History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 2 (of 3) / Third Edition

by Sir John William Kaye

THE MACADAMISATION OF THE PUNJAB.

[Book IV., chapter 2, page 48.]

“The plot is thickening,” wrote Macnaghten, on the 10th of April, “and I have no hesitation in asserting my belief that we shall find ourselves in a very awkward predicament, unless we adopt measures for macadamising the road through the Punjab.” On the 15th of the same month he wrote: “It may not be the interest of our neighbours to give us offence; but it is their interest to do us injury, and in attempts to effect this, a certain good neighbour has certainly been most active and persevering. We have fresh instances and clear proof of this spirit daily. Nothing would give us a greater name in Central Asia than success in such a cause; but I need not dilate on the ten thousand advantages that would attend a vigorous policy in this direction.”—[MS. Correspondence.] Avitabile’s proceedings at this time were a source of extreme annoyance to Macnaghten. The General was interfering with the Khyburees. The Koochlee-Khail tribe of Afreedis, from whom he demanded revenue, went to Mackeson for protection, and said: “Formerly the Sikhs used to pay us 13,000 rupees a year to get water at Jumrood; and now, on the strength of their alliance with you, they ask us for revenue.”—[Lieutenant Mackeson: April 12, 1840. MS. Correspondence.] The chief of the tribe said to Mackeson: “Why do you stay at Peshawur? You are powerless there, and you prevent us from injuring the Sikhs in return for the injuries they inflict upon us. Come and tarry with us.” Avitabile threatened to carry fire and sword among the Koochlee-Khail people; and Mackeson, to prevent the employment of force, went security for them. Besides this, he laid an embargo on all merchants and travellers, subjects of Shah Soojah, passing through Peshawur, and declared that not one of them should proceed until the Shah had given ample security against the commission of robberies in the pass.—[Lieutenant Mackeson to Mr. Maddock: April 26. MS. Correspondence.] These things greatly embarrassed our position, at a time when we especially desired to tranquillise the Khyburees. Macnaghten wrote urgently to government on the subject: “By this day’s dawk I am sending to the Supreme Government,” he wrote, in a private letter, on the 23rd of April, “a budget containing the proceedings of General Avitabile. These are calculated to do infinite mischief—so much so, indeed, that unless redress is afforded, I do not see how it is possible that a rupture with the Sikh Government can be avoided; it’s a necessary consequence of such proceedings; all our ties must be renewed in the pass, and commerce by this route may be extinguished. Can the Volpe be acting without instructions? Why should he seek to exasperate us? But our convoy has got safely through, and we are on the best possible terms with the Khyburees, who detest our allies.”

THE MISSION TO KOKUND.

[Book IV., chapter 2, page 70.]

The grounds upon which Macnaghten proceeded in this matter, as well as the recognised objects of the Mission, may be gathered from the following passages of a letter to the Supreme Government: “Referring, therefore, to the general permission accorded in the Secretary’s letter of the 11th of May last, on the point of Captain Conolly’s mission to Kokund, I have come to the determination of at once sending off that officer to the Court in question by the route of Khiva, and in company with Yakoob Bai, the Khan Huzzrut’s envoy here, who is anxious to return home. Yakoob Bai will be a good escort for Captain Conolly through the whole of the desert country extending from the Hindoo-Koosh to Khiva, and thence, as shown by the memorandum of the envoy’s conversation with me on the 13th of June last, his way will be safe and easy on to Kokund, the ruler of which place can be directly advised of his approach. His Lordship in Council has himself been pleased to express his sense of Captain Conolly’s qualifications for the duty proposed to be entrusted to him, and I venture to hope that this Mission will give great support to our position in Afghanistan, besides being the means of obtaining other important advantages. I have so repeatedly had the honour of laying before the Right Honourable the Governor-General my opinions as to the affairs of Toorkistan, that I need not repeat them. I will do myself the honour of forwarding on another occasion my specific instructions to Captain Conolly for his journey, which will have for its chief object the establishment of a correct impression, at every place which he visits, of British policy and strength, as it bears upon Asia and on Europe, with reference especially to the late interference in Afghanistan—the strengthening of amicable relations with the chief Oosbeg powers, which have shown a friendly disposition towards us, and endeavouring to persuade them to help themselves, and enable us to help them, by doing present justice to their enemies, and forming an agreement with each other to prevent or to redress future injury done by any one party among them to Russia, so as to deprive the latter power of pretexts for interference with their independence. Captain Conolly will either at Khiva or Kokund learn the result of the endeavour committed to the two deputies of Shah Soojah, mentioned in my letter of yesterday, to bring the Ameer of Bokhara to reason. If by this influence, or by other means, the Ameer should promptly exhibit a decided disposition to atone for his past, and to be friends with us and the Afghan King, Captain Conolly can return to Afghanistan viâ Bokhara, otherwise his course must be regulated by circumstances.”—[Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Government: Caubul, August 2, 1842. MS. Correspondence.] I have taken this from a copy in Arthur Conolly’s hand-writing.

SOURCES OF DOURANEE DISCONTENT.

[Book III., chapter 3, page 105.]

“It is curious to observe the manner in which the Douranees have reasoned upon the liberality of his Majesty’s Government, and the gradual modifications which we may suppose their feelings to have undergone, from the evidence of alterations in their tone and conduct. During the first year of his Majesty’s restored government, they exhibited outwardly but little change from the same passive demeanour which had characterised their submission to the Sirdars under the later periods of the Barukzye administration. No sooner, however, had the new order been issued for the remission of the land-tax, than, with resuscitated hopes, they began to remonstrate, to agitate, and ultimately to take up arms, when other means of intimidation failed them. I bring forward, by way of illustration, the example of the tribes in Zemindawer. They had been subjected, during the preceding year, to some severity of treatment by the financial arrangements of Wullee Mahomed Khan; but they had endured the yoke almost without a murmur. Since the arrival of the Wukeel at Candahar they had been, on the contrary, entirely free from interference. Not a government agent of any class had appeared in Zemindawer, nor had a khurwar of grain been realised, yet the tribes of that district, on the first demand of revenue, took up arms to withstand, as they said, oppressive exactions; and whilst a party of horse were encamped upon this side of the Helmund, appointed to support the government officer in his collections, they crossed the river, and attacked them without the semblance of an excuse on the score of provocation or actual rapacity. The unpopularity of the agent deputed to realise the revenues, and the apprehension of a repetition of the exactions of the previous year, may have been instrumental in assembling the tribes in arms as a measure of defence; but surely such motives are insufficient to justify or explain a gratuitous attack before the collections of the present year had commenced; or, if the motives which the Zemindawerees assigned for their offensive hostility be admitted, surely some radical change of character must have taken place, to have emboldened to this act of aggressive rebellion tribes who had submitted passively to the most galling tyranny on the part of the Sirdars, and who had even yielded, since the accession of his Majesty, to the harshness of the collections of the preceding year without betraying any open signs of discontent. It appears to me that, had the land-tax on the Tajul Kulbas been continued, the tribes in Zemindawer, seeing no indication of a change in the policy of the government, and conscious that the power of coercion was stronger at the present than at any previous time, would never have dreamed of assembling in arms to resist the royal authority; and that we must consequently attribute to the exercise of his Majesty’s clemency, and to the impression which had arisen from it, that it was the aim of the government to manage the Douranees through the agency of their hopes rather than of their fears, and that rebellion might thus be attempted with impunity, so sudden and unusual a display of boldness as could induce the tribes to rise in arms and attack a government agent, however, and perhaps deservedly, unpopular.”—[Major Rawlinson’s Douranee Report. MS. Records.]