My Dear Mr. Macnaghten,
Just as I was entering this place, I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 23rd, requesting me to state my views on the means of counteraction which should be presented to Dost Mahomed Khan, in the policy that he is pursuing. I should have liked to have conversed with you on this important subject, for it has so many bearings, and involves so many conflicting interests, that it is impossible to do it justice; but I do not delay a moment in meeting your wishes, as far as can be done in a letter.
It is clear that the British Government cannot, with any credit or justice to itself, permit the present state of affairs at Caubul to continue. The counteraction applied must, however, extend beyond Dost Mahomed Khan, and to both Persia and Russia. A demand of explanation from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh would, I conceive, be met by an evasive answer, and gain for us no end; besides, the policy of Russia is now fairly developed, and requires no explanation, for it explains itself, since that government is clearly resolved upon using the influence she possesses in Persia (which is as great there as what the British command in India), to extend her power eastward. It had better, therefore, be assumed at once that such are her plans, and remonstrate accordingly. If we can do but little with Russia, the cause is widely different with Persia. She should at once be warned off Afghanistan, and our continuance of an alliance with her should depend upon her compliance. I believe that a letter from the Governor-General of India, sent to the Shah of Persia at Herat, would gain our end, and this effected, there is nothing to fear from the proceedings of Dost Mahomed Khan, or any other of the Afghan chiefs. If this be left undone, they will succumb to Persia and Russia, and become the instruments for whatever those powers desire. I therefore distinctly state my conviction that the evil lies beyond Afghanistan itself, and must be dealt with accordingly.
If it is the object of government to destroy the power of the present chief of Caubul, it may be effected by the agency of his brother, Sultan Mahomed Khan, or of Soojah-ool-Moolk; but to ensure complete success to the plan, the British Government must appear directly in it; that is, it must not be left to the Sikhs themselves. Let us discuss the merits of these two plans; but first I must speak on the establishment of Sikh power in Afghanistan, to which you refer as a general question.
No one entertains a more exalted opinion than I do of the Maharajah’s head to plan, and ability to achieve; but I look upon the power of the Sikhs beyond the Indus to be dependent on his life alone. It is mere temporising, therefore, to seek to follow up any such plan; and were this of itself not conclusive against it, the fact of its alienating the Afghan people, who are cordially disposed as a nation to join us, would be a sufficiently valid objection for not persevering in it. I conclude always that our object is to make the Afghans our own, and to guide Afghanistan by Afghans, not by foreigners. It is, I assure you, a mere visionary delusion to hope for establishing Sikh ascendancy in Caubul. For argument’s sake, I will admit that the Maharajah may take it; but how is it to be retained? Why, he cannot keep his ground with credit in Peshawur, and the Sikhs themselves are averse to service beyond the Indus. But facts are more illustrative than arguments; the French officers could not with safety leave their homes to an evening dinner whilst we were at Peshawur and our intercourse was confined to breakfasts. I saw this morning two tumbrils of money the followers of dozens of others, on their way to Peshawur to pay the troops, and the Maharajah only wishes a road of honour to retreat from it. If you use him, therefore, as an agent to go further a-head, the first request he will make of the British will be for money, and we shall waste our treasure without gaining our ends, which, as I understand them, are an influence in Caubul, to exclude all intrigues from the West.
Of Sultan Mahomed Khan, the first instrument at command, you will remember that his brother Dost Mahomed, plainly confessed his dread of him if guided by Sikh gold, and with such aid the ruler of Caubul may be readily destroyed; but Sultan Mahomed has not the ability to rule Caubul; he is a very good man, but incapable of acting for himself; and though fit as an instrument in getting rid of a present evil, he would still leave affairs as unsettled as ever when fixed in Caubul, and he is consequently a very questionable agent to be used at all.
