[297] “The enemy appear to have been unable to traverse their big gun sufficiently to bring it to bear on our new position; and I suspect, also, they must have expended their shot, for the last two rounds which were fired as we were changing ground, and which fell short, were old shells of ours filled with earth.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[298] Colonel Palmer and the other British officers had been carried to Caubul.
[299] The engineer officers fathomed the great well in the citadel, and found fifty-one feet of water in it. The bottom of the well is believed to be below the level of the river, so that it could not be drained. The fear of a failure of water ought not, therefore, to have driven Palmer to surrender. He might easily have secured the possession of the well by running a covered way from it, and protecting it with his guns.
[300] “I visited Roza in the evening, took another copy of the Cufic inscription upon Mahmoud’s tomb, and had a long conversation with the Moollahs of the shrine. They assert that the tomb was constructed in its present state immediately after Mahmoud’s death; that it remained intact during the Ghuzneevide and Ghooride dynasties, but that when Ghenghiz Khan, in his pursuit of Jellaladeen, threatened Ghuznee, the inhabitants heaped the tomb over with earth and ruins to preserve it from desecration, and deserted the place. They further pretend that the tomb thus remained buried until the time of Sultan Abdool Rizak, the grandson or great-grandson of Timour, to whom the spot was revealed in a vision, and who excavated and repaired the place, and dedicated to it rich endowments of lands. The endowments remained, they say, till the time of Nadir, when they were resumed by the government, and since that time the establishment at the tomb has been dependent for support upon a few gardens attached to the village, and the voluntary offerings of devotees. The Moollahs uphold that the gates are really those of Somnauth, and that the inscriptions on the tomb date from the time of the son of Mahmoud; but this I hold to be morally impossible, for although the Cufic may possibly be of the form used in that age (which, however, I doubt), the inscription in the Nuskh character on the reverse of the sarcophagus, which details the precise date of the Sultan’s death, is obviously of a much later age. From many circumstances, I feel positively certain that the tomb does not boast a higher antiquity than that of Sultan Abdool Rizak, who built the present walls of Ghuznee, and who is himself buried in a rude mausoleum on the outskirts of the village of Roza. The gates, therefore, are certainly not those of Somnauth; but it is of course the interest of the Moollahs to keep up the delusion, and to affect for the spot the odour both of sandal and sanctity. I was much struck by the crowds of pilgrims, Mussulman officers in our ranks, who thronged the tomb during my visit there to make the Ziarut.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[301] Major Rawlinson’s account of the removal of the gates is very interesting. “We moved our camp,” he writes, “this morning from the west to the east of Roza, preparatory to fairly setting out on the march to Caubul; and during the day the measure was carried into effect of removing the gates of Mahmoud’s tomb. The work was performed by Europeans, and all possible delicacy was observed in not desecrating the shrine further than was absolutely necessary. The guardians of the tomb, when they perceived our object, retired to one corner of the court and wept bitterly; and when the removal was effected, they again prostrated themselves before the shrine and uttered loud lamentations. Their only remark was: ‘You are lords of the country, and can of course work your will on us; but why this sacrilege? Of what value can these old timbers be to you; while to us they are as the breath of our nostrils?’ The reply was: ‘The gates are the property of India—taken from it by one conqueror, they are restored to it by another. We leave the shrine undesecrated, and merely take our own.’ The sensation is less than might have been expected; and no doubt the Moollahs, who have had the guardianship of the tomb for generations in their family, will be the chief sufferers by the measure. I doubt if the Afghan tribes lately risen from obscurity to power, and holding the country rather as conquerors than citizens, possess that feeling of unity with each other, and identity with the interests they are supposed to protect, to view the abduction of the gates as a material outrage. The act may be made use of by the priesthood to excite fanaticism against us; but if the Barukzye chiefs could only retain their darling plaything, power, they would care little about the gates of Somnauth. With Shah Soojah the case was different. As the representative of the Suddozye family, aiming at the reconsolidation of monarchical power, he could not but view the demand of Runjeet Singh for the gates as a national indignity, powerfully affecting his own personal and political interests. At present, religious excitement is alone to be apprehended from our carrying off these trophies. I call them trophies, although assured that they are spurious, for the belief in their genuineness is, politically considered, the same as if they really were so.