Bruns, Das Recht des Besitzes, p. 477.
Girard, Droit Romain, p. 244.
[206]. Austin, p. 358. German Civil Code, sect. 90: Sachen im Sinne des Gesetzes sind nur körperliche Gegenstände.
[207]. Vide supra, § 73.
[208]. This use of the term thing (res) and the distinction between res corporalis and res incorporalis are derived from Roman Law. Just. Inst. II. 2:—Quaedam praeterea res corporales sunt, quaedam incorporales. Corporales eae sunt, quae sui natura tangi possunt: veluti fundus, homo, vestis, aurum, argentum, et denique aliae res innumerables. Incorporales autem sunt, quae tangi non possunt. Qualia sunt ea, quae in jure consistunt: sicut hereditas, usufructus, obligationes quoque modo contractae.
[209]. The same explanation is applicable to the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal property. A person’s property consists sometimes of material objects and sometimes of rights. As to the different uses of the term property, see infra, ch. xx.
[210]. He who owns property for his own use and benefit, without the intervention of any trustee, may be termed the direct owner of it, as opposed to a mere trustee on the one hand, and to a beneficial owner or beneficiary on the other. Thus if A. owns land, and makes a declaration of trust in favour of B., the direct ownership of A. is thereby changed into trust-ownership, and a correlative beneficial ownership is acquired by B. If A. then conveys the land to B., the ownership of B. ceases to be merely beneficial, and becomes direct.
[211]. On the nature of trusts see Law Quarterly Review, vol. 28, p. 290 (The Place of Trust in Jurisprudence, by W. G. Hart).
[212]. Vide supra, § 85.
[213]. On investitive and divestitive facts, see chapter xvi., § 120.