[165] The force consisted of five companies of her Majesty’s 44th, under Captain Leighton; six companies of the 5th N.I., under Lieut.-Colonel Oliver; six companies of the 37th N.I., under Captain Kershaw, of the 13th; a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, under Captain Bott; a squadron of Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Walker; 100 men of Anderson’s Horse; one Horse Artillery gun, under Sergeant Mulhall; 100 Sappers, under Lieutenant Laing, of the 27th, N.I.
[166] The officers who so distinguished themselves were Captain Macintosh and Lieutenant Laing, who were killed; and Captains Mackenzie, Troup, and Leighton.
[167] The loss upon our side was severe. Four officers fell—namely, Colonel Oliver, Captains Mackintosh and Walker, and Lieutenant Laing. Six others were wounded.
[168] Lady Sale says: “Osman Khan was heard by our Sepoys to order his men not to fire on those who ran, but to spare them. A chief, probably the same, rode round Kershaw three times when he was compelled to run with his men; he waved his sword over his head, but never attempted to kill him; and Captain Trevor says his life was several times in the power of the enemy, but he was also spared.”
[169] No small quantity of military criticism has been lavished upon this unfortunate action of the 23rd of November. Eyre’s criticisms are well known; and their soundness has been acknowledged by almost every subsequent writer. Major Hough, however, says, with reference to Eyre’s assertion that Shelton formed his infantry into squares on the Beh-meru hill, that the Brigadier assured him that he formed no squares at all, but only threw back his flanks en potence. Captain Evans, of the 44th, also assured him that there were no squares. Every other writer, however, makes a similar assertion relative to the squares on the Beh-meru hill. Of the atrocity of the single gun there is only one opinion. With regard to the general plan of operations, Lady Sale says: “The misfortunes of the day are mainly attributable to Shelton’s bad generalship, in taking up so unfavourable a position after his fault in neglecting to surprise the village and occupy, which was the ostensible object of the force going out.” But I have shown that it was not Shelton’s fault that the village was not surprised. A simultaneous attack on the village and on the hill was the course recommended by the Brigadier; but he was overruled in council. He went into action feeling certain that the plan mapped out for him was a wrong one—and the battle was not fought the better for the feeling that he had been thwarted and opposed.
[170] Correspondence of General Elphinstone.—[MS. Records.]—The substance of this letter is given in Eyre’s Journal.
[171] Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.—[MS. Records.]
[172] Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.—[MS. Records.]
[173] Unfinished Report of Sir W. H. Macnaghten to the Supreme Government—found in his writing-desk after his death.—[MS. Records.]
[174] Principally cabbages. It was apprehended by some that the broad leaves might conceal bottles of spirit, wherewith it was designed to intoxicate the garrison previous to an attack on the cantonment; but they proved on examination to be very harmless cabbages after all.