As for Soojah-ool-Moolk personally,[363] the British Government have only to send him to Peshawur with an agent, and two of its own regiments as an honorary escort, and an avowal to the Afghans that we have taken up his cause, to ensure his being fixed for ever on his throne. The present time is, perhaps, better than any previous to it, for the Afghans as a nation detest Persia, and Dost Mahomed having gone over to the Court of Teheran, though he believes it to be from dire necessity, converts many a doubting Afghan into a bitter enemy.
The Maharajah’s permission has only, therefore, to be asked for the ex-king’s advance on Peshawur, granting him at the same time some four or five of the regiments which have no Sikhs in their ranks, and Soojah becomes king. He need not remove from Peshawur, but address the Khyburees, Kohistanees of Caubul, and all the Afghans from that city, that he has the co-operation of the British and the Maharajah, and with but a little distribution of ready money—say two or three lakhs of rupees—he will find himself the real King of the Afghans in a couple of months. It is, however, to be remembered always that we must appear directly, for the Afghans are a superstitious people, and believe Soojah to have no fortune (bukht); but our name will invest him with it. You will also have a good argument with the Maharajah in the honour of “Taj Bukhshie;” but still his Highness will be more disposed to use Sultan Mahomed Khan as an instrument than Soojah, for he will, perhaps, have exaggerated notions of Afghan power in prospect; but our security must be given to him, and we must identify ourselves with all the preceedings to make arrangements durable.
I have thus pointed out to you how the chief of Caubul is to be destroyed, and the best means which have occurred to me for effecting it; but I am necessarily ignorant of the Governor-General’s views on what his Lordship considers the best mode of hereafter managing Afghanistan. It has been notified to me in various despatches, that this end may best be gained by using one small state to balance another, to keep all at peace, and thus prevent any great Mahomedan power growing up beyond the Indus, which might cause future inconvenience. It is with every respect that I differ; but these are not my sentiments, and though in theory nothing may appear more just and beneficial, I doubt the possibility of putting the theory into practice, and more than doubt the practice producing the benefit expected from it; for while you were trying to bring it about, another power steps in, paves the way for destroying the chiefships in detail, and the policy along with it. Our fears of a powerful Mahomedan neighbour are quickened by what we read of Ahmed Shah’s wars in India, and the alarms spread even by Shah Zemaun, so late as the days of Lord Wellesley; but our knowledge of these countries has wondrously improved since that time; and though the noble Marquis, in his splendid administration, made the Afghans feel our weight through Persia, and arrested the evil, we should have had none of these present vexations if we had dealt with the Afghans themselves. We then counteracted them through Persia. We now wish to do it through the Sikhs. But as things stand, I maintain it is the best of all policy to make Caubul in itself as strong as we can make it, and not weaken it by divided power; it has already been too long divided. Caubul owed its strength in bygone days to the tribute of Cashmere and Sindh. Both are irrevocably gone; and while we do all we can to keep up the Sikhs as a power east of the Indus during the Maharajah’s life, or afterwards, we should consolidate Afghan power west of the Indus, and have a King and not a collection of chiefs. Divide et impera is a temporising creed at any time; and if the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia, and instead of distant relations, we have everything under our eye, and a steadily progressing influence all along the Indus.
I have before said, that we cannot with justice to our position in India allow things to continue as at present in Caubul; and I have already, in my despatch of the 30th April, suggested a prompt and active counteraction of Dost Mahomed Khan, since we cannot act with him. But it remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahomed. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high opinion of the British nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and Russia to-morrow. It may be said that that opportunity has been given to him, but I would rather discuss this in person with you, for I think there is much to be said for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a choice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. I am not now viewing the question in the light of what is to be said to the rejection of our good offices as far as they went, or to his doing so in the face of a threat held out to him; but these facts show the man has something in him; and if Afghans are proverbially not to be trusted, I see no reason for having greater mistrust of him than of others. My opinion of Asiatics is, that you can only rely upon them when their interests are identified with the line of procedure marked out to them; and this seems now to be a doctrine pretty general in all politics.