[304] Captain Havelock says: “From the 28th of March, the loaf of the European soldier was diminished in weight, the Native troops received only half instead of a full seer of ottah (that is a pound of flour) per diem, and the camp-followers, who had hitherto found it difficult to subsist on half a seer, were of necessity reduced to the famine allowance of a quarter of a seer.”
[305] “The Khan, with a good deal of earnestness, enlarged upon the undertaking the British had embarked in—declaring it to be one of vast magnitude and difficult accomplishment—that instead of relying on the Afghan nation, our government had cast them aside and inundated the country with foreign troops—that if it was our end to establish ourselves in Afghanistan, and give Shah Soojah the nominal sovereignty of Caubul and Candahar, we were pursuing an erroneous course—that all the Afghans were discontented with the Shah, and all Mahomedans alarmed and excited at what was passing—that, day by day, men returned discontented, and we might find ourselves awkwardly situated if we did not point out to Shah Soojah his errors, if the fault originated with him, and alter them if they sprung from ourselves—that the chief of Caubul was a man of ability and resource, and though we could easily put him down by Shah Soojah, even in our present mode of procedure, we could never win over the Afghan nation by it.”—[Burnes to Macnaghten: Khelat, March 30, 1839. MS. Records.]
[306] Burnes to Macnaghten: Khelat, April 2, 1839.
[307] The Shah and his Contingent moved from Shikarpoor on the 7th of March.
[308] “His Majesty the Shah is naturally anxious to occupy a prominent position in our movements, and it is very desirable, on political grounds, that he should do so: I trust, therefore, that your Excellency will see fit to attend to his Majesty’s wishes in this particular, and to authorise his being in advance with at least a portion of his own troops, after the junction of the several divisions shall have been effected, or rather after you have made your final arrangements for the order of our advance. This you will observe will be conformable to the wishes of the Governor-General, as expressed in the accompanying extracts. His Lordship never contemplated the leaving behind any portion of the Shah’s force, except in the case of opposition being shown by Sindh and Khelat.”—[Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane: Shikarpoor, Feb. 27, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.]
[309] “I am exceedingly obliged to you for the attention you have paid to my suggestions regarding the Shah’s troops; but your want of camels is so pressing, that I feel it impossible to retain the 1000 camels placed at my disposal. Deeply as I regret, on political grounds, the necessity of leaving behind any portion of the troops of his Majesty, I feel that any scruples on this score must give way to the more urgent exigencies of the public service.”—[Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane: Shikarpoor, March 3, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.]
[310] Mr. Macnaghten to Sir W. Cotton: March 15, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.
[311] Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.
[312] From Bagh, Macnaghten wrote to the Governor-General’s Private Secretary: “This is a wretched country in every respect. It may be said to produce little else but plunderers; but with the knowledge we now have of it, we may bid defiance to the Russian hordes as far as this route is concerned. Any army might be annihilated in an hour by giving it either too much or too little water. The few wells that exist might easily be rendered unavailable, and by just cutting the Sewee bund the whole country might be deluged.”—[Mr. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: Camp Bagh, March 22, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.]
[313] Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.