Yesterday arrived yours of the 12th instant addressed jointly to Captain Macgregor and myself. I have only, in reply thereto, to say that in my last I informed you definitively that I would, by God’s blessing, hold this place to the 31st instant, by which time you acquainted me that you could arrive at Jellalabad with the dragoons. You now state to me your expectation that they will only reach your present encampment by that date. Our European soldiers are now on two-thirds of their rations of salt meat, and this the commissariat supply; on the 4th proximo that part of the force will then be without meat, notwithstanding every arrangement to lessen the consumption. I have this day directed all the camels to be destroyed, with the view of preserving the boosa for the horses of the cavalry and artillery; and these valuable animals cannot receive any rations of grain whatever after the 1st proximo, but must be subsisted entirely on boosa and grass, if the latter can be procured.
Believe me to be, yours sincerely,
R. Sale.[353]
GHOLAB SINGH AND THE SIKH ARMY.
[Book VII., chapter 3, page 77.]
On the 10th of February Mr. Clerk wrote to the Government Secretary: “There seems to have been no good reason for the delay of Rajah Gholab Singh in crossing the Attock, unless he really feared a collision with the Nujeeb battalions, encamped on the other side. But for the Rajah’s apparent reluctance immediately to undertake to co-operate in the Khybur Pass, there may be better grounds. These may be either an apprehension of his inability to oppose the enemy there; or, as supposed by Captain Lawrence, a want of incentive to exertion—or both these causes may retard his movements. In regard to the former, the presence of the large body of British troops assembling at Peshawur will encourage him. With respect to the latter, I should be glad to be provided with the instructions of government.”—[MS. Records.]
Writing again, on the 13th of February, he says: “In regard to the means of inducing zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops, I do not think that the expectations of Captains Mackeson and Lawrence are quite reasonable, or the almost indefinite extent of proposed reward judicious, or the direct negotiation with the Jummoo Rajahs for their immediate aggrandisement honourable.... It would not be compatible with the friendship long subsisting between the British Government and the Lahore Government, now to assign suddenly and directly to the Jummoo Rajahs any territories as a compensation for services demanded of the Sikh Durbar. This would be precipitating the decline of a power which it may be soon expedient to prop, both against Afghans and Jummooees.”—[MS. Records.] But though Mr. Clerk thought, at this time, that it would not be honourable openly to treat with the Jummoo Rajahs for the transfer of Jellalabad, he was not unwilling to place it permanently in their hands by a stroke of finesse. I confess that I cannot see very distinctly how the course suggested by Mr. Clerk is so much more “honourable,” and “compatible with friendship,” than that suggested by Captains Mackeson and Lawrence.
POLLOCK’S APPEAL TO HIS ARMY.
[Book VII., chapter 4, page 84.]
After alluding to the defence of Jellalabad, and the probability that the Peshawur force would immediately advance to its relief, General Pollock said: “Success in relieving these troops will raise for this force the admiration and gratitude of all India, and the Major-General commanding feels assured that officers and men will cheerfully make any sacrifices to attain so noble an object. He therefore now calls upon the Brigadiers to assemble the commanding officers under their orders, and determine on the least quantity of baggage and the smallest number of camp-followers with which their regiments can advance. The success of this enterprise will greatly depend upon the quantity of baggage taken, as from the nature of the country between Peshawur and Jellalabad, the line most consistent with safety must be as little incumbered as possible. The Major-General commanding trusts that the confidence he feels in the troops will be repaid by their confidence in him. The soldiers may rest assured that his thoughts are constantly engaged in ensuring their provisions and securing their comforts, and they may be convinced they will never be called upon by him to make useless sacrifices, or to undergo unnecessary hardships. Arrangements will be made for placing such baggage as may be left behind in perfect security at Peshawur.”