§ 112. Double Personality.
It often happens that a single human being possesses a double personality. He is one man, but two persons. Unus homo, it is said, plures personas sustinet. In one capacity, or in one right as English lawyers say, he may have legal relations with himself in his other capacity or right. He may contract with himself, or owe money to himself, or transfer property to himself. Every contract, debt, obligation, or assignment requires two persons; but those two persons may be the same human being. This double personality exists chiefly in the case of trusteeship. A trustee is, as we have seen, a person in whom the property of another is nominally vested, to the intent that he may represent that other in the management and protection of it. A trustee, therefore, is for many purposes two persons in the eye of the law. In right of his beneficiary he is one person, and in his own right he is another. In the one capacity he may owe money to himself in the other. In the one capacity he may own an encumbrance over property which belongs to himself in the other. He may be his own creditor, or his own landlord; as where a testator appoints one of his creditors as his executor, or makes one of his tenants the trustee of his land.[[276]] In all such cases, were it not for the recognition of double personality, the obligation or encumbrance would be destroyed by merger, or confusio as the Romans called it, for two persons at least are requisite for the existence of a legal relation. No man can in his own right be under any obligation to himself, or own any encumbrance over his own property. Nulli res sua servit.[[277]]
§ 113. Legal Persons.
A legal person is any subject-matter to which the law attributes a merely legal or fictitious personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the limits of fact—this recognition of persons who are not men—is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination, and the true nature and uses of it will form the subject of our consideration during the remainder of this chapter.
The law, in creating legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing. Such a person has to this extent a real existence, and it is his personality alone that is fictitious. There is, indeed, no theoretical necessity for this, since the law might, if it so pleased, attribute the quality of personality to a purely imaginary being, and yet attain the ends for which this fictitious extension of personality is devised. Personification, however, conduces so greatly to simplicity of thought and speech, that its aid is invariably accepted. The thing personified may be termed the corpus of the legal person so created;[[278]] it is the body into which the law infuses the animus of a fictitious personality.
Although all fictitious or legal personality involves personification, the converse is not true. Personification in itself is a mere metaphor, not a legal fiction. Legal personality is a definite legal conception; personification, as such, is a mere artifice of speech devised for compendious expression. In popular language, and in legal language also, when strictness of speech is not called for, the device of personification is extensively used. We speak of the estate of a deceased person as if it were itself a person. We say that it owes debts, or has debts owing to it, or is insolvent. The law, however, recognises no legal personality in such a case. The rights and liabilities of a dead man devolve upon his heirs, executors, and administrators, not upon any fictitious person known as his estate. Similarly we speak of a piece of land as entitled to a servitude, such as a right of way over another piece. So, also, in the case of common interests and actions, we personify as a single person the group of individuals concerned, even though the law recognises no body corporate. We speak of a firm as a person distinct from the individual partners. We speak of a jury, a bench of judges, a public meeting, the community itself, as being itself a person instead of merely a group or society of persons. But legal personality is not reached until the law recognises, over and above the associated individuals, a fictitious being which in a manner represents them, but is not identical with them.
Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, all fall within a single class, namely corporations or bodies corporate. A corporation is a group or series of persons which by a legal fiction is regarded and treated as itself a person. If, however, we take account of other systems than our own, we find that the conception of legal personality is not so limited in its application, and that there are at least three distinct varieties. They are distinguished by reference to the different kinds of things which the law selects for personification.
1. The first class of legal persons consists of corporations, as already defined, namely those which are constituted by the personification of groups or series of individuals. The individuals who thus form the corpus of the legal person are termed its members. We shall consider this form of fictitious personality more particularly in the sequel.
2. The second class is that in which the corpus, or object selected for personification, is not a group or series of persons, but an institution. The law may, if it pleases, regard a church, or a hospital, or a university, or a library, as a person. That is to say, it may attribute personality not to any group of persons connected with the institution, but to the institution itself. Our own law does not, indeed, so deal with the matter. The person known to the law of England as the University of London is not the institution that goes by that name, but a personified and incorporated aggregate of human beings, namely the chancellor, vice-chancellor, fellows, and graduates. It is well to remember, however, that notwithstanding this tradition and practice of English law, fictitious personality is not limited by any logical necessity, or, indeed, by any obvious requirement of expediency, to the incorporation of bodies of individual persons.
3. The third kind of legal person is that in which the corpus is some fund or estate devoted to special uses—a charitable fund, for example, or a trust estate, or the property of a dead man or of a bankrupt. Here, also, English law prefers the process of incorporation. If it chooses to personify at all, it personifies not the fund or the estate, but the body of persons who administer it. Yet the other way is equally possible, and may be equally expedient. The choice of the corpus into which the law shall breathe the breath of a fictitious personality is a matter of form rather than of substance, of lucid and compendious expression rather than of legal principle.