History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1 (of 3) / Third Edition

by Sir John William Kaye

A season of outward tranquillity succeeded the completion of the treaty of Toorkomanchai. But the great northern power did not slumber. Though, during those years it added little outwardly to its dominions, it was obtaining more and more that great moral ascendancy which, perhaps, was better calculated to secure its ends than an ostentatious extension of territory. The game of quiet intimidation was now to be tried. The experiment succeeded to the utmost. Obtaining such an ascendancy over its counsels as enabled it to induce Persia to transgress its legitimate boundaries, and adopt an aggressive policy towards the countries on its eastern frontier, the European power overawed its Asiatic neighbour. It was the object of Russia to use the resources of the Persian State in furtherance of its own ends, without overtly taking possession of them, and thus bringing itself into collision with other powers. To secure this ascendancy it was necessary to assume a commanding—indeed, an offensive—attitude of superiority, and, whilst abstaining from acts of aggression, sufficiently momentous to awaken the jealousy of other European States, to keep alive the apprehensions of its Eastern neighbour by an irritating, dictatorial demeanour, often implying threats of renewed hostility. Conscious of weakness, Persia yielded to the influence thus sought to be established; and in due course became, as was intended, a facile tool in the hands of the Russian minister.

Such, briefly stated in a few sentences, is the history of the relations subsisting between Russia and Persia since the treaty of Toorkomanchai. It need not be added that, during this time, English influence declined sensibly at the Persian Court. Little pains, indeed, were taken to preserve it, until it became apparent that the encroachments of Persia upon the countries between its frontier and India, instigated as they were by the Russian Government, were calculated to threaten the security of our Indian Empire. In 1831, Abbas Meerza, the Prince Royal, against the advice of the Shah, determined on sending an army into Khorassan; and then projected an expedition against Khiva, for the chastisement of that marauding state, which had so often invaded the Persian frontier, and carried off into slavery so many Persian subjects. The Russian agent encouraged, if he did not actually instigate, these movements. It was said, indeed, that the active co-operation of Russia would soon be apparent in both enterprises—that it was her policy to seek the assistance of Persia in a movement upon Khiva, and to aid that state in the subjugation of Khorassan. Not only in Khorassan itself, in Afghanistan and Toorkistan, but in the bazaars of Bombay,[100] was the advance of the confederate armies of the two states into Khorassan, and thence upon Herat and India, generally discussed and believed. Such, indeed, at this time, was the ascendancy of Muscovite influence over the mind of Abbas Meerza, that it was reported he had married a Russian Princess, and adopted the Christian faith.

There was a British officer in the Persian camp, Captain Shee, whose interference brought about the postponement of the Khivan expedition, and in the following year it was determined to abandon the Oosbeg enterprise for the time, and to punish the offending Afghans. An expedition against Herat was then planned; but British interference, this time directed by the sagacity of Mr. M’Neill, was again successfully put forth, and the movement was suspended. In the mean while the Khorassan campaign was prosecuted with vigour. The arms of Abbas Meerza were triumphant. The independence which the province had endeavoured to assert could not be maintained in the face of the battalions of the Prince Royal, aided, as they were, by European courage and skill.[101] Ameerabad and Koochan fell before him. The recusant chiefs made their submission; and before the close of 1832 all the objects of the campaign had been accomplished, and the subjugation of Khorassan was complete.

Emboldened by success, Abbas Meerza now contemplated new enterprises. The project of an expedition against Khiva, to be subsequently extended to Bokhara, was then revived; and the reduction of Herat, a design favoured alike by the ambition of the Prince and the insidious policy of Russia, was again brought under review. Herat, which lies on the western frontier of Afghanistan, had, on the partition of the Douranee Empire among the Barukzye Sirdars, afforded an asylum to Shah Mahmoud, and had ever since remained in the hands of that Prince and Kamran, his successor. To subjugate this tract of country was to open the gate to further Eastern conquest. The Russian agent was eager, therefore, to promote a movement which squared so well with the designs of his own Government. The expedition against Herat was no longer to be postponed. In 1833 it was actually put into execution; and the command of the invading force was entrusted to Mahomed Meerza, the son of the Prince Royal.

In the autumn of 1833 Abbas Meerza died at Meshed. Arrested in the prosecution of the siege of Herat by the tidings of his father’s death, Mahomed Meerza returned, in no enviable frame of mind, and withdrew within the Persian frontier. There were some doubts, too, at that time, regarding the succession; but these were soon set at rest. The Shah nominated Mahomed Meerza as his heir, and both the British and the Russian Governments gave their cordial assent to the choice.

