[165]. In re Hallett, 13 Ch. D. at p. 712.
[166]. Osborne v. Rowlett, 13 Ch. D. at p. 785.
[167]. It is clearly somewhat awkward to contrast in this way the terms authority and principle. It is odd to speak of deciding a case on principle because there is no legal principle on which it can be decided. To avoid misapprehension, it may be advisable to point out that decisions as to the meaning of statutes are always general, and therefore establish precedents and make law. For such interpretative decisions are necessarily as general as the statutory provisions interpreted. A question of statutory interpretation is one of fact to begin with, and is decided on principle; therefore it becomes one of law, and is for the future decided on authority.
[168]. Holmes, The Common Law, p. 35.
[169]. On the decision by judges of questions of fact under the guise of questions of law, see Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence, pp. 202, 230, 249.
[170]. This statement, to be strictly correct, must be qualified by a reference to the interests of the lower animals. It is unnecessary, however, to complicate the discussion at this stage by any such consideration. The interests and rights of beasts are moral, not legal.
[171]. Pandekt. I. sect. 37.
[172]. Geist d. r. R. III. p. 339, 4th ed.
[173]. Theory of Legislation, pp. 82–84. See also Works, III. 217.
[174]. Principles of Ethics, II. p. 63.