[475]. Contracts which have no specific name are called by the civilians contractus innomnati.
[476]. A conclusive presumption is sometimes called a presumptio juris et de jure, while a rebuttable presumption is distinguished as a presumptio juris. I am not aware of the origin or ground of this nomenclature. The so-called presumptio facti is not a legal presumption at all, but a mere provisional inference drawn by the court in the exercise of its unfettered judgment from the evidence before it.
[477]. See Bentham, Works, VII. pp. 445–463, and Dumont, Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Book VII. ch. 11: “If all the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would have established for their security?... One could be tempted to believe that those notions had been taken from the laws of honour which regulate private combats.”
[478]. Leviathan, ch. 14. Eng. Works III. p. 129.
[479]. On the history of oaths, see Lea, Superstition and Force, Part I. ch. 2–8; Encyclopædia Britannica, sub voc. Oath; Hirzel, Der Eid (1902). As to their utility, see Bentham’s Works, VI. 308–325.
[480]. Vide supra, § 10.
[481]. Supra, § 5.
[482]. Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, i. 159; Laws of King Edward, pr.
[483]. Ibid. i. 171; Laws of Edward and Guthrum, 6.
[484]. Ibid. i. 181; Oaths, 3.