A few months afterwards, in the autumn of 1834, Futteh Ali Shah died at Ispahan; and Mahomed Meerza ascended the throne. The change was not favourable to British interests. Futteh Ali had ever been our friend. From him the Russians had received little encouragement—but his son and his grandson had thrown themselves into the arms of the Muscovite; and now that the latter had ascended the throne, there was every prospect of Russian influence becoming paramount at the Persian Court. Great Britain had done for the young King all that he required. He believed that those good offices, which mainly had secured for him the succession to the throne, were employed only for the purpose of counteracting the dreaded ascendancy of Russia; and he was in no humour to display his gratitude towards a nation, the character and the resources of which he so little understood.

The thought of breaking down the monarchy of Herat still held possession of the mind of Mahomed Shah. Ever since, in the autumn of 1833, he had been arrested in his first expedition against that place by the death of his father, he had brooded over his disappointment, and meditated a renewal of the hostile undertaking. It is said, indeed, that he swore a solemn oath, sooner or later to retrace his steps to the eastward, and to wipe out his disgrace in Afghan blood. Seated on the throne of his grandfather, and upheld there by British influence, he dreamt of Eastern conquest, openly talked of it in durbar, and delighted to dwell upon his prospective triumphs over Oosbeg and Afghan hosts. He needed little prompting to push his armies across the Eastern frontier. But there were promptings from without as well as from within. Russia was at the elbow of the Shah, ever ready to drop tempting suggestions into the young monarch’s ear, and to keep alive within him the fire both of his ambition and his revenge. It was the policy of Russia at this time to compensate for its own encroachments on the Western frontier of Persia, by helping that country to new acquisitions of territory on the East. Mahomed Shah had little real love for his great Northern neighbour; but he profoundly reverenced the gigantic power of the Czar, and, mistaking quiescence for weakness, aggressiveness for strength, contrasted the resources of Russia and England in a manner very unfavourable to the pretensions of the latter.[102] The enormous wings of the Russian eagle seemed to overshadow the whole land of Iran; and the Shah was eager that they should be stretched over him in protection, and not descend upon him in wrath. He knew, by bitter experience, what was the might of the Northern army; he had fled before the Cossacks on the field of Ganjah, and narrowly escaped with his life. But of the English he knew little more than that some courteous and accomplished gentlemen were drilling his native troops, and doing their best to create for him a well-disciplined army out of the raw materials placed at their disposal.

And so it happened, that in 1835, when Lord Palmerston wrote to Mr. Ellis, who had been sent out from London to assume charge of the Mission on the part of the Crown, that he was “especially to warn the Persian Government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Afghans,” he could obtain no more satisfactory reply from the ambassador than that the Shah had “very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan.” “In common with all his subjects,” added Mr. Ellis, “he conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Candahar is as complete now as in the reign of the Suffarean dynasty.” “This pretension,” it was added, “is much sustained by the success of his father Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan campaign, and the suggestions of General Berowski.”[103] The Persian ministers declared that the rightful dominions of the Shah extended to Ghuzni; that an expedition against Herat would be undertaken in the following spring; that the capture of Candahar would shortly follow; and that then he would launch into new fields of enterprise among the Beloochees and the Toorkomans.

The Heratee campaign, however, was the most cherished, as it was the proximate of all these undertakings; and the Russian minister was ever ready with suggestions for the immediate march of the Persian army, lest the British Government should step in to discourage the undertaking, or take measures to thwart its success. It was urged, too, that the expedition would be rendered more difficult by delay, and at a later period more extensive military resources would be required to prosecute the war with success.

The British minister watched all these proceedings with interest and anxiety. It seemed to him, that whilst the restlessness of Russian intrigue was constantly threatening to educe a state of things in Central Asia, embarrassing to the British-Indian Government, it became the British, on their parts, to make a counter-move that would keep her dangerous ally fairly in check. It had been seen, long before this, that the experiment of drilling the Persian army was nothing better than an expensive failure. It had, to some extent, the effect of excluding other European disciplinarians; but, beyond this, it did not increase our influence in the Persian dominions, or the security of our Indian frontier. It was advisable, therefore, to do something more. Never doubting that the network of Russian intrigue would soon extend itself beyond the Persian frontier, it appeared to the British minister expedient that we should anticipate the designs of Russia in Afghanistan by sending an envoy to Dost Mahomed, and offering to despatch British officers to Caubul to discipline the Ameer’s army.[104] It was obvious that a decided movement was becoming every day more and more necessary. A mere conciliatory course of policy, dictating offers of quiet intervention, was found of no avail in such a conjuncture. The British minister offered to use his influence with Shah Kamran to induce that ruler to abstain from the commission of those acts which had offended the Shah-in-Shah of Persia, but the offer had been coldly received. It was evident that the aggressive designs of Mahomed Shah were largely promoted by the Russian minister, and that no peaceful mediation would induce the young King to abandon his projects of Eastern conquest.