[366]. Tillett v. Ward, 10 Q. B. D. 17.
[367]. Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588.
[368]. Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson, 3 A. C. 193.
[369]. These negative rules as to negligence commonly assume the form of rules of evidence to the effect that there is no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. But to withdraw a case from the jury on this ground is clearly equivalent to the establishment of a rule of substantive law that the facts proved do not amount to negligence.
[370]. Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 C. & P. 375.
[371]. As to negligence in law, see Holmes, Common Law, p. 111 sqq.
[372]. See. for example, Smith’s Leading Cases I. 228, 10th ed. (Notes to Coggs v. Bernard.)
[373]. See Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. at p. 661, per Denman, C. J.: “It may well be doubted whether between gross negligence and negligence merely any intelligible distinction exists.” Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. at p. 113, per Rolfe, B.: “I said I could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence, that it was the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet.” Grill v. General Iron Screw Colliery Co., L. R. 1 C. P. at p. 612, per Willes, J.: “No information has been given us as to the meaning to be attached to gross negligence in this case, and I quite agree with the dictum of Lord Cranworth in Wilson v. Brett that gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet, a view held by the Exchequer Chamber in Beal v. South Devon Ry. Co.” Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. and El. at p. 265, per Denman, C. J.: “I thought and I still think it impossible for a judge to take upon himself to say whether negligence is gross or not.” Pollock’s Torts, p. 441, 8th ed. Street’s Foundation of Legal Liability, I. p. 28. See, however, for a full discussion of the matter, and an expression of the contrary opinion, Beven on Negligence, Book I. ch. II.
[374]. D. 50. 16. 226. See also D. 17. 1. 29. pr. D. 47. 4. 1. 2. D. 11. 6. 1. 1.; Lata culpa plane dolo comparabitur.
[375]. R. v. Harvey, 2 B. & C. at p. 264, 26 R. R. at p. 343: “A party must be considered in point of law to intend that which is the necessary or natural consequence of that which he does.” Cf. Freeman v. Pope, 5 Ch. Ap. at p. 540; Ex parte Mercer, 17 Q. B. D. at p. 298.