refusing to follow, [168];
  • retrospective operation of the overruling of, [166], [169];
  • transform questions of fact into questions of law, [171];
  • rationes decidendi, [173];
  • the sources of judicial principles, [174];
  • respective functions of judges and juries with reference to, [176].
• Prescription, its relation to immemorial custom, [124], [157];
  • periods of, in Roman law, [151];
  • in Canon law, [151];
  • in English law, [152];
  • in Continental law, [152];
  • operation of, in case of mediate possession, [254], [255];
  • origin of term, [408], n.;
  • nature of, [408];
  • positive and negative, [408];
  • rational basis of, [410];
  • what rights subject to, [411];
  • perfect and imperfect, [412].
• Presumptio juris, [445], n.
• Presumptions, conclusive, [445];
  • rebuttable, [446].
• Primary rights, opposed to sanctioning, [84].
• Principal rights, distinguished from accessory, [216].
• Principle, contrasted with authority, [173].
• Private war, its gradual exclusion by public justice, [69], [70].
• Privy Council decisions of, not authoritative in England, [163].
• Probative force, [440].
  • See Evidence.
• Procedure, distinguished from substantive law, [437];
  • occasional equivalence of procedural and substantive rules, [439].
• Proceedings, civil and criminal, [70]–75;
  • specific and sanctional enforcement of rights, [84];
  • forms of sanctional enforcement, [85]–87;
  • a table of legal proceedings, [88];
  • penal and remedial, [88];
  • secondary functions of courts of law, [89]–91;
  • petitions of right, [90];
  • declarations of right, [90];
  • judicial administration of property, [91];
  • secondary functions included in civil justice, [91].
• Professional opinion, as a source of law, [120], [121].
• Proof, nature of, [441];
  • conclusive and presumptive, [445]–447;
  • modes of, in early law, [450].
• Property, material, [387]–390;
  • immaterial, [395]–397;
  • corporeal and incorporeal, [221]–224, [386];
  • different meanings of the term, [385]–387, [491];
  • movable and immovable, [390]–393;
  • real and personal, [394].
• Proprietary rights, distinguished from personal, [207]–212;
  • constitute a person’s property or estate, [208];
  • may be either real or personal, [208];
  • subject-matter of the law of things, [211];
  • not necessarily transferable, [210].
• Protectorates, [113].
• Puchta, his theory of customary law, [154];
  • his Institutionen, [492].
• Pufendorf, his treatise on Natural Law, [2], [492];
  • his relation to modern English jurisprudence, [8];
  • his definition of law, [47].
• Pugh v. Golden Valley Ry. Co., [167].
• Punishment, purposes of, [75]–84;
  • deterrent, [75];
  • preventive, [75];
  • reformative, [76]–80;
  • retributive, [80]–84;
  • expiative, [83];
  • measure of, [377]–382.
• Quasi-contracts, [432]–435;
  • their nature, [432];
  • instances of, [433], [434];
  • reasons for recognition of, [434].
• Quasi possessio, [239].
• Questions of fact, distinguished from questions of law, [15]–18;
  • examples of, [15];
  • mixed questions of law and fact, [16];
  • answered by jury, [17];
  • but sometimes by the judge, [17], [177];
  • transformation of, into questions of law by judicial decision, [18], n., [171]–173;
  • sometimes treated fictitiously as questions of law, [178].
• Questions of law, distinguished from questions of fact, [15]–18;
  • examples of, [15];
  • wrongly regarded as including all questions answered by judges instead of juries, [18], n.
• Qui prior est tempore potior est jure, [218], [269], [479].
• Quod fieri non debet factum valet, [169], [479].
• R. v. Armstrong, [330].
• R. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Ry. Co., [288].
• R. v. Brown, [345].
• R. v. Collins, [345].
• R. v. Coombes, [330].
• R. v. Dudley, [348].
• R. v. Edwards, [167].
• R. v. Ellis, [331].
• R. v. Great North of England Ry. Co., [288].
• R. v. Harvey, [360].
• R. v. Joliffe, [150].
• R. v. Keyn, [57], [330].
• R. v. Labouchere, [276].
• R. v. Moore, [248].
• R. v. Mucklow, [243], [249].
• R. v. Price, [276].
• R. v. Prince, [367], [370].
• R. v. Raynes, [276].
• R. v. Ring, [345].
• R. v. Roberts, [345].
• R. v. Senior, [277].
• R. v. Stewart, [276].
• R. v. Tolson, [367].
• R. v. West, [277].
• Raffles v. Wichelhaus, [312].
• Rationes decidendi, their nature, [173];
  • their sources, [174].
• Real property, distinguished from personal, [394];
  • personal, [394];
  • origin of the distinction, [394].