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[302] The enemy harassed our camp at night, firing on our picquets, and working us other annoyance. “I doubt the policy,” wrote Rawlinson, “of our firing a few forts and going no further. It exasperates the Afghans without intimidating them. I believe that we should either have abstained altogether from retribution, or have carried fire and sword before us.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[303] “The attack upon the heights and their subsequent abandonment,” says Major Rawlinson, “might have led to unpleasant consequences, had not the news of Akbar’s defeat arrived just in time to prevent Shumshoodeen from availing himself of this advantage. We were all most anxious to have gone straight on to Mydan, and to have attacked Shumshoodeen in his position, throwing the light companies along the heights to the left, which were already in our possession, the whole way down to the Mydan gorge; but the General would not stir beyond the place he had first marked out for his encampment, for fear of harassing the cattle.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[304] MS. Notes.—See also the following from Rawlinson’s Journal: “As it appeared desirable that a direct communication should be established between the camps as soon as possible, I proposed to the General, on arriving at Urghundeh, that I should ride in and see General Pollock. My offer was accepted, and I immediately put on an Afghan dress, and escorted by the Parsewans who had come out to the camp, rode in through the town to the race-course, where I found the Jellalabad force encamped. I experienced no sort of difficulty or inconvenience on the road, being generally taken for an Afghan. I now learnt from General Pollock that there were no fresh orders from Lord Ellenborough regarding the establishment of an Afghan Government; in fact, that he was prohibited from pledging the government to recognise any one, but that still, as Futteh Jung had thrown himself on our protection, and that as it was absolutely necessary something like a government should be established, in order to enable us to obtain supplies (the Jellalabad Commissariat being entirely exhausted) as well as to facilitate our subsequent departure, General Pollock had resolved to give Futteh Jung such indirect assistance as he was able. In this view he had recommended the Kuzzilbash and Douranee chiefs to tender their allegiance to him, and he had so far given him his countenance as to accompany him to the Balla Hissar in the morning, and even, as the Shah elect took his seat on the throne, to fire a royal salute, ostensibly for the remounting of the British colours on the citadel of Caubul, but of course, in the apprehension of the Afghans, as an honorary recognition by us of the new monarch’s accession. I met Macgregor in my way to the camp, coming into the Balla Hissar with all the chiefs to make their salaam to Shah Futteh Jung as he is now called, and I now hear that Macgregor, who conducts all the political duties of General Pollock’s camp, endeavoured, in a private audience which he had of his Majesty after the Durbar, to come to an explanation with him regarding our inability to support him with men, money, or arms, and the necessity, in consequence, of his relying entirely on his own resources. At first sight, it appears to me out of the question that Futteh Jung should be able to hold his own after our departure, and I see no great object even in making the attempt, but I cannot yet form a proper judgment.”—[Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal.]
[305] Shakespear, with characteristic gallantry, had volunteered for this service. The Kuzzilbashes had tendered their services to Pollock.
[306] “September 14.—As we find that the prisoners have certainly been carried off to Bameean, and the Kuzzilbashes are disposed to assist us in their recovery, while General Pollock is not likely to encounter further opposition on his march upon Caubul, it was suggested to the General to-day that he should despatch a brigade from Urghundeh, where the Bameean road strikes off, to form a support for our party, assisted by the Hazarehs, to fall back upon. He would not, however, listen to this proposal, declaring that he had only one object in view, that of marching his force to India viâ Caubul, without turning to the right or left; and that he considered, from the tenor of all Lord Ellenborough’s despatches, the recovery of the prisoners to be a matter of indifference to government.”