[249] Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records.
[250] There was no need to cut them down. It was sufficient to cut deep rings through the bark to the heart of the tree; for they seldom survived the operation. There is something in this so repugnant to our civilised and Christian ideas of righteous retribution, that it is only just that I should give in this place the explanation of an act, perpetrated, indeed, upon other occasions, in the words of an officer equally gallant and humane. “All the injury,” said Captain Macgregor, “that we could do to their forts and houses could, with facility, in a short time be repaired by them. From their proximity to the hills, they could always obtain timber in abundance; and where water is plentiful they could rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up; and therefore a greater degree of punishment than this seemed to be necessary, and was completely within our power, if we destroyed their trees—a measure which seems barbarous to a civilised mind; but in no other way can the Afghans be made to feel equally the weight of our power, for they delight in the shade of their trees. They are to be seen under them in groups, during the summer, all day long, talking, reading, weaving, and sleeping. Even women and children seek the shade of their trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to us in any other way. He removes his herds, flocks, and property to the hills on the shortest notice; and flies before our troops to places where he is inaccessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, were deserving of no mercy. The amount of treasure they had plundered (viz., 18,000 or 20,000 rupees) was considerable. They had been very pertinacious in attacking Captain Ferris’s cantonment; and equally so, subsequently, our troops at Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at once to commence the work of destruction, desired that neither fort, house, tree, grain, nor boosa should be spared to them. This assuredly was the best plan for preventing the necessity of harsh measures in future. Working parties from the brigade were accordingly appointed for this purpose.”—[Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records.]
[251] Report of Brigadier Monteith: July 27, 1842. Published Papers.
[252] “It is impossible,” wrote General Pollock, “to guess how this mission may succeed, because, in dealing with Afghans, you deal with treachery and deceit; but appearances are as fair as they can be for the release of the prisoners. Captain Troup says that if it had depended on Mahomed Akbar alone, some of the ladies would have been sent with him; but Mahomed Shah appears to be a bitter enemy of ours—much more so than I had reason to suppose. The man who has come with Captain Troup was selected in opposition to the wish of Mahomed Akbar, who wished to send Dost Mahomed Khan, a brother of Mahomed Shah. Dost Mahomed was objected to by the chiefs as being too bigoted to his own party, whereas Hadjee Buktear Khan was considered neutral. He is a Candahar man—has been at Bombay and others of our settlements, and is better acquainted with the European character than the other.”—[Jellalabad, July 15. MS. Correspondence.]
[253] “Captain Troup,” wrote General Pollock, “is still here. I am glad that, in proposing terms, I insisted on having the guns, for I think there is almost a certainty of an objection being made to that, in which case, of course, I can back out.... On this occasion I have written nothing.”—[Jellalabad, July 18. MS. Correspondence.]
[254] “I have my camp in two lines,” he wrote a few days afterwards to Pollock, “the cavalry facing the river, and rear to the water—the front of our encampment an open stony plain—a good place for a fight. The left of our line rests on a small hill that commands a view all round.”—[MS. Correspondence.]
[255] The Governor-General, however, seems to have considered it not wholly improbable that the contemplated military movement upon Caubul would be suspended by the favourable conclusion of the negotiations with the enemy; and actually authorised Pollock to exercise his discretion in ordering Nott to retire by Quettah, even though the march upon Ghuznee and Caubul had been commenced.—[Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock: July 29, 1842.] Subsequently the Governor-General seemed to awaken to a sense of the extraordinary character of this suggestion, for he wrote to General Pollock to say that he “could hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the diversion of Major-General Nott’s army from the route of Ghuznee and of Caubul, when his intention of marching by that route shall have been once clearly indicated.”—[Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock: August 26, 1842.]
[256] MS. Correspondence.
[257] Nott’s letter was despatched on the 27th of July. It comprised but a few lines:
“Candahar, July 27, 1842.