• Real rights, [202]–207;
  • distinguished from personal, [202]–207;
  • always negative, [203];
  • distinction between real and personal rights not strictly exhaustive, [205];
  • significance of the terms real and personal, [205];
  • origin of terms in rem and in personam, [207];
  • significance of term jus ad rem, [206].
• Recht, different meanings of the term, [459];
  • derivation of, [459];
  • subjective and objective, [460].
• Redress. See Penal Redress.
• Reformation, one of the ends of punishment, [76]–80.
• Release, [308], [309].
• Remedial proceedings distinguished from penal, [88].
• Remedies, legal. See Proceedings.
• Remoteness of damage, [476].
• Reputation, the object of a right 188;
  • of the dead, [276].
• Res, meaning of the term in Roman law, [211];
  • corporalis and incorporalis, [225], [226].
• Res judicata pro veritate accipitur, [121], [171], [446], [479].
• Respondeat superior, [375], [479].
• Responsibility. See Liability.
• Retribution, one of the purposes of punishment, [80];
  • Kant’s opinion as to, [82].
• Revenge, its transformation into criminal justice, [81], [83].
• Reynolds v. Ashby, [392].
• Richer v. Voyer, [257].
• Ridsdale v. Clifton, [167].
• Rights, enforcement of, the object of civil justice, [70], [84];
  • primary and sanctioning, [84];
  • specific and sanctional enforcement of, [85]–87;
  • defined, [181]–185;
  • of animals, [181], n.;
  • natural and legal, [182];
  • denial of natural rights by Bentham, [182];
  • correlation of rights and duties, [184];
  • alleged distinction between relative and absolute duties, [184];
  • elements of legal rights, [185];
  • the subjects of, [186];
  • the contents of, [185];
  • the objects of, [187];
  • the titles of, [185], [299];
  • rights over one’s own person, [187];
  • right of reputation, [188];
  • rights in respect of domestic relations, [188];
  • rights in respect of other rights, [188];
  • rights over immaterial property, [189];
  • wide and narrow use of the term right, [190];
  • rights in wide sense defined, [190];
  • rights distinguished from liberties, powers, and immunities, [190]–194;
  • perfect and imperfect rights, [184], [197]–199;
  • rights against the state, [199];
  • positive and negative rights, [201];
  • real and personal, [202]–207;
  • in rem and in personam, [202]–207;
  • ad rem, [206];
  • proprietary and personal, [207]–212;
  • rights of ownership and encumbrances, [212]–216;
  • dominant and servient, [212];
  • principal and accessory, [216];
  • legal and equitable, [217];
  • local situation of, [393];
  • in re propria and in re aliena, [212].
• Rigidity of the law, [23].
• Rigor juris, opposed to aequitas, [35].
• Roman law, jus civile, [3], n.;
  • jus commune, [33], n.;
  • jus singulare, [33], n.;
  • aequitas and strictum jus, [36];
  • jus praetorium, [38];
  • actio furti, [86], n.;
  • professional opinion as a source of, [121];
  • jus scriptum and non scriptum, [129];
  • relation between custom and enacted law, [147];
  • dominium, [207];
  • obligatio, [207], [422];
  • actio in rem, [207];
  • res corporales and incorporates, [226], n.;
  • traditio brevi manu, [257];
  • constitutum possessorium, [257];
  • malicious exercise of rights, [342], n.;
  • noxal actions, [373];
  • emphyteusis, [400], n.;
  • traditio as a title to property, [413];
  • culpa and dolus, [359].
• Rylands v. Fletcher, [372].
• Sadler v. Great Western Ry. Co., [427].
• Saga of Burnt Njal, [70].
• Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [282].
• Sanctional enforcement of rights, [84]–87.
• Sanctioning rights, [84], [85].
• Sanctions, nature and kinds of, [11].
• Savigny, his system of modern Roman law, [8];
  • on the relation between enacted and customary law, [148];
  • his theory of customary law, [154];
  • his theory of possession, [258]–261.
• Scaramanga v. Stamp, [163].
• Scientific law, [41].
• Scottish law, on the relation between enacted and customary law, [148], n.
• Securities, [402]–406;
  • nature of, [216], [402];
  • mortgages and liens, [403].
  • See Mortgage.
• Seisin, its nature and importance in early law, [238].
• Semi-sovereign states, [113].
• Sententia legis, contrasted with litera legis, [138].
  • See Interpretation.
• Servient rights, [212].
  • See Encumbrances.
• Servitudes, nature of, [216], [400];
  • distinguished from leases, [400];
  • public and private, [401];
  • appurtenant and in gross, [401];
  • easements, [402], n.
• Shares in companies, nature of, [286], n.
• Sharp v. Jackson, [304].
• Sheddon v. Goodrich, [167].
• Sheil, Ex parte, [199].
• Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, [214], [479].
• Simpson v. Wells, [150].
• Sloman v. Government of New Zealand, [296].
• Smelting Co. of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [394].
• Smith v. Baker, [434].
• Smith v. Hughes, [313].
• Smith v. Keal, [167].
• Solidary obligations, [424]–427;
  • their nature, [424];
  • their kinds, [425]–427.
• Solon, on making men just, [81], n.
• Sources of the law, formal and material, [117];
  • legal and historical, [117]–120;
  • list of legal sources, [120];
  • grounds of the authority of these sources, [120]–123;
  • constitutive and abrogative operation of, [123], [124];
  • sources of law and sources of rights, [124];
  • ultimate legal principles without legal sources, [125];
  • literary sources of the law, [120], n.
• South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [249].
• Sovereignty, nature of, [111], [467]–473;
  • essential in a state, [467];
  • divisibility of, [468], [469];
  • limitations of, [469]–473.
• Space, ownership of, [390], [395], n.
• Special law, contrasted with common law, [28];
  • kinds of, [29]–32;
  • local customs, [29];
  • mercantile customs, [29];
  • private legislation, [30];
  • foreign law, [30];
  • conventional law, [31].
• Specific enforcement of rights, [85];
  • the general rule, [320];
  • not always possible, [321];
  • not always expedient, [321].
• Spencer, H., on the essential functions of the state, [94], n.;
  • on the gradual differentiation of these functions, [98], n.;
  • on natural rights, [182].
• Spinoza, on the rule of reason and of force, [11].
• Starey v. Graham, [192].
• State, its will the sole source of law, [49], [117], [155];
  • its nature, [93]–98;
  • defined, [99];
  • its essential functions, war and the administration of justice, [93]–98;
  • generic identity of these two functions, [94];
  • their specific difference, [95];
  • secondary differences, [96]–98;
  • secondary functions of the state, [98];
  • its territory, [99];
  • non-territorial states, [99];
  • membership of the state, [99];
  • citizens and aliens, [100];
  • personal and territorial idea of the state, [102];
  • its constitution, [105]–110;
  • its government, [110];
  • independent and dependent states, [111]–114;
  • different meanings of the term state, [113], n.;
  • fully sovereign and semi-sovereign states, [113];
  • unitary and composite states, [114];
  • imperial and federal states, [115];
  • rights against the state, [199];
  • legal personality of the state, [294]–298.
• Status distinguished from estate, [208]–212;
  • different uses of the term, [210];
  • subject-matter of the law of persons, [211];
  • the law of, [484].
• Statute law, the typical form of law in modern times, [132];
  • compared with case-law, their relative merits and defects, [133]–136;
  • interpretation of, [137]–142.
  • See Interpretation.
• Statutes referred to: Interpretation Act, [30];
  • Judicature Act, [34], [217], [231];
  • Statute of Marlborough, [70];
  • Westminster I., [149];
  • Prescription Act, [158];
  • Magna Carta, [96];
  • Sale of Goods Act, [258];
  • Lord Campbell’s Act, [277];
  • Statute of Uses, [413];
  • Factors Act, [416];
  • Statute of Frauds, [447];
  • Parliament Act, [469].
• Stephen, Sir J. F., his definition of criminal attempts, [344].
• Suarez, his distinction between lex positiva and lex naturalis, [3], n.;
  • on opinio necessitatis in customary law, [147], n.;
  • on time immemorial, [152];
  • his treatise De Legibus, [493].
• Subject of a right, different uses of the term, [185];
  • no rights without subjects, [186].
• Subjects. See Citizenship.
• Substantive law, distinguished from procedure, [437].
• Subtilty of law and lawyers, [26].
• Succession, [416].
  • See Inheritance.
• Summum jus opposed to aequitas, [35].
• Summum jus summa injuria, [24], [36], [479].
• Suretyship, [402], n.
• Suzerainty, [113].
• Sydney v. The Commonwealth, [298].
• Taylor, Jeremy, on the uncertainty of natural justice, [21];
  • on men and wolves, [65].
• Taylor, Ex parte, [340].
• Territory, of a state, [99].
• Terry, analysis of rights, [194], n.
• Text-books, authority of, [164], n.
• Tharsis Sulphur Co. v. Loftus, [355].
• Themis, meanings and derivation of the term, [462].
• Things, different senses of the term, [225];
  • material and immaterial, [225], [387];
  • corporeal and incorporeal, [225], [387];
  • law of, [211];
  • in action and in possession, [423].
• Things, law of, [211].
• Thomasius, on the law of nature, [46];
  • his distinction between jurisprudence and ethics, [494].
• Thompson v. London County Council, [427].
• Tillett v. Ward, [357].
• Time immemorial, a requisite of particular customs, [148]–152;
  • rule derived from canon, through civil law, [149], [150];
  • original meaning of rule, [149];
  • how affected by Statute of Westminster, [149];
  • reason for requirement of immemorial antiquity in custom, [150].
• Titles, their nature, [185], [299];
  • original and derivative, [299], [301];
  • origin of term, [300], n.
• Torts, their nature, [428]–432;
  • waiver of, [434].
• Trade-marks, a form of immaterial property, [397].
• Traditio brevi manu, [257].
• Transfer of rights, [299], [300], [301], [414].
• Trial by battle. See Battle.
• Trusts, a kind of encumbrance, [216];
  • their nature, [227]–231;
  • their purposes, [228], [291];
  • distinguished from contracts, [229];
  • distinguished from agency, [230];
  • how created and destroyed, [230];
  • distinguished from the relation between legal and equitable ownership, [232];
  • not recognised at common law, [232];
  • for animals, [274];
  • for maintenance of tombs, [276].
• Turquand, Ex parte, [29].
• Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus, [479].
• Ubi jus ibi remedium, [198], [480].
• Ultimate rules of law, without legal sources, [125].
• Unitary states, [114].
• United States v. Davis, [330].
• Universitas, use of the term in Roman law, [283], n.
• Unus homo plures personas sustinet, [278].
• Vaughan, In re, [276].
• Vera, Cruz, The, [165].
• Vested ownership, [232]–235.
• Vestitive facts, [299]–301.
• Vigilantibus non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, [411], [480].
• Volenti non fit injuria, [480].
• Waiver of torts, [434].
• Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., [277].
• Wallis, In re, [167].
• Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telegraph Co., [391].
• War, an essential function of the state, [93]–98;
  • compared with the administration of justice, [93]–98;
  • not governed by law, [96];
  • private, [70], n.
• Ward v. National Bank, [426].
• West Rand Co. v. Rex, [57].
• Williams v. Howarth, [296].
• Williams v. Williams, [275], [276].
• Wilson v. Brett, [359].
• Windscheid, on the relation between enacted and customary law, [148];
  • his theory of customary law, [155];
  • on the nature of rights, [182];
  • on proprietary rights, [208], n.;
  • on ownership, [224], n.;
  • on the possession of rights, [266], n.;
  • his Pandektenrecht, [494].
• Winter v. Winter, [257].
• Witnesses, exclusion of, in early law, [27], [448]
• Wood v. Leadbitter, [193].
• Woolsey, on retribution as the essential end of punishment, [82], n.
• Written and unwritten law, [128].
• Wrongs, civil and criminal, [71];
  • private and public, [72];
  • these distinctions not equivalent, [73];
  • historical relation between public wrongs and crimes, [74];
  • definition of, [179];
  • moral and legal, [179].
  • See Liability.
• Year books, [494].

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[1]. See on this subject Reid’s Philosophical Works, Essay on the Active Powers, V. 3. (Of systems of natural jurisprudence.) Also Dugald Stewart’s Works, VII. 256 (Hamilton’s ed.).

[2]. The term civil law, though once in common use to indicate the law of the land, has been partly superseded in recent times by the improper substitute, positive law. Jus positivum was a title invented by medieval jurists to denote law made or established (positum) by human authority, as opposed to that jus naturale which was uncreated and immutable. It is from this contrast that the term derives all its point and significance. It is not permissible, therefore, to confine positive law to the law of the land. All is positive which is not natural. International and canon law, for example, are kinds of jus positivum no less than the civil law itself. See Aquinas, Summa, 2. 2. q. 57 (De Jure) art. 2. Utrum jus convenienter dividatur in jus naturale et jus positivum. See also Suarez, De Legibus, I. 3. 13: (Lex) positiva dicta est, quasi addita naturali legi.

The term civil law possesses several other meanings, which are not likely, however, to create any confusion. It often means the law of Rome (corpus juris civilis) as opposed more especially to the canon law (corpus juris canonici), these being the two great systems by which, in the Middle Ages, State and Church were respectively governed. At other times it is used to signify not the whole law of the land, but only the residue of it after deducting some particular portion having a special title of its own. Thus civil is opposed to criminal law, to ecclesiastical law, to military law, and so on.

The term civil law is derived from the jus civile of the Romans. Quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Just. Inst. I. 2. 1.

[3]. It will be understood that this list is not intended as an exhaustive statement of the proper contents of a work of abstract jurisprudence, but merely as illustrative of the kinds of matters with which this branch of legal learning justly concerns itself.

[4]. Austin, p. 